The power of small states
The Power of Small States
To the memory of

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This is an inquiry into how the governments of small and militarily weak states can resist the strong pressure of great powers even in crisis periods. The continued existence and, indeed, startling increase in the number of small states may seem paradoxical in the age of superpowers and the drastically altered ratio of military strength between them and the rest of the world. It is well known that the ability to use violence does not alone determine the course of world politics. Some of the other determinants can be observed with exceptional clarity in the diplomacy of the small powers which were striving to stay out of World War II. I have chosen to focus my attention on certain small states situated on the periphery of Europe. This is not a history of the foreign policy of these countries during a selected period nor yet another inquiry into neutrality. Nevertheless, the events of the times, as they involved these states, and the objectives of the five states' diplomacy are the materials out of which I have sought to construct some propositions about the power of small states.

My study grew out of an interest in the mounting influence of Turkey, the Cinderella of the eastern Mediterranean. Here was a striking example of a small state which was no helpless pawn in international politics. An outcast after World War I, this poor and militarily weak country grew in power until it was being actively wooed by several great powers in World War II, and it later joined the "Atlantic" states comprising NATO. How could this have happened? The Turks were not alone in the 1939-45 period in having to face a succession of demands from the warring great powers and in wishing to remain out of war. Some of the small states were as successful as Turkey; some were not. Some, like Turkey, were able to resist compliance with great-power demands, or at any rate they could put off with
impunity complying with some of them. Thus my purpose to analyze the power of small powers through a study of Turkey was broadened to include four other states in somewhat similar circumstances. It was simultaneously narrowed down to a specific time period when the diplomacy of several small states having much in common could be compared fruitfully.

The period chosen, World War II, is far enough in the past so that much valuable documentary material and numerous memoirs have already appeared. It is close enough in time for those participating in the major decisions to be questioned about them. Of course there are documents which mislead and reporters who are too subjective to be reliable. Nevertheless, for the purposes of this study it was sufficient to describe the broad outlines of decision-making in particular crises, and the available evidence permitted me to draw these pictures without undue risks of misjudgment. It was not possible to discover, precisely and in detail, the motivations of the individual diplomatists; fortunately, this was not necessary to illustrate the main themes of this analysis.

In any case, for those who care to read, the historical record of this subject is now available. How the leaders behaved and the effects of their behavior can be calculated without delving deeply into their motives; it is sufficient to learn how they estimated the future before embarking upon it. For an analysis of the power of small states it is enough that the data should say: This is how the situation looked to the decision-makers; this is what they did about it; and this is the effect of their action.

Readers primarily interested in straight diplomatic history may care to skip the first and last chapters, which may be too analytical for their tastes. On the other hand, political scientists may be able to draw from the case studies material for a different kind of analysis from that which I have attempted.

In acknowledging my gratitude to the many individuals who aided me in this study, I deeply regret that I cannot name those in the countries involved, both key participants and discriminating observers, who were so useful in clarifying my perspective on their governments' actions. I can only say that without their friendly help the analysis would be wider from the mark of authenticity than it is. Fortunately, I can be more specific, if unavoidably selective, in thanking some of those in the American
academic world who kept me from making more mistakes than I have undoubtedly committed.

First and foremost, for his dedicated attention to every word in the unpublished manuscript, I must mention William T. R. Fox, my husband. The members of the Center of International Studies as well as other members of the faculty at Princeton University have at one time or another assisted me in important ways, but I would like to single out particularly Dr. William W. Kaufmann (now at RAND), and Professors Percy E. Corbett, Dankwart A. Rustow, and Cyril E. Black. A special debt of gratitude is owed to the director of the Center of International Studies, Frederick S. Dunn, whose intellectual and moral encouragement was indispensable to this book. All shortcomings in the work are of course my own responsibility.

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I

Introduction

A prince ought never to make common cause with one more powerful than himself to injure another, unless necessity forces him to it . . . for if he wins you rest in his power, and princes must avoid as much as possible being under the will and pleasure of others . . . One never tries to avoid one difficulty without running into another, but prudence consists in being able to know the nature of the difficulties, and taking the least harmful as good.¹

During World War II it was widely asserted that the day of the small power was over. Not only could such a state have no security under modern conditions of war; it could have no future in the peace that presumably one day would follow. This was a belief shared by respected students of world politics and by advocates of Lebensraum for the thousand-year Reich. Striking evidence that this view was exaggerated is found in the European theater of conflict; Sweden, Spain, Turkey, Switzerland, Eire, and Portugal all avoided being drawn into the war and emerged from it unwounded and, if anything, stronger than before. How could such relatively weak states survive while “total” war swept around them? Other small states were drawn into the war. What was it about these six that enabled them to succeed where the others had failed?

A traditional great-power stereotype of the small state was that of a helpless pawn in world politics. The governments of

¹Machiavelli’s advice to the head of the principality of Florence (The Prince, chap. xxi). (Full bibliographical details of sources cited in footnotes will be found in the Bibliography.)
the great powers frequently regarded the small states simply as objects, to be moved around at will in their own struggle for dominance over other great powers. From the small-power point of view, on the other hand, the great states were perceived as cynical manipulators of power and the small states as virtuous and law-abiding countries.

Of course, neither the great states nor the small ones have generally behaved in accordance with these stereotypes. Most great powers have continued to treat small powers on a basis of legal equality even when it was inconvenient. They have tended to shy away from anything which would be portrayed as an intimidation of a small power. Likewise, small states have frequently made unwelcome demands on great powers, with surprising success if one considers only the relative military potentials of the two sides. Thus in recent times Nasser, Syngman Rhee, Sukarno, and Mossadegh, all leaders of small powers, have defied the will of some of the greatest powers and come off well. But the general belief still exists that the great powers determine the course of world politics and that the small powers can do little but acquiesce in their decisions.

The distinctive power of great states flows from their military strength. However, the ability of a state to secure what it wants through the use of violence is only one mark of political power. There are other means which may under certain circumstances be effective in exercising influence or resisting coercion. Both great and small states can employ economic, ideological, and diplomatic methods as well as military measures. They may buy consent with goods and services, win friends and influence people with psychological maneuvers, bargain for the exchange of advantages, and gain strength through appropriate alliances.

For the small state, diplomacy is the tool of statecraft in whose use it can on occasion hope to excel. The representatives of great powers have more than once been outmatched at the conference table by the diplomats from the small states. But this is often tied in with other means of gaining support. For example, small states may have at their command the capacity to appeal to world opinion, operating from a "rectitude" base,

A more realistic appraisal may be found in George Liska, *International Equilibrium*, pp. 24–33, and Arnold Wolfers, "In Defense of Small Countries."
or their fighting qualities may gain them a reputation for being likely to resist violence with violence.

Success or failure in securing its own demands or in resisting the demands of other states is the test of the power position of any state. In the case of the small powers, it has historically been the latter, the capacity to resist great-power demands, which has been the more important in defining their power status.  

What are the kinds of claims which great powers have made upon small states? In the past, these have often had to do with such things as concessions for the exploitation of natural resources or the control over strategic passageways. Demands of this nature have usually been made upon states falling in the class now known as “underdeveloped states.” Today we are witnessing the reverse process as these states struggle to achieve a political independence commensurate with their conception of sovereignty.

There is another kind of claim, however, which both underdeveloped and industrialized states have had to meet in the past and continue to face today. This demand, or complex of demands, is likely to be made whenever there is a war or threat of war between the great powers. Small states which could add to the military capabilities of either side are bound to be under heavy pressure to yield this aid or to forbid it to the opposing camp.

War among the great powers is only one situation in which small-power diplomacy may be observed to advantage. In a world of peace a small power’s freedom from encroachment by a great power often depends upon the great power’s unwillingness to fritter away its strength, which has to be conserved for inter-

3 Small powers are almost by definition “local” powers whose demands are restricted to their own and immediately adjacent areas, while great powers exert their influence over wide areas. In the terminology of Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan (Power and Society, p. 77) the power of the small state is narrow in “domain,” however much or little may be its “weight.”

great-power competition. The small state may run the gamut from being unheeded to being the arbiter of its own fate in a deadlock struggle between giants. It is in the crises of inter-great-power war that one sees the most active and most intense phase of the relationships between the small powers and the great.

A knowledge of the relations between certain strategically located small European states and the major belligerents during World War II should provide some clues leading to a clearer understanding of the more general question, How can the small state exercise power in international politics? Here one may watch under the microscope the behavior of various small states struggling in the web of great-power diplomacy to preserve their independence and to save their territories from becoming battlegrounds for the great powers. The observations made in this study could later be compared with the experience of other small states in World War II, of small states in earlier periods, and of small states in the era following World War II.

The states chosen for the present study were Turkey, Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain. In all five there was national unity as to the main purpose of wartime diplomacy—non-participation in the hostilities. None of them was surrounded by hated or hostile neighbors; each possessed geographical advantages giving it some chance to remain non-belligerent through self-defense. For reasons to be stated later, two of these states were eventually drawn into the war.

The three northern states were culturally very similar and presented marked political contrasts to both Spain and Turkey, but only one of them, Sweden, succeeded in staying out of the war. Finland and Turkey bordered in part on Russia, their mutually most feared antagonist. Spain and Turkey in many respects mirrored each other's experience, located as they were at the eastern and western ends of the Mediterranean and showing marked leanings at the beginning of the war toward opposing sides in the struggle. Spain, Sweden, and Norway had been successful in maintaining their neutrality in World War I. That period also witnessed the birth of Finland as an independent nation and the rebirth of Turkey as a republic.

5 In the case of Spain, unity existed because of a combination of all-pervasive war fatigue and the coercive power of the victorious dictatorship.

[4]
There were numerous other similarities and contrasts among the selected states which will be considered later, but all five had a common geographical asset. Unlike the Low Countries, for example, none of them lay on the direct path of invasion of the great-power belligerents. The location of each could sustain the hope that the war might not come their way, or might at least shift its course before involving them. That such seemingly disparate countries as Sweden and Turkey had a common interest was recognized by their governments, which kept each other informed during the war.

Switzerland, most famous neutral of all, was excluded from this study, partly because legal and political recognition of Switzerland’s neutrality goes so far back into history and has become so fixed a feature in the thinking of European diplomats that there was a psychological obstacle to invasion possessed by no other neutral. In addition, the physical barrier of the Alps helped to make the Swiss relatively secure in the midst of the conflict. Not only would Switzerland have refused to participate in the war, but its participation would probably have been of much less value to any of the belligerents than that of the other states considered here. Further, the basis of the Swiss Confederation is a union of three nationality groups, making a choice of sides quite impracticable. The combination of these features makes Switzerland unique among European small states, and in fact among small states anywhere. Hence the contribution of the Swiss experience to the understanding of how small states can resist pressure for participation in a great-power conflict would not be very significant.

In certain ways, of course, Switzerland resembles the other European state most renowned for its neutrality policy over a long period: Sweden. Each has, for example, a formidable militia-type army and a highly skilled labor group, together with an industrialized economy. During the war each provided humanitarian and diplomatic services as well as valuable war matériel to both sides. If invaded, the Swiss could have destroyed the tunnels and passes in the Alps so useful to Germany’s communication with its Italian partner, just as the Swedes controlled a similarly useful and destructible facility in their iron mines. When surrounded by German might, both countries made concessions worth far more to Germany than any advantage it
could have gained through an obviously costly use of force.\textsuperscript{6} To the extent that Swiss experience duplicated that of Sweden, investigation of the latter should be sufficient for the purposes of this analysis.

All these states differ in important respects from the countries outside western European civilization which, since World War II, have posed important problems in United States foreign policy. The general perspectives of the leaders and their followers on what is valuable and how it is to be obtained vary greatly between the two worlds. Nevertheless, for many situations of great-power pressure on a small state, the accomplishments of the European neutrals in this study probably represent the limit of success which any small state could hope to reach under similar circumstances.

We may also learn lessons of value to the great powers. Many of the factors that prevented a belligerent, during World War II, from achieving its total objectives with respect to a particular small state are equally present in postwar relations between the great and small powers, whether European or not. By including Spain and Turkey, elements can be weighed which are also characteristic of the non-European world.

Periods of crisis in the wartime experience of the five selected states will be analyzed separately. These were the periods when the small power was being subjected to heavy pressure from one or more belligerents and the actions and reactions of the parties to the conflict resulted in some lowering of the tension. In this way, the power of each of the small states at each particular moment of crisis can be appraised, and then a more generalized picture of the great-power–small-power confrontation can be attempted.\textsuperscript{7}

To facilitate the comparison among the five states here studied


\textsuperscript{7} Although Norway and Finland failed to stay out of the war, in some crises they succeeded in resisting a great-power demand; on the other hand, the “successful” wartime neutrals in certain crises had to yield. Thus the analysis will draw on the total experience of all five.
and to permit generalization based on their combined experience, the chapters dealing with the individual countries have a common pattern of organization. There will be a brief treatment of the distinctive characteristics of the country relevant to the question of power. The analysis of each successive crisis will be made in terms of (1) the political and military relationships between the pertinent states at the moment, (2) the expectations of the participants, (3) the demands upon the small state, (4) the techniques employed by each side, and (5) the resultant effect on the power position of the small state concerned. Following a brief summary of the pertinent events in the crisis, a number of hypotheses about the potentialities of the small state will be outlined. These will be based on the experience of the particular state under examination and will relate to the special circumstances of the crisis. Although the total experience of each of the five states was unique, they will be found to have had many features in common at particular points in their wartime history.

The timing of the events is of great importance to their proper assessment. At the end of the book will be found a chronology of major war events interpolated with the specific experiences of the small states studied. The footnotes are especially important in this study, because they have to bear much of the burden of factual confirmation for statements made in the historical portions of the work. The narrative has had to be so drastically compressed that the bases for many hypotheses cannot be fully described in the text.

While a number of writers have contributed to a knowledge of the diplomatic history during World War II of the five countries chosen for this analysis—as the appended bibliography amply demonstrates—there is no study which gives an account of their diplomacy during this period in such a way as to permit comparison. Previous narratives have usually been ex parte, providing no depth of understanding about what went on except from the point of view of a single participant. The study of the foreign policies of small powers is a relatively unworked field, and gathering together the histories of these five may suggest other themes to be pursued. For each country the crises of great-power-belligerent-small-power-neutral relations have had to be dealt with chronologically. Otherwise the account would have
been deficient in at least two respects. It could not have shown how experience in early crises had a cumulative effect on the diplomacy of later crises, nor could the power of the small states have been portrayed in the light of the changing fortunes of World War II. With the chapters dealing with individual countries organized in parallel form and with each crisis in the wartime diplomacy of each country treated according to a common pattern, comparison of and generalization about the small states become possible.

What is impressive is the variety of circumstances under which the power of a small state, when confronted with an unwelcome great-power demand, turns out to be much greater than any inventory of its internal resources would suggest. The leaders often had some genuine choice of action, and even though this was only in the form of a selection of the lesser of two evils, the choice had an effect on their subsequent experience. Their ability to choose was, however, derived largely from the existence of competition among the great states. The main external source of a small state’s strength in dealing with one great power was the knowledge, open to both parties, that there were behind the small state one or more other great powers, despite the customary absence of alignment. This strength of the small state was thus “other-conditioned” and therefore inherently unstable, depending as it did upon the existing relationships between the great powers. The question for the small-state leaders was how they could best draw on such power, and the possibility of choice lay chiefly in the ways the small powers could influence the expectations of the interested great powers. Geography was often an important element in the calculations of the great and small powers, but it could not be said to determine their course. The expectations of the leaders, sometimes influenced by geographical considerations, to be sure, were the crucial factor.  

For the particular time segment and the particular kind of pressure—aid to one or more belligerents during World War II—the operational question for the government of each of these small states was how to wait out a crisis while making its neutrality desirable to both sides. Their power of choice lay in

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8 See Harold and Margaret Sprout, “Man-Milieu Relationship Hypotheses in the Context of International Politics.”
their capacity to convince the great-power belligerents that the costs of using coercion against them would more than offset the gains. The great-power leaders were not likely to press too hard for a concession if one or more of the following undesirable consequences appeared probable: (1) the demanding great power would be deprived of valued goods or services over which the neutral had control; (2) the enemy would retaliate directly or indirectly so severely as to outbalance any conceivable advantage; (3) the neutral would go over to the enemy side.

Not all the would-be neutrals could avail themselves of these possibilities, and even those who remained out of the war could not do so all the time. The chapters to come will suggest the conditions for success in resisting the pressures of the great-power belligerents during wartime. They should also illustrate some aspects of the power of small states in world politics.
II

Turkey: Neutral Ally

The presumption of success should always be in favor of a single power contending against a combination, however superior in numbers and power. For independent of the infinity of circumstances of which an individual can take advantage better than a combination of many, the former will always have the opportunity, with a little address, to create divisions between the latter, and thus to weaken any powerful combination.\(^1\)

Of all the neutrals in World War II, Turkey was probably best placed to use one belligerent to resist the pressures of another. There were three interested power blocs; and the Turkish government, when under pressure from one of the three, had two directions in which to look for counterbalancing support. Paradoxically, it was able to do so even though formally an ally of one set of belligerents. In fact, this alignment, which all the strictly neutral governments would have regarded as dangerous and perhaps fatally compromising, was in many ways a source of profit. Turkey succeeded in staying out of the war and beyond that made each belligerent power bloc pay a high price for Turkey's continued resistance to the demands of the others. Small-power diplomacy in the midst of world conflict could hope to achieve no greater success.

World War II was bound to touch Turkey, a focus of international rivalry for centuries because of its gateway position, partly in Europe, partly in Asia.\(^2\) As soon as the Balkans or Russia or

\(^1\) Machiavelli, Discourses, Book III, chap. xi.

\(^2\) A useful account of events in Turkey during the war is G. E. Kirk, "Turkey," in Royal Institute of International Affairs, The War and the Neutrals, pp. 345-66.
the eastern Mediterranean became involved in the war, Turkey would become a concern of the belligerents. Athwart the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, it was unlikely to avoid pressure from at least one belligerent for some kind of aid. This was all the more probable because Turkey was the strongest state in both southeast Europe and the Middle East, and therefore a highly desirable junior partner.

Even before the hostilities began, both the Western Allies and the Soviet Union had sought to commit Turkey more precisely and had encountered the inevitable German counterpressure. The resulting diplomatic crisis, in the second month of the war, was only the first of seven with which the Turks had to deal before the war had run its course. As did all the other neutrals, the Turks at the onset of the war found themselves the object of trade competition between the belligerents. Then, as the Germans began in late 1940 to expand in the direction of the Balkans, the Turks were pressed by the British to aid in consolidating resistance to this expansion. When the Germans succeeded in sweeping over all of southeast Europe to Turkey’s border, the Turkish government felt compelled to sign a friendship treaty with them in June, 1941. Following this, the Nazis tried to exploit their dominance in the economic field, while the British, Americans, and Russians exerted counterpressures. After the Allies and the Soviet Union had begun to get the upper hand over their common enemy, the Turkish government was strongly urged in 1943 to become a belligerent on their side. Although the Turks successfully resisted this demand, they capitulated in 1944 to the pressure for ending economic and diplomatic ties with Germany.

Turkey had only a dubious chance of offering successful military resistance to hostile action by any of the great powers bringing pressure to bear upon it. On the European side of the Straits, its greatest city and former capital, Istanbul, lay practically defenseless. On the Asiatic side, defense was greatly aided by very formidable mountains, but Turkey shared a boundary there with its traditional enemy, Russia. Primitive communications, although an obstacle to successful invasion, were also a hindrance to efficient organization of defense and to utilization of aid from outside. The Turks had a reputation for toughness and fortitude—"The Turks are good soldiers." Yet their technical training and
equipment were obsolete and in every way inadequate for combating a major adversary.

However rich its unexploited natural resources, Turkey was a poor country which had made only elementary steps toward industrialization. If the modernization of Turkey's economy was to be continued, its foreign trade had to be maintained even during war. Turkey could not, by expanding its own manufacturing, meet its defense needs against possible attack by the armed forces of a great power. At the same time, its currently low standard of living was less dependent on foreign trade than the relatively high standards of some other neutrals, particularly the northern countries. Not requiring much petroleum, Turkey was relatively invulnerable to the cutting-off of trade in this import which was so vital to more advanced countries. The one need above all which had to be filled from abroad was armaments.

Turkey, although a Middle Eastern and Moslem country, had been governed for over twenty years by leaders who identified themselves with the West. For centuries the country had played a part in European politics, and this involvement had trained them thoroughly in diplomatic practice. From the long and humiliating years of trying to shore up a dying empire, the Turks had learned to be unsentimental and pragmatic in their approach to politics. Defeated in World War I, Turkey had been whittled down from the already truncated Ottoman Empire to a compact and homogeneous political entity, and the Turks had accepted this status. Under their great leader Atatürk, the country had experienced a fundamental revolution and a rebirth of national feeling. Some of its leaders in World War II had played major roles in securing Turkish independence in the early twenties, and this experience had heightened their determination to preserve the New Turkey. The then president, İnönü, had been Atatürk's personally selected successor and was renowned for both his military and his diplomatic victories in this struggle for independence. The government ruled through an authoritarian one-party state in which the lower classes, not yet Westernized, were accustomed to give obedience to their superiors. Differences of opinion regarding policy were settled inside the governing circle, and there was no threat of rebellion from either a disaffected social class or a national minority.

A virtual outcast along with Russia (with which the Turkish
government had a temporary rapprochement), Turkey in the 1920's attempted to develop itself with the minimum of outside participation. Having secularized the state, the Turks turned their backs on the rest of the Moslem world. As Turkey's prestige increased, its leaders by the 1930's found themselves drawn again into the orbit of European politics. Their success at the Montreux Conference in 1936 in improving Turkey's legal position at the Straits marked the country's final emergence from its semi-outcast status and so permitted the dissolution of its mariage de convenance with the other and more powerful pariah, the Soviet Union. Indifferent neither to Western values nor to the respect of Western governments, the Turks were still anxious to remain aloof from Europe's wars. With their ancient distrust of Russia revived and with the spearhead of Axis imperialism so close to their shores in the form of the Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands, not only neutrality but the very survival of the Turkish republic was at stake in Turkey's dealings with two of the three groups of great-power belligerents.

I

THE MUTUAL ASSISTANCE PACT WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE, MAY, 1939—JUNE, 1940

In the spring of 1939, Britain and France sought Turkey's adherence to a tripartite pact of mutual assistance in order to bolster their guaranties to Greece and Rumania. Thereby they also expected to strengthen their position in the eastern Mediterranean against Italian expansion and to obtain Turkey's aid in consolidating the Balkans against a possible German advance. Britain and Turkey in May, 1939, and France and Turkey in June publicly declared their intentions of concluding such a pact, but it was not signed until October. 3

Meanwhile the Soviet Union, which in the spring had approved such a move by Turkey, signed a non-aggression pact with Germany, after which it took a very different path in its policy toward Turkey. In September the Russians invited the Turkish foreign minister to Moscow to discuss a mutual assistance pact of their own to offset and perhaps even replace the one still under discussion between Turkey and the Western powers. Such a pact would at least neutralize Turkey in connection with any Allied military intervention in southeast Europe. To their suspicious German partners, the Russians explained that such an agreement would be a hook by which they would pull Turkey away from the Anglo-French bloc. Furthermore, they made a show of indifference by leaving the Turkish representative completely alone in Moscow a good part of the three weeks of negotiation. Then they demanded terms clearly unacceptable to the Turks. Among these were the requirement that, contrary to the Montreux Convention, Turkey should close the Straits to the warships of non-Black Sea powers, whether or not Russia was a belligerent. In addition, the Soviet Union would bind itself to “help” in the defense of the Straits should Turkey become involved in war. Further, the Russians did not want to oblige themselves to take any action against Germany as a result of the agreement. For these and other reasons the Turkish foreign minister departed from Moscow without engaging in further negotiations.4


Three days later the Turkish government signed the tripartite mutual assistance pact with the Western powers. In it Great Britain and France promised to co-operate with Turkey and give all possible aid if Turkey should become involved in hostilities with a European power consequent upon that power's attacking Turkey. The pact also contained reciprocal promises that each side would give all assistance in its power in the event of a European aggression leading to hostilities in the Mediterranean in which France and Britain were involved.

The Russians confined their animus over this pact to verbal broadsides and directed most of their invective toward the British and French. At that time the Germans were revealing surprising power in Poland and appeared more capable of threatening Russian interests in southeast Europe than Turkey's new allies.

The German response to the pact was also limited to angry words. They had not at the start looked to Turkey for active collaboration with the Axis but were surprised to discover that Turkey had agreed to co-operate diplomatically with their opponents. Turkey was far down on the list of states about which the Nazis were concerned, and they had been content to oppose the tripartite agreement by pressing their Soviet ally to block it. The Germans put their confidence in their own military strength and in the likelihood that the Soviet Union would insure Turkey's neutralization in any Allied move toward a Balkan encirclement under the leadership of Turkey. Therefore they were satisfied merely to keep Turkish-Allied relations as distant and imprecise as possible.\(^5\)

For the British and French, the effectiveness of the pact turned upon their willingness to grant large credits and provide war matériel to improve Turkish military facilities, as stipulated in a subsidiary agreement. Joint Allied-Turkish military conversations were held in early 1940 to realize the Anglo-French objective of

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\(^5\) Aspects of the German reaction to the pact between Turkey and the Allies may be found in Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 81, 117-18; Harry N. Howard, "Germany, the Soviet Union, and Turkey during World War II," pp. 63-64; Peter de Mendelssohn, Design for Aggression, pp. 102, 224; Paul Schmidt, Hitler's Interpreter, p. 129; Documents on British Foreign Policy, V, 574, 592-94, 789-90; U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945, Ser. D (1937-55), VIII, 114-16, 371-72; and Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 583.
building up bases in Turkey, but progress was slow. As the end of the Blitzkrieg approached, Italy entered the war, and the Allies, in accordance with the pact, sought Turkey's belligerency. However, taking advantage of a reservation in the agreement regarding the position of Russia, the Turks declined either to take any overt military steps or to break off relations with Italy. They merely affirmed their loyalty to the Allies.

In June of 1940, therefore, the Turks were still neutral, the status around which their policy had been oriented from the founding of the Republic. The moves in their direction of German and Italian military forces and the Fascists' practice of trampling upon the rights of small states standing in their way had led the Turks in October, 1939, to take the new course of aligning themselves diplomatically with their former opponents, the British and French. They looked to their new and distant friends, with their vast resources, to protect Turkey in case of attack by great powers not so distant. They did not expect these friends to require any aid of their smaller ally except in case of an offensive. In taking the momentous step of alignment, the Turks were emboldened further by the thought that the Germans were too far away to retaliate violently and that the Russians shared Turkish fears of German intentions in the Balkans. Although the outer limit of effectiveness in conciliating the Soviet Union had been reached, the Turks had been careful to except from the tripartite pact any obligation likely to cause hostility between Russia and Turkey. At the same time, they held their own responsibilities down to giving "all assistance in their power" to Britain and France in case of conflict in the eastern Mediterranean, and to hostilities in which the Allies found themselves as a result of their guaranties to Greece and Rumania. The Turks would not directly guarantee aid to Rumania or Greece in case of aggression.

As the Allies began to carry out their promise of building up Turkey's defenses, the Turks continually questioned the adequacy of the support and also raised questions about their own role in commanding a Balkan campaign and about the Allied intentions if Italy became a belligerent. The British would not admit Turkey's peril in the spring of 1940 to be as great as the Turks pictured it, but when France fell and Italy entered the war, the British were not even able to maintain the flow of promised
war matériel. Thus when the Turkish government refused the plea of the allies to participate as a belligerent, the British had to agree that Turkey was indeed ill-prepared to join the battle at that critical point.

We see from the foregoing account that in the opening months of the war there was a three-sided rivalry among Russia, Germany, and the Allies (Great Britain and France) for the friendship of Turkey. This situation was complicated by the fact that hostilities were still localized and far away, and the relations among the suitors were not entirely clear. The Allies sought an alliance in which Turkey would help defend joint interests. Russia, which bordered on Turkey and was its traditional foe, sought a "mutual" assistance agreement which would have infringed on Turkey's sovereignty and would have canceled the usefulness of any competing mutual assistance pact which Turkey might conclude with the Allies. Germany opposed both pacts but did not ask for a similar agreement. In particular, Germany was opposed to a pact between Russia and Turkey despite the fact that Germany was linked with Russia—an uneasy coalition, to be sure, in which few had much faith. Meanwhile, a second ally of Germany, Italy, was expanding into an area which the Turks regarded as within their security sphere, and both the Allies and Russia were offering aid should Turkey become involved.

To meet this situation, the Turkish government had accepted the support of Great Britain and France, who were the more distant and least menacing of the rival great powers and who had foreign policy objectives coinciding most closely with those of Turkey. This move served as a counterbalance to the threat that the Soviet Union might take advantage of the struggle between the Axis and the Western powers to improve its position in the Near East. The act, moreover, warned the nearby powers that a local aggression at Turkey's expense would not remain localized.

There was little possibility of Soviet retaliation against Turkey for signing the mutual assistance pact with Britain and France and not one with her, since the Russian interest in having Hitler

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kept away from the Straits was greater than its hostility to the West. Furthermore, the Russians—and the Germans also—were still interested in influencing Turkey, and so their wrath was focused on the Western powers rather than on Turkey. The Turks had been careful to define very explicitly and narrowly the terms of their Western alliance so that it could not develop to the point where it would appear as an immediate danger either to the Soviet Union or to Germany. The departure from neutrality appeared to be a diplomatic move only. At the same time, Turkey used the alliance as a means of increasing its military equipment and thus improving its chances of resisting a violation of its neutrality.

That the Turks could accomplish such feats under the particular circumstances outlined does not mean that other states are likely to follow the same pattern in similar situations with the same results. Nevertheless the fact that one small state did achieve these effects shows the possibility that the sequence might be repeated.

2

GERMAN AND ALLIED PRESSURE FOR TURKISH TRADE, 1939–40

The financial aid Turkey was to receive under the pact with Britain and France was not the only economic advantage it derived from its new diplomatic alignment. Not long before the war broke out, it had been saved from the German economic trap by the steps taken by Britain and France to stimulate their Turkish trade. This was a difficult task, since the Allies could not easily supply the products Turkey needed or make use of much of its predominantly agricultural production. Germany was a more natural trading partner of Turkey. Nevertheless, a substantial improvement was made in the Allied trade with Turkey.

During the war, Britain and France were anxious to cut off the export of strategic materials, especially chrome, from Turkey to Germany. Chrome was essential to the German armament industry, and Turkey was practically the only available source of supply. The Turks were not willing to give up their lucrative trade with Germany just because of their new alliance with the Western powers, and the trade routes were out of reach of contraband
control agencies. The British and French did what they could to make inroads into the German-Turkish trade by granting extensive credits to Turkey, by agreeing to take large (and often unwanted) quantities of Turkey's regular export of such products as dried fruit, and by making pre-emptive purchases of the Turkish chrome production for a period of two years ahead. At the same time, the Allies realized the advantage of allowing Turkey to continue receiving from Germany products for rearmament which they could not supply and which would strengthen Turkey's capacity for defense.

The fall of France greatly complicated Turkey's relations with the competing great powers. Before that event, despite months of negotiations, the Allies had not yet secured a general war trade agreement with Turkey that would confirm the Allied interest in restricting German imports of war materials. After France fell, the Western powers were unable to prevent conclusion of a Turkish-German commercial agreement signed in July, 1940. It turned out, however, that this agreement was of far greater economic advantage to Turkey than to Germany. It did not cover the one item which the Germans were most intent on securing—chrome. Germany agreed to exchange such items as locomotives, railway equipment, and pharmaceutical products—all of which Turkey greatly needed—for olive oil, mohair, rags, cotton, nuts, and similar products which it could readily supply. Furthermore, Germany undertook responsibility for transportation of these products to and from Germany. Moreover, the agreement did not close out the British. They continued to negotiate with the Turks regarding specific items which they sought to keep out of Germany, and to discuss means to increase trade between Turkey and Britain.

Aside from the question of chrome, the chief German aim at the time was, according to Von Papen, German ambassador to Ankara, to support Turkey in its "desire to resist the pressure of the western powers, and keep out of war." The Turkish negotiator of the agreement replied that his government was similarly motivated and that the question at hand was merely "one of weighing mutual interests in order to arrive at a commercial exchange." In other words, aside from chrome, the Turks sought to buy needed goods as cheaply as possible and to sell their own production as dearly as they could, regardless of the country involved.
To make up for the potential loss of a lucrative market for chrome in Germany, the Turkish government had already sought and obtained from the Western Allies an agreement to purchase agricultural products awaiting export and to do as much as possible to supply the armaments and factory equipment the Turks would otherwise have had to buy from Germany. Meanwhile the Turks made clear to the German ambassador that they had alternative trade possibilities, and at the same time they kept the Allies informed of their trade negotiations with Germany. When France fell and Italy entered the war, normal Turkish trade arteries were almost severed, and the Turks inevitably became more economically dependent on Germany. To compensate for their pro-Allied political leanings, they gave some economic favors to the Germans, but they also gave substance to their alliance with Britain by allocating the French quota of the pre-empted chrome to Britain. Privately they assured the British that they would do their best to keep down to the smallest quantity feasible the export of materials useful to the German economy or war industry.\(^7\)

This economic tug of war during the first year of hostilities was uncomplicated by the Soviet Union, which remained aloof. Turkey's alliance was with the side having no economic use for its products. In contrast, the target of Allied economic warfare, waged indirectly through the neutrals, was a great power intensely interested in Turkish commodities, most particularly chrome. While the military balance remained even between the opposing great powers, Turkey demonstrated that an alliance with one side need not impede a small state from exploiting the bargaining power lying in its possession of a near monopoly over a strategic raw material.

To obtain the full advantage from such an opportunity, the leaders in the small state should not be inhibited by fear that the effects of trading with the enemy would significantly alter the course of the war, and they must be able to ignore ideological ap-

peals from one side as well as intimidation by the other. To extract the largest concession from the side pressing for trade, especially in the scarce raw material, the small state in Turkey's position may stand upon its alliance and prior contracts with the other side while profiting from the reluctance of the importuning state to take measures that might push the small state further into the orbit of its ally. At the same time, the Turks showed how a small state may persuade its ally that trade with the enemy in products the ally cannot supply is to the ally's advantage in strengthening the small state. Such persuasion was effective because the Turks showed that in essential respects they remained loyal to the alliance, particularly because they did not make substantial concessions to the enemy and kept their bargain regarding the strategic resource. In such circumstances the diplomatic alliance, far from hobbling the small state in the economic field, provided additional opportunities for obtaining economic advantages. Thus the Turks demonstrated the possibility of obtaining unusual trade concessions in order to solidify the partnership while avoiding the sanctions against trading with the enemy which their great-power ally was ready to impose on unallied neutrals. All these accomplishments dwindled in importance when military events forced a realignment of trade by imposing physical obstacles to continued economic contacts between Britain and Turkey.

3
TURKISH CO-OPERATION WITH BRITAIN TO CONSOLIDATE THE BALKANS, 1940-41

With France out of the war and Italy on the other side, the British by no means ceased their economic warfare waged through Turkey. As 1940 wore on, however, economic pressure took second place to diplomatic strivings to curb German expansion. Turkey was to be the agent for these efforts. To prevent the Germans from moving down through the Balkans to the Aegean and the Turkish Straits, the British had already begun early in 1940 to call on Turkey, their main hope in the eastern Mediterranean, to form an anti-Axis diplomatic front in southeast Europe. But Turkey's neighbors were paralyzed by fear and confusion. The British then turned to the possibility of military aid.
By November, 1940, the Italians were already in Greece but faltering, and Germany was likely to take over their battle. In the winter of 1940-41 the British sought to impede this by obtaining a Turkish promise to enter the war (in collaboration with Yugoslavia and Greece) if any of them were attacked by the Germans.

Churchill appealed to President İnönü to make the airfields the British had helped to build available to British planes for threatening the Germans if they came through Bulgaria. In particular he wished thereby to be able to bomb the Rumanian oil fields. In return he promised additional air support. Despite the knowledge that the Turks had practically no defense against air attack and that their military equipment and personnel were entirely inadequate against German opposition, Churchill pleaded again and again for Turkish participation while there was still time to deter the Germans by a show of united resistance. These appeals failing, the British decided in March, 1941, to shift the weight of their military support to the Greeks, who were already fighting the Italians. This left no British fighting forces for Turkey. Following the German occupation of Bulgaria in March and the attack on Yugoslavia in early April, 1941, the British joined the forlorn cause of the Greeks without Turkish aid and were defeated. Nevertheless, the Turks’ refusal to enter the war neither surprised nor angered the British, so conscious were they of their own weakness in the eastern Mediterranean.\(^8\)

The Germans, confident of their overwhelming military power, had been ignoring Turkey’s diplomatic maneuverings during the Balkan crisis. They relied on the terror Germany might arouse by such actions as the bombing of Belgrade to keep the Turks quiescent. Seeing as a green light for passage into Greece the last-minute non-aggression pact the Turks signed with Bulgaria February 17, 1941, the Germans were concerned only because Turkish troops remained mobilized on the border of Thrace opposite the Bulgarians. They considered Turkey sufficiently important to warrant waging intensive psychological warfare upon both

government and people, impressing them with German might, arousing suspicions of the British by stories of their duplicity in Moscow, and particularly playing upon Turkish fears of Russian intentions. Meanwhile the Nazis assured the Turks that German movements in southeast Europe would not endanger Turkey unless it gave assistance to the British.9

The insinuations concerning Russian aims were not without foundation. When Molotov had gone to Berlin for the crucial talks with the Nazis in November, 1940, the two partners had clashed, *inter alia*, over the future of the Turkish Straits. At that time the Germans pretended indifference, explaining that they were interested only in keeping southeast Europe secure from the British. They tried to divert the Russians' attention to expansion southeast of the Caucasus toward the Indian Ocean and would not answer directly the Soviet proposals about a Russian "guarantee" of Bulgaria and a base at the Turkish Straits.

Following the Berlin talks, the Russians became more and more concerned about German movements in the Balkans. They changed their behavior toward the Turks, whom they had earlier warned not to try to form a Balkan bloc. Now, in March, 1941, they were ready to acquiesce in a Turkish move in that direction. On the twenty-fifth of that month they publicly declared that they had no intention of taking advantage of Turkey's possible involvement in the war and would remain neutral if Turkey should be attacked.10

While the Turks were thus somewhat reassured about the Russian attitude, their concern over German intentions, already profound in late 1940, rapidly increased as they saw them coming closer and closer in the spring of 1941. Having failed to weld to-


gether a Balkan alliance, they felt themselves powerless to stem the tide. Earlier they had believed that any armed aid they could give Greece directly against the Italians would more likely harm than help Greece's cause because their intervention might bring the Bulgarians into the war. They had therefore declared their neutrality in October, 1940, but by January, 1941, the bulk of the Turkish army was massed in Thrace.

Turkey's non-aggression agreement with its unfriendly neighbor, Bulgaria, failed to deter the Germans from infiltrating that country in February, nor did it prevent the stationing of freshly armed Bulgarian troops on the Turkish border. Despite the Turks' favorable impression of the mounting British power elsewhere, as revealed in Africa and the Battle of Britain, they did not believe the British had enough force in the eastern Mediterranean to withstand the Germans. They knew that British deliveries of aircraft were far behind schedule, and they were well aware of the vulnerability of Istanbul and Edirne to bombing and the general lack of air defense in Thrace. Thus to grant air facilities in Turkish territory to the British seemed suicidal. Too small a British contingent would be worse than none at all. Therefore they told Foreign Secretary Eden late in February, 1941, and reiterated later, that Turkey would fight the Nazis if attacked but that in view of their lack of offensive power the stage at which they would enter the war had not come. When the Germans invaded Greece, the Turkish government announced that it would not join the war but still identified itself with the Allied cause. Then the government ordered what amounted to a general mobilization, decreed martial law in those areas immediately threatened by the German advance, and helped evacuate many classes of the population from Istanbul to Anatolia. The Turks then awaited their turn.11

During this critical period the situation had dangerously worsened, with the crumbling resistance by the small states lying be-

tween Turkey and Germany. The Germans were relentlessly advancing and would soon be on Turkey's border. Turkey's ally, Britain, militarily weak though it was in that region, intended to oppose the enemy's advance and needed Turkey's aid to have any chance of success at all. But the great power did not appear strong enough to protect its small ally from the consequences of joining a battle that might possibly be avoided. Germany's "ally," Russia, though no friendlier to Turkey than earlier, shared its fears regarding the advance and was opposing the aggressor through several diplomatic channels.

With a predatory great power moving in Turkey's direction by leaps and bounds, Turkey's alliance no longer furnished any protection and could have become a danger. The Turks' diplomatic efforts to assist Britain and themselves by consolidating the resistance of the neighboring small states had failed through the internal weaknesses of these states and had drawn unfavorable attention from both Germany and its erstwhile ally, Russia.

The contest was now transferred to the military field. Here Turkey was almost useless to its great-power ally. Furthermore, to go to war prior to being attacked would have nullified the purpose for which Turkey had entered the alliance. In addition, the expectations of greatly strengthened defenses within Turkey had not materialized, and its ally was too weak in the general region for the aid it might provide Turkey to impress Germany with any notion except the small state's hostility. Nevertheless, Turkey was able to preserve the form of the alliance, since the British recognized that Turkey would resist their enemy if actually attacked, even though its belligerency would be unlikely to turn the scale. The Turks engendered similar expectations in the minds of the Germans, especially because of their mobilization on the border of the Nazi satellite. In addition, the Turks were able indirectly to affect the thinking of their potential aggressor by inducing Russia to promise neutrality in case the Nazis attacked them. This confirmed the rivalry of Germany and Russia in the region.
key. Ahead of them was the unheralded attack on the Soviet
Union, secretly prepared for during the previous six months.
They had sealed off the Balkans, into which the British had been
lured partly as a result of the Italians' foolhardy attack on Greece
and partly because of the Rumanian oil fields. However, over-
coming Yugoslav and Greek resistance had taken longer than
Hitler had planned, thus somewhat delaying the drive eastward.
The subjection of Turkey could wait until the completion of the
Russian campaign, which Hitler expected to be short.

Hitler's naval leaders had been urging him to give highest pri-
ority to a full-scale Mediterranean campaign, including a thrust
through Turkey, one way or the other. Nevertheless, he regarded
such a strategy as too full of pitfalls at that moment. He over-
estimated British strength in the eastern Mediterranean and un-
derestimated Soviet powers of self-defense. Such a move as the
naval leaders proposed would cause complications with the Itali-
ans and Vichy French. Turkish resistance was likely to be vigo-
rious and the terrain to be traversed was very hazardous for mili-
tary operations. The possibility of enticing Turkey into the Axis
orbit, although it still existed, also seemed slight. Therefore the
best possible objective at that period would be an understanding
with the Turks that they would not interfere with the Germans.
Such an agreement was eventually reached on June 18, 1941; un-
der it each state promised to respect the integrity and inviolabil-
ity of the other's national territory. Both states promised not to
employ any measures directly or indirectly aimed at the other. It
was further agreed that their representatives should meet in
friendly contact to agree upon common interests, including eco-

12 For the German perspectives and conclusion of the friendship pact see
Von Papen, op. cit., pp. 471 ff., 476-77; F. H. Hinsley, Hitler's Strategy,
pp. 94, 99, 109, 103, 107, 115-17, 122-23, 152 ff.; Chester Wilmot, The
Struggle for Europe, pp. 57-58, 67; U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Fueh-
ner Conferences, 1940, II, 32-33, 52; Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 433,
435; Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 347-48; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 312-14; Inter-
national Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals: Documents
in Evidence, XXIX, 32-34, 39-40, and XXXIV, 261-62; Churchill, The
Grand Alliance, pp. 353-54; B. H. Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the
Hill, pp. 238, 244, 252; and "German Documents: Conferences with the
Axis Leaders," Department of State Bulletin, June 30, 1946, p. 1104; also
July 14, 1946, p. 60.
During the negotiations the Germans indicated their desire secretly to send matériel, including weapons, through Turkey to the German-supported rebel movement in Iraq. Before this question developed into an important issue, it became clear to the Germans that they could not get sufficient force to Iraq to prevent the British from quelling the movement. They therefore satisfied themselves with the mere transit of certain supplies (including gasoline) from Vichy-controlled Syria to Mosul via the railroad which ran in part through Turkish territory.

In reaching agreement on a friendship pact, the Germans had relied for the most part on the Turks' ready appreciation of their exposed position and had made no outright demands which they knew would be rebuffed. Meanwhile, their propaganda had dwelt extensively on Soviet demands for control of the Turkish Straits, especially as revealed in the Molotov talks in Berlin. The Nazis belittled the strength of the Soviet Army and American war matériel productivity, and had given promises that they would respect Turkey's territorial integrity. They had also offered certain territorial concessions of a vague nature, only to discover that these suggestions fell on deaf ears. Having achieved the friendship agreement, the Germans then bypassed Turkey while warning that there would need to be further "adjustments" to the new political situation in the future.

To the Turks, the friendship treaty with Germany represented a time-gaining truce and the least concession to German desires they dared to make. By the end of April, 1941, all Europe had been overrun by the Nazis, and even the islands in the seas around Turkey were in Axis hands, while Rommel was making a spectacular advance in North Africa. Thus the Turks had expected that their country would be the next target. The Germans would attack them in a strike toward either Suez or Iraq and Iran, or even the Caucasus. Temporizing during the negotiations over the friendship agreement, the Turks had softened their resistance to German pressure in certain ways. They permitted German ships to pass through the Straits en route to Crete; this embarrassed the British, although it did not violate the terms of the Montreux Convention. Next the Turkish government had signed a new commercial agreement with Germany, the first one which provided for shipments not only of industrial machinery but of arms to Turkey. They had also made a vain attempt to
mediate between Britain and Germany. After prolonged discussion, the Turks were ready by the middle of June to sign the treaty with Germany.

The Turks had inserted a clause which in effect gave their alliance with Britain priority over the later pact. They publicly announced that "existing obligations of the two parties are unaffected." Privately they assured the British that they would not demobilize or permit German troops or war matériel to pass through Turkey. These assurances had to satisfy the British, who knew the military helplessness of both Turkey and themselves if the Germans should attack. The alternative to the pact might have meant German invasion, and a devastated Turkey would have been of no advantage to Britain.\(^\text{13}\)

In this way the Turks met the critical situation in which an aggressive great power hovered over their border following a triumphant sweep through the other small states in their region. In the process the aggressor had effectively excluded Turkey's ally, Britain, from the area. However, Germany had at that time secret plans for attacking its partner, Russia, before marching through Turkey and for the moment required of it only a quiet flank.

Although the Turks were unaware of the German plan to attack Russia, their experience showed that, under the particular circumstances described, it was possible for a small state to buy time and avoid the demand for an alliance, or an attack if the alliance were to be refused.

For the time being, the situation of Turkey was not very different from that of a neutral state which had no previous alliance with either side. The Turks satisfied, temporarily, their potential aggressor, Germany, by a formal declaration of friendship which contained no particular self-enforcing obligations and merely provided evidence that the small state had no hostile intentions.

They were able to reconcile such an agreement with their continuing alliance with Great Britain by excepting from the friendship pact any obligations earlier assumed. By this means and by their continued affirmations that they would resist attack, the Turks compensated their hard-pressed ally for the time being. They were able to convince the British that the agreement with Germany would not result in their aiding the enemy and that it was the necessary price to pay for their continued safety. These affirmations were the more persuasive since the Turks had prolonged negotiations over the friendship agreement until, with the turn of battle in a different direction, they had avoided facing the issue of transit through their territory for military personnel or matériel. This the Turks managed to accomplish chiefly because the Germans had immediate objectives in which Turkey had only a small function, that of remaining quiescent. Germany's aims were also shaped in part by the realization that to force Turkey into a more active role would produce serious military resistance, and the cost of using violence would outweigh the gain in view of the Nazis' grand strategy.

5

GERMAN ECONOMIC PRESSURE AND ALLIED COUNTERPRESSURE
WHILE GERMANY WAS DOMINANT, 1941–1942

Four days after the friendship pact was signed between Turkey and Germany, on June 22, 1941, the Nazis attacked the Soviet Union. As they swept eastward, they pressed the Turks strongly for strategic materials, most particularly for large quantities of the chrome which had earlier been denied them despite the offer of very high prices. Besides securing further commercial agreements, the Germans eventually got the promise in October, 1941, of a certain amount of chrome, to be delivered in 1943 and 1944. In the following September the Germans secured the promise of half of the total production of chrome. For this they were to exchange arms, in addition to the war matériel arranged for in the earlier agreement. During this period the Germans still made no direct threats, employing instead a politic approach which might enable them to pocket Turkey with greater ease after the expected Soviet defeat. However, they made intensive
use of propaganda, especially that which worked on the Turkish fear of British-Soviet intrigue at Turkey's expense.\textsuperscript{14}

In the month following the German invasion of Russia, British Commonwealth and Free French forces gained control of Syria and Lebanon, and their toe hold in the area on Turkey's southern border somewhat strengthened the British position in the eastern Mediterranean. During August, 1941, the British and Russians jointly occupied Iran, thus securing the passage of war matériel up from the Persian Gulf. On the suggestion of the British, the Russians joined them in attempting to reassure the Turks of their intention to respect Turkey's territorial integrity. They declared that they "fully appreciated" the Turkish desire not to be involved in war and promised to give Turkey all aid if it was attacked by a European power. This was one of a number of occasions upon which Churchill emphasized to Stalin the importance of a friendly Turkey. The British, knowing that too great pressure on Turkey to resist German economic demands might end in the Germans using violence to get their ends, continued to woo the Turks with friendly words. They emphasized their continued alliance and tried economic enticements as well. In this endeavor they were very significantly supported by the United States, which even before Pearl Harbor had been supplying Turkey with goods through British auspices. Even the Russians participated in granting an economic favor to Turkey, delivering warship-guarded oil in December, 1941, when Turkey's supplies had sunk very low.\textsuperscript{15}

Such attentions did not distract the Turks from their peril. There was always the danger that either Germany or Russia might look upon Turkey as an alternative route through which

\textsuperscript{14} For the German techniques see Howard, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 71-72; Royal Institute of International Affairs, \textit{The War and the Neutrals}, p. 352; \textit{Bulletin of International News}, 1941, pp. 798, 1321, 1784-85, 1945; 1942, p. 782; \textit{Von Hassell Diaries}, p. 206.

to injure the other. If the Russians did not hold out, the hope for mutual attrition would disappear, and the Germans would quickly move toward Suez. On the other hand, if the Russians proved too difficult to subdue, Turkey might equally be involved. And if the Russians won over the Germans, Turkey might still be the victim of the victor as the battle swept westward. Even the presence of the United States in the war—though the Turks believed it would eventually turn the balance—was not an unmitigated good, for it proved conclusively that the struggle was world-wide and total.

Fully mobilized, the Turks guarded their territory from neutral use as evenly as they dared. In the words of one official, they “had to keep the sheep fed and the cabbages from being eaten.” They addressed friendly public references to both sides, curbed propaganda with an even hand, and did not limit the opportunities for intelligence activities to one side. Likewise, they allocated important exports to both sides impartially.  

Turkey’s promise to sell chrome to the Germans was not to be fulfilled for more than a year from the date of the agreement, when the Turks would no longer be bound by their previous agreement with the British. The chrome, a fraction of the amount sought by the Germans, was not to be provided until prior receipt of war matériel, and the Germans still had to be responsible for transportation in both directions. All exchanges were to be of equal value, and Turkey continued to refuse to build up a credit balance in Germany. Since the only way in which the Turks could obtain arms and other war matériel from Germany was by providing materials necessary for their manufacture, it could be explained to the British that their trade concessions were necessary to obtain what the Allies wanted Turkey to have but could not spare. Thus the enemy would strengthen the military power of the alliance. By such maneuvers the Turks

16 Such a policy did not rule out temporary embargoes and other limitations on exports which the Turks imposed for bargaining purposes when dealing with the Germans.

17 Unfortunately for their own cause, the British had in 1940 held the period of their agreement to two years rather than the much longer period requested by the Turks.
maintained their non-belligerent status through the period ending with El Alamein and the raising of the siege of Stalingrad.

During this period Turkey, though in a backwater of the war, was close to the scene of a life-and-death struggle between two great powers both hostile to the Turkish government. However, one was allied to Britain, Turkey's ally. Meanwhile, the United States had finally become a belligerent, making the war world-wide. Turkey was almost although not quite out of reach of its friends, but their foothold in neighboring territory meant that Turkey was completely surrounded by belligerents. In such a situation Turkey showed that impartial treatment meted out to ally and potential aggressor can help to keep the small power out of war. Without sundering its alliance with Britain, Turkey made certain economic concessions to the dominant belligerent on the other side in order to buy time and to avoid more far-reaching demands. The concessions were not complete, and advantageous bargains could still be struck, since the Turks maintained the semblance of their earlier contracts and retained control of a resource of great value to the aggressor's armament industry. Furthermore, the Turks by extensive mobilization gave the impression that Germany's demands would be secured at least cost through commercial interchange. Meanwhile, Turkey's concessions procured arms from the attacking power and thereby contributed to Turkey's own powers of military resistance and to the advantage of its ally at the expense of neither.18

6

ALLIED BID FOR TURKISH BELLIGERENCY, 1943

With the tide of battle turned, the Turks could expect the hard-pressed but unsubjugated Russians to try to alter Turkish neutrality in favor of the Soviet Union. However, the Russians for


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some time to come made demands not directly upon Turkey but upon their great-power partners. The pressure for a change in Turkey's policy came from its British ally. Churchill had abandoned the "protective pad" conception of Turkey's function and turned now to ways in which the Turks could be positively helpful. If they assumed the status of belligerency, they would keep the Germans occupied in the eastern Mediterranean while the Allies prepared their European invasion. He argued that a campaign in the Balkan region would make use of strength not yet employable in the major buildup and would permit the British to "give a right hand" to the Russians. In preparation for such a possibility Churchill had gone to Adana in Turkey early in 1943. There he arranged with President İnönü and his prime minister to provide very substantial aid in equipping the Turkish defenses. The British would provide an air detachment and help in the necessary improvement of the still primitive communication system and air facilities of Turkey.\(^{19}\)

However, at their Quebec Conference in August, 1943, the Allies decided that the time had not yet come for Turkey to enter the war. The requirements and potentialities of the Italian campaign had reduced Churchill's ardor for Turkey's participation. When the Russians asked at the Moscow Conference in October, 1943, that Turkey's belligerency be sought so that fifteen German divisions might be diverted from the Russian front, the British agreed in order to maintain Russian co-operation in other matters. With the rapid military change in favor of the Soviet Union, the Russians soon lost interest in Turkey's participation. However, by this time Churchill was again anxious to have the Turks engaged, and in November he took the lead at the Cairo Conference in trying to persuade President İnönü to bring Turkey in. The Americans acquiesced in this move, although, like some of Churchill's own compatriots, they thought the chance of Turkey's agreement small and the advantage not worth diverting any effort from more important fronts in western Europe and the Pacific. The Russians did not participate in this conference.

At Teheran following the Cairo meetings they insisted that nothing should distract the Western Allies from their plans to invade Europe. While not opposing Turkish participation, Stalin indicated that he would take no part in persuading them and certainly would make no concessions to them in order to secure their belligerency. The battle was going well for the Soviet Union now, and the Russians behaved as though they wanted to avoid any interference in their expansion westward.20

Thus Churchill could not summon impressive backing when he sought from İnönü agreement that the Turks would soon permit British planes to operate from bases in Anatolia and that Turkey would enter the war by February, 1944. He actually seemed more interested in the use of Turkish territory than in the participation of its still unmechanized troops. At Cairo, as on earlier occasions, the British argued that Turkey would not suffer from taking the desired actions. Germany was too intent on more immediate troubles to retaliate against the Turks, and British air power was in any case overwhelming. Indeed, Turkey would profit from becoming a belligerent, since it would thus earn a better place at the peace table and the good offices of the Western victors.

During this period the Germans, who knew of the pressures being exerted on the Turks, warned them of dire consequences if they joined the front against Germany. Hitler attempted to give substance to these warnings by refusing his military leaders in the area permission to withdraw from exposed positions, in order that the continued presence of German forces would impress Turkey.21


21 German techniques are indicated in Felix Gilbert, Hitler Directs His War, pp. 75, 90, 95; Hinsley, op. cit., p. 231; Wilmot, op. cit., p. 146; Von Papen, op. cit., pp. 493-94.
The Turkish leaders were well aware that, in spite of the changing military balance, the Germans still dominated the Balkans and the Aegean. During the month before the Cairo Conference, they had seen a demonstration of German air power when the British were expelled from the Dodecanese just off the Turkish coast. The rise of Allied power elsewhere had not made Turkey's main cities and its few industrial establishments less vulnerable to German bombardment. But greater than the fear of air attack was the Turks' concern that the Soviet Union should not have any excuse for crossing their territory to "co-operate" in the defeat of the Germans. The Turkish leaders were aware of the Russians' ambivalent attitude toward Turkish belligerence and of the Americans' hesitations. Furthermore, the Turks believed that the total destruction of Germany would remove the traditional counterbalance against Russian expansion. In any case, the Turks did not like being cast in the role of cat's-paw. They resented the fact that they were not asked to participate in the strategy decisions while at the same time they were expected to expose themselves to the fury of the enemy.

The Turks were always willing to carry on discussions with their ally and had given the impression early in 1943 that they would eventually be ready to modify their neutrality. However, work on the projects planned at the Adana conference went very slowly. When President İnönü agreed to come to Cairo in November, 1943, he did so on the condition that the conference be a free and unprejudiced discussion among equals. Just prior to his coming, the Turks showed their loyalty to the British by giving them extensive non-military help when the British had to evacuate their newly won positions in the Dodecanese. In negotiating about military action, the Turkish leaders refused to discuss the use of their bases apart from the general question of Turkey's entering the war. Finally they said that Turkey would eventually become a belligerent but that this would depend upon previously obtaining "adequate" defense support. There must also be a plan for military co-operation drawn up with Turkish participation, a plan in which the Turks would know their part clearly, and they would have to have information on future Allied plans. The negotiations broke down in disagreement over what comprised "adequate defense." Time for
the strengthening process was what the Turks demanded, and
time was one thing which Churchill could not concede.\textsuperscript{22}

When the Allies began to raise the question of belligerency, the Turks were less perilously situated than earlier. The Allies were gaining the upper hand; Germany was losing. Nevertheless, dangers remained. Germany was being defeated in the east by a great power known to be hostile to Turkey. The Nazis were still on Turkey's border and capable of inflicting serious damage. Furthermore, the Allies were divided as to strategy and tactics involving Turkey, and their policies were changing rapidly with changing military events. The postwar plans being prepared by the winning partners would certainly affect Turkey, particularly because of Russia's traditional desire to control the Turkish Straits. The Turks could not share the Allies' goal that Germany be totally defeated, since German power had served as a counterbalance to the ever hostile Russia.

In such circumstances the Turks' refusal to commit themselves militarily was to be anticipated. Turkey's behavior showed how in such circumstances a small state may maintain an alliance with great powers without fulfilling their expectations for full collaboration. By negotiating willingly and at length about the conditions of full belligerency, the Turks were able to insist upon objectively reasonable prerequisites which the Allies could not grant, and hence the Turkish government avoided the onus of saying "no" outright.

Much could be gained by such delays. The time could be used to increase Turkey's military strength. Furthermore, premature collaboration might very well have meant the loss of the security for which Turkey had entered the alliance. The Turks could not prevent their great-power ally from deciding with its partners to assign Turkey a role beneath its dignity and contrary to Turkish objectives. But they could postpone compliance until the relations between the Allies and Russia were changed

by military events and their aims became divergent. During this interval when Russian power was expanding, the Turks could sustain the interest of their British ally because Turkey still occupied a strategic position. Such an interest was the more desirable, since Germany would clearly be totally defeated and hence incapacitated as a counterbalance to Russia.

Eventually, however, the Turks learned that time may run out, for the small states as for the great. The point may ultimately be reached where the small state can no longer induce a powerful ally to continue to strengthen it to meet a crisis always receding into the future.

**7**

**ALLIED DEMANDS THAT TURKEY END ALL TIES WITH GERMANY, 1944**

By the end of December, 1943, Churchill had abandoned any hope of using Turkish territory for air bases. Because of military advances in Italy the need was no longer so pressing. The British turned instead to finding ways in which a non-belligerent Turkey could aid in shortening the war. To this end they sought the severance of all Turkish relations with Germany, beginning with an embargo on chrome.

For a while, the British assumed an attitude of unusual coolness toward Turkey. Early in 1944 they withdrew their military mission and cut off further war supplies. In April, 1944, they warned Turkey that if it continued to send strategic materials to Germany they would apply to it the same blockade as was used against other neutrals. The United States joined the British in this warning. After receiving a quick and conciliatory response from the Turkish government, the British sought the end of Turkey's diplomatic relations with Germany. When they were satisfied that Turkey would cut all ties with Germany, they lost interest in further discussions about Turkish belligerency. The question again arose at the Yalta Conference in February, 1945. When Stalin displayed an unfriendly attitude toward those nations who, like the Turks, "had wavered and speculated about the winning side," Churchill secured Russia's agreement that if Turkey declared war before the end of February it could be among those invited to San Francisco to draw
up the United Nations Charter. In return, he agreed to Stalin's proposal that the "outmoded" Montreux Convention be revised.\textsuperscript{23}

Increased Soviet hostility toward Turkey had been readily apparent the previous summer. In July, 1944, the Russians had complained that the Western Allies' proposal for Turkey merely to break off diplomatic relations with Germany did not conform to their earlier agreement at Moscow. They added that the British had departed from this agreement without Russian concurrence and that the Soviet Union would thus no longer be obliged to act jointly with the Western powers regarding Turkey. All counterproposals to an outright declaration of war had come too late, and the Russians would now leave Turkey to its own devices.

The Americans tried at this period to mediate between Turkey and Britain and the Soviet Union. Failing in their efforts to get more friendly treatment for the Turks, they promised the Turkish government that they would do all they reasonably could to alleviate any economic disturbances that a complete break in relations with Germany might create in Turkey.\textsuperscript{24}

Early in 1944 the Germans had been satisfied by Turkish reassurances and their own intelligence activities that there was no possibility of Turkish belligerency. Germany was soon in such desperate straits that it could not even retaliate for lesser unfriendly acts, such as cutting off the supplies of chrome, which would ultimately have a disastrous effect on their arms production. There were more immediate problems engaging the Germans.\textsuperscript{25}

The Turks were aware that the Germans lacked the capacity to do them much harm. At the same time, they feared that a rigid resistance to the Allies' demands could undermine their economy.


\textsuperscript{24} For the Russian and American reactions see Hull, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 1372–76; Churchill, \textit{Triumph and Tragedy}, p. 81.

\textsuperscript{25} For the German expectations see Von Papen, \textit{op. cit.}, pp. 517, 524; and L. C. Moyzisch, \textit{Operation Cicero}.

[38]
By that time the growing power of the Soviet Union was their paramount anxiety, and their chief hope of protection against it was support from the Western Allies, in whose good graces they must remain.

The Turks knew that merely displaying conciliatory attitudes toward an unfriendly great power would not change its designs. Nevertheless, during the period of Allied coolness in the spring of 1944, the Turks tried to conciliate the Russians in various ways. Thus a secret organization in Turkey devoted to the pan-Turanian movement was officially disclosed and prosecuted, and the Turks suggested an agreement for closer political co-operation between the two countries which would include security guaranties in the Balkans. However, none of these measures succeeded in influencing the Russians.

Meanwhile, the Turks had embargoed all chrome exports to Germany, six days after the blockade warning but before the threat was publicized. Soon they negotiated the gradual reduction of other exports enumerated by the Western Allies. They also agreed to close the Straits to all German ships after the British protested about the passage of some small warships disguised as commercial vessels. A new foreign minister was appointed to replace the official who had been head of the Foreign Office during the most critical period of their relations with the Allies. In answer to the Allied demand that Turkey sever all relations with Germany, the Turks made a counterproposal. They should be treated as a full ally of Britain, receive from both allies whatever aid they could spare in war matériel, and obtain help in disposing of surplus exports and providing necessary Turkish imports. By this time the British had become satiated with discussions over details which postponed decisions, and the Turks had to be content with an American promise of some economic aid. August 2, 1944, they broke off political and commercial relations with the Nazi government. When the Turkish government received word of the Yalta Conference decision, they declared war on Germany five days before the deadline, to take effect a week later, and thus Turkey qualified for the San Francisco Conference.26

26 The Turkish expectations and techniques are indicated in Von Papen, op. cit., pp. 507, 526-27; Hull, op. cit., pp. 1372-73; Royal Institute of In-
The "peace table" which all parties so frequently referred to was never set. Ten years later, revision of the Montreux Convention was no longer even being considered by the West. But at Potsdam in the summer of 1945 Turkey had already become so controversial a subject between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies that all mention of it was excluded from the communiqué reporting the conference. The Russian demands on Turkey in the spring of 1945 to yield to them a preferred position in the Turkish Straits eventually led to the Truman Doctrine and later to Turkey's joining the North Atlantic Alliance.

When the British ceased to assume that Turkey would become a full belligerent, the Turks could not retain the military and economic benefits that had flowed from this assumption. Verbal indignities and the loss of military support were endurable for the Turks, but since Germany could no longer keep them supplied, the Turks could not afford a strict blockade imposed by the winning side. In the Allies' economic warfare Turkey was now to be treated no differently than unaligned neutrals. Thus the Turks had to comply with the demand that they stop the flow of strategic materials to the enemy, but compliance was now possible without risk of harm by Germany.

Cutting both economic and diplomatic ties with Germany kept Turkey in the good graces of Britain and its Western partner but did not appease the hostile Soviet Union. Not conciliation but the ability to resist its demands impressed the totalitarian state. Here the alliance between Turkey and Britain continued to be a political advantage. The Turks could still depend upon Britain to give them diplomatic support in the victors' planning for the future. As the British recognized, even in the most perilous times Turkey had never repudiated its alliance, and it had stood firm against the Germans in essential ways. Now its great-power ally would help Turkey stand firm against the Russians. Turkey assured itself of retaining this support by a symbolic gesture of belligerence when all danger of war had passed.

CONCLUSIONS

For over five years the Turks were able to make their neutrality appear to benefit both sides. The Germans never actively sought any other kind of behavior from the Turkish government. For the Allies, who had wanted a different policy intermittently, the Turks could successfully claim that their course had been more advantageous than belligerency. Partly because of Turkey’s reputation as a tough country to invade, it appeared to be a roadblock to German expansion southward and toward Iran and the Persian Gulf. Thus Turkey received credit for aid in keeping the eastern gate of the Mediterranean open to the Allies. The position of the Turkish government had also permitted the British to move more freely in North Africa. Had Turkey gone to war against the Axis, it would surely have proved a burden to the Allies; on this both they and the Turks later agreed.

The lack of British success in getting the Turkish ally to behave more like an ally appeared to be due in part to the revelation of Britain’s weakness in the region of Turkey after the alliance had been concluded. Small states can afford to link themselves only with the clearly dominant power. The Turks’ unwillingness to abandon their ally at even the most critical point can be credited both to mutual good faith and to the Turks’ ability to predict the ultimate victory of the British side. However, the British interests to be served by a Turkish policy more actively hostile to the Germans did not appear to coincide with Turkish interests and in fact at times clearly conflicted with them. The ends which the British sought through economic warfare were secured in Turkey not so much by their own measures as by Turkish action toward Germany, which above all served Turkish interests best.

The Soviet Union appeared to be least advantaged by Turkish policy. However, the Russians were earlier not strong enough to coerce Turkey if they had wished, and were later inhibited by their allies and their own more easily secured objectives closer to the center of Europe. One aim which the Soviet Union did not achieve during World War II was dominance over the Turkish Straits.\(^{27}\) Yet the control of the straits turned out to be of no great military significance to any belligerent. Thanks to

\(^{27}\) Cf. Wilmot, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 711.
the competition among three great powers to influence Turkey, the Turks’ skill in bargaining, their immunity to propaganda, their understanding of the military and economic position of the parties involved at each stage, and their lack of sentiment, Turkey stayed out of the war. Thus it escaped both possible annihilation by the Germans and occupation by the Russians. Meanwhile, the Turks suffered relatively little economic deprivation.\textsuperscript{28} Despite some temporary lapses, they succeeded in retaining the good will of the Western Allies, who never seriously doubted that they favored the Allied side. The belief that “the Turks would have died in the last ditch sooner than allow an invader to cross their frontier” was never really put to the test, but many people still hold it.\textsuperscript{29} As a result, Turkey has since been provided the means to justify it, if challenged.

The Turks were among the most successful of the neutrals because they were unusually alert in exploiting openings to convince the great powers making demands upon them that more intense pressure was not worth the cost. They convincingly persuaded those threatening them that Turkey would withhold services of value, that the enemy’s retaliation would be highly injurious, that further pressure would push Turkey into open belligerence, or that one or more of these disadvantages would follow coercive steps.


\textsuperscript{29} Quotation from Knatchbull-Hugessen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 204.
III

Finland: Fighting Neutral

The Legate Lentulus said, "That for the purpose of saving the country no propositions ought to be rejected. The safety of Rome depended upon that army, and he maintained that it ought to be saved at any price; that the defence of their country was always good, no matter whether effected by honorable or ignominious means. That if the army were saved, Rome would in time be able to wipe out that disgrace; but if the army were lost, even if they died most gloriously Rome and her liberties would also be lost." ¹

At the opposite extreme from Turkey, Finland was, at the opening of World War II, in an unfortunate position: only one great power was exerting pressure upon it, and that one was its long-standing enemy, Russia. When the Germans were later preparing to attack Russia, the Finns were unable to draw upon the strength of any other great power; hence their only foil against Russia was Germany, an ideologically repugnant and dangerous great state, whose partnership eventually proved highly embarrassing. Nevertheless, the Finns for a few months in 1941 were able to increase their power very markedly by reason of Germany's interest in their fate. Finally, however, they had to fall back almost exclusively upon their own strength to protect themselves from two predatory enemies. Yet they were not quite completely alone, for their relatively strong neutral neighbor, Sweden, was at their back.

Despite strenuous efforts to remain outside the great-power

¹ Machiavelli, Discourses, Book III, chap. xli.
conflict, Finland was one of the first of the small states to be involved in hostilities after World War II broke out. Then the Finns had to fight two wars with Russia and one with Germany during the general conflict. Finland lost both armed contests with Russia and suffered serious damage at the hands of the retreating Germans. A Draconian peace which fell just short of actual occupation was imposed on Finland by the Soviet Union. Yet in less than ten years the peace terms had been met and Finland had regained its character as a Western type of democracy, outside the Iron Curtain, with only one major reservation: the Finnish government could not take sides in international politics.

Finnish experience should suggest some answers to one side of the general question of the power of small states. It illustrates the circumstances under which a small power cannot resist the pressure of one or more great powers during war without being involved in violence. Superficially, Finland in World War II seemed a classic example of how small countries are treated merely as pawns in international politics. Indeed, Finnish leaders often expressed their belief that Finland's fate was to an important extent beyond their control. They thought it depended primarily upon external factors which allowed them little or no choice of action. Yet in the crises faced by Finland during World War II, the Finns did make choices, and their decisions often made a considerable difference in what happened to them.

What kind of people were these Finns who faced continual and incompatible demands from the Soviet Union, Germany, and the Western powers during World War II? Long accustomed to governing themselves in domestic matters, the Finns constituted a "law-bound" society. Like other northern peoples, to whom they were closely linked in their culture, the Finns were predominantly Lutheran, highly literate, industrially sophisticated, and intent on carrying out a social and economic program resembling those of the Scandinavian countries, including a notable development of co-operatives.\footnote{John H. Wuorinen (ed.), Finland and World War II, 1939–1944, pp. 5–12. Among other works dealing with the history and characteristics of the Finnish people are Anatole G. Mazour, Finland between East and West; Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Scandinavian States and Finland: A Political and Economic Survey, pp. 73–135; Hugh Shearman, Finland: The Adventures of a Small Power; and J. Hampden Jackson, Finland.} The Finns were not...
widely separated by class differences based on income, and they enjoyed the reputation of great physical endurance and of skill and courage in personal combat.

Against these sturdy characteristics useful for survival must be set several weaknesses. First, there were very few Finns—less than four million—and they had enjoyed sovereignty only since the close of World War I. Their “War of Liberation,” primarily a civil war, left cleavages between Right and Left far deeper than those in most Western states. Most serious, at the depth of the depression there erupted the Lapuan movement, which took the law in its own hands to repress not only Communists but Socialists as well and which, before it died out, had seriously endangered the civil government itself. In addition to these ideological differences, there was the not inconsiderable division into the numerically predominant Finnish Finns and the influential Swedish-speaking Finns. The persistence of these differences points up another social characteristic. Many Finns will agree with outsiders that their countrymen do not as a rule change their minds easily in the face of changed circumstances, although the Finns do not regard such inflexibility as a weakness. Incontestably, they differ from the more mercurial Spaniards and the supple Turks.

Finland’s most unmanageable weaknesses are due to its geographic position. With almost a third of the country above the Arctic Circle, the Finns must endure all the hardships of a longer winter than most other countries know. Chief among these difficulties is a very short growing season. Finland, at the inner end of the Baltic, seems isolated from most of the Western countries, especially in the winter, while it must share a very long border with its ancient and modern enemy, Russia. Although well favored in a few mineral resources, such as nickel, and rich in forests, Finland lacks most raw materials necessary for a modern economy. It produces no fuels except wood, and much of its water power is to be found in the more inaccessible parts of the country. It has a poor soil and must depend upon the outside world for part of the foodstuffs necessary for survival. Geography favors Finland in one respect: the snow-covered forests in the winter and the impenetrable marshes in the spring provide formidable obstacles to the invader.

Finland’s independence dates from the downfall of the Tsarist regime in 1917. The revolution gave the Finns their chance to
break loose from Russia and end their status as a duchy which had lost its autonomy rights during a period of severe repression. The struggle to throw off Russian domination took the form of a civil war in which Russian-inspired "Reds" fought a bitter but losing battle with the government forces represented by the "Whites." The latter were led by Marshal Mannerheim, who again took command at the beginning of the Winter War with Russia in 1939. In 1920 the Soviet Union signed the Treaty of Dorpat, which, \textit{inter alia}, recognized Finnish sovereignty over the Petsamo region in the north, with its nickel resources and ice-free port. It also provided for the cultural autonomy of eastern Karelia, a promise unkept by the Soviet Union. Suspicion continued to characterize Finnish-Russian relations, and frictions multiplied while economic and cultural contacts remained few. However, a treaty of non-aggression was signed by the two countries in 1932.

With the Germans the Finns, especially among the military, had much closer bonds. Contrary to Russian suspicion, however, no Nazi Fifth Column operated in Finland in the late thirties, and the vast majority of Finns were repelled by the new German ideology. Furthermore, because theirs was a small state, they were especially disturbed by the growing international disorder and the violation of treaty obligations by the Fascists in the late thirties. However, there was no direct threat to Finland from the German side. The danger came instead from possible British and, more especially, Soviet reactions to German expansionism. As the tension increased in 1939, Finland was faced with the unhappy circumstance that both the Allies and Germany were wooing the Soviet Union.

The Finns never doubted that Communist Russia was a greater threat to European peace than Nazi Germany, even if it was the Germans and not the Russians who were likely to start the dreaded world conflagration. They thought of Finland as the outpost of Western civilization, yet they felt powerless to influence the course of events. With the other Oslo Powers they had expressed their disillusionment about the League of Nations by severely limiting their obligations under Article XVI. In 1938 Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Iceland set up rules for a common neutrality, and the Finns continued to co-operate with the other Nordic states in this aim. They declined the
German demand for a non-aggression pact made in April, 1939, following the agreed-upon line drawn by the Nordic foreign ministers. (Only Denmark felt unable to do so.) Following the German invasion of Poland, Finland joined the others in a common declaration of neutrality.

Meanwhile the Finns had failed in diplomatic attempts to conciliate the Russians. They were no more successful when they tried to develop closer relations with Britain. They had to recognize that the British might be of ideological or economic help but were without real strength or interest in the Baltic. Similarly unfruitful were the Finns' attempts to give substance to their partnership with Sweden, with whom they wished to develop a neutral zone against the potential belligerents. The only fruit of these efforts was the blighted plan for co-operatively refortifying the Åland Islands. Swedish fear of Russian opposition thwarted this move.³

The lack of military underpinning to the association of the northern neutrals reflected the attitudes of the several peoples toward the need for defense preparations to support their diplomatic orientation. After the Austrian Anschluss the Finnish government embarked on a belated and limited program of rearmament. However, the dominant political groups gave a relatively low priority to such expenditures, arguing that the primary need was to insure that each citizen enjoyed a standard of living worth fighting for. As World War II broke out, Finland was still without modern armament or equipment. The fortifying of the eastern frontier in Karelia was left in large part to voluntary labor. The impulse to rearm was further weakened by the failure of many Finnish leaders to appreciate the threats to Finnish security posed by certain international events. Like many others, they were lulled by the false promise of peace at Munich, and the Czech coup only partly awakened them. The German-Russian compact again quieted their fears, since it was interpreted as easing the rivalry between the two powers which had put Finland in her difficult position.⁴

³ For the Åland Islands prologue see chapter on Sweden.
⁴ The Finnish perspectives at the outbreak of World War II are revealed in Väinö Tanner, The Winter War, pp. 15-16, 19-21; Wuorinen, op. cit., pp. 36-37, 42-43, 50; U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, V, 589-91; Eljas Erkko, “La neutralité et sa défense,” pp.
At this time Finland was being hard pressed by the Soviet Union to yield certain concessions inconsistent with Finland's neutrality, and the demands increased during the autumn crisis of 1939, finally terminating in the Winter War. The war itself could only end in Finland's defeat. The real problem for the Finns was to find the safest time and conditions for capitulation while mobilizing outside help. The Peace of Moscow, which ended this war, was only a signpost marking the beginning of a new period of pressure from the Russians and increasing counter-pressure from the Germans. The climax came when Finland was drawn into Germany's war with the Soviet Union. Then followed a tug of war between the Allies and Germany over Finland's continued participation in the war, while the Finns again had to weigh Russia's conditions for peace and choose the least dangerous point at which to concede defeat. The die was cast when the Finns agreed to an armistice in September, 1944, and the subsequent retaliatory war waged by the Germans against Finland was an affair for soldiers rather than foreign policy makers. These five major crises will now be examined in turn.

I

RUSSIAN DEMANDS LEADING TO THE WINTER WAR, 1939

In preparation for the eventual conflict with Germany, the Soviet Union began in the spring of 1938 to make demands on its small northern neighbor. The Russians feared that Germany would use a weak Finland as a springboard for attack and were particularly concerned about the security of Leningrad, less than twenty miles from the Finnish border at the end of the Baltic. The Soviets sought to participate in the defense of Finland in various ways that would involve a diminution in Finnish control over its own defense and would link Finland with the Soviet Union in some kind of alliance. The demands fluctuated in detail but steadily in-
creased in intensity and extent. The Russians included in their proposals at one time or another the lease for naval use of Hangö Peninsula (at the entrance to the Gulf of Finland), the joint fortification of the Åland Islands, a base on the island of Hogland (which had been demilitarized by the Treaty of Dorpat), the lease of certain islands in the eastern Gulf of Finland, a mutual assistance pact, the cession of the western part of Fisher Peninsula (close to Petsamo), strategically more advantageous boundaries on the Karelian Isthmus, and demolition of the fortifications on this frontier.

In exchange for such concessions the Russians offered on one occasion or another "a highly advantageous" trade treaty, deliveries of armament, a guaranty of Finland's territorial integrity, and the exchange of certain territory in eastern Karelia. Since these inducements were not by themselves effective in winning over the Finns, the Russians employed threats as well. As the crisis deepened, ominous signs appeared of Russian troop movements, concentrations of aircraft, regular air flights over the disputed areas, and military trains passing day and night over the Murmansk railroad. The Russians also sought their ends through the other great powers. Thus one of their conditions in the summer of 1939 for aligning the Soviet Union with Britain and France was a unilateral Russian guaranty of the states bordering the Soviet Union, including Finland. This aroused vehement protests from the Finnish government, which only deterred the Western powers. When the Allied-Soviet negotiations broke down and the Soviet Union made its compact with Germany, a secret protocol to their agreement defined Finland as inside the Soviet sphere of influence.

The German-Soviet treaty brought only temporary relief from the pressure on Finland. As Stalin declared to the Finnish diplomats, "Everything can change in this world." In October, 1939, the Russian government summoned the Finnish government to send a very high-ranking Finnish delegation to Moscow to discuss the Russian demands. In every way the Russians sought to drive home the notion that Finland owed its short-lived independence to their good graces. Stalin reiterated that the Russian demands were "minimal" and could not be bargained about, while he complained that the Finns "offered too little." The Russian negotiators ignored the Finns' exposition of how they could
by themselves effectively prevent troop landings on the difficult Finnish coast. Furthermore, the Russians broke the secrecy rule which they had imposed upon the Finns since the beginning of the negotiations in 1938. The Soviet government published its demands, thus declaring a position from which it could not retreat. On the third visit of the Finnish delegation, the point arrived when Molotov said, "We civilians seem unable to accomplish anything more. Now it is up to the military to have their say." A few days later the Russians closed their doors to any Finnish communication. Following the departure of the Finns, the Soviet government manufactured the "Mainila incident." It charged that Finnish artillery had shot at Soviet troops on the frontier. It refused an investigation, as called for by the Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact, and likewise declined any mediation. Then without ultimatum Red Army troops crossed a wide front on November 30, 1939, and several Finnish cities were at once subjected to air raids. 5

The attack stunned the Finns, for they could not believe that the Russians would resort to violence without explicit warning. Even the demands seemed incomprehensible. How could the Russians have expected a German attack eastward in so indirect a fashion as through their northern, very isolated country? Had Finland not demonstrated its neutrality by refusing to sign the German non-aggression pact? To agree to the Russian demands would diminish their sovereignty and draw Finland into a great-power conflict. The Finns could not agree to being "aided" by the one state which they most feared.

For these reasons the Finns, even at the most critical period, had offered concessions only about some shifts in the border. These were small compromises relative to the size of the Russian demands, although they strained the limits of political feasibility within the country and the requirements of military security. Meanwhile, the Finns continued to emphasize their neutrality in

word and deed. As the crisis deepened, they sought diplomatic support from the other Nordic countries as well as from the United States. The Scandinavian states, in identical notes to the Soviet Union on October 12, 1939, expressed the hope that the Russians would ask nothing which would prevent Finland from keeping her independent position and neutrality in close co-operation with the other northern states. Even from Sweden the Finns could get no more backing, except co-operation in seeking President Roosevelt's intervention. The President's message to Soviet President Kalinin on behalf of Finland had no effect except to arouse Russian resentment. At one point in the critical negotiations the Finnish government ordered a preliminary mobilization, and a voluntary evacuation of the larger towns took place at the time of the first visit to Moscow in October. But as the negotiations dragged on and then ceased, the military measures for an alert tapered off.  

During the fall of 1939 the Finns left no diplomatic stone unturned. Both they and the Swedes sounded out certain German officials on the possibilities of getting the German government to use its influence with the Russians on behalf of the Finns. Despite the sympathy of some of the Germans, the government was deaf to any suggestions that it give diplomatic support to the Finns. The German Foreign Office pointed out that Finland had refused the German request for a non-aggression pact; now it would be advisable for the Finns to be conciliatory to the Soviet Union. By remaining aloof from the controversy, the Germans acted not merely in loyalty to a partner. They also sought other objectives, including Russian aid in obtaining certain bases in the north. Hitler and other German leaders did not anticipate a Russian attack on Finland that fall, and they held the same low opinion of Russian war-making capacity as did the Western nations.  


7 The German reaction may be found in Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 104, 111, 121-22; Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 107, 151-52, 231, 240, 246, 253, 255, 267, 347, 351; Ernst von Weizsäcker, Memoirs, pp. 226-27; von Blücher, op. cit., p. 150; Erik Castrén, “Effects of the Present War on Finland's Maritime Trade,” pp. 459 ff.
Neither the Germans nor the Finns estimated correctly the desires and probable behavior of the Russians, and the Winter War revealed that the Russians made equally inaccurate calculations about the Finns.

As World War II approached, Finland's situation resembled Turkey's in one respect—Russia was next door. However, Turkey's big friends were down the street, while Finland's big friends were not even in the neighborhood. This small state appeared to be at the mercy of its hostile great-power neighbor, whose leaders were known to be unscrupulous. The Russians felt that their border with Finland was defenseless against the possible onslaughts of Germany. The Soviet leaders suspected that there were ties between Germany and Finland and that Germany coveted Finnish territory to use in its own defense preparations. The agreement, just prior to the war, between Germany and Russia had defined Finland as within the latter's sphere. This deprived Finland of any possible diplomatic support from Germany without stemming Russia's demands upon it. Indeed, these demands greatly intensified with the outbreak of war between Russia's "ally" and the democracies. Germany's startling military success in immediately overcoming Poland, lying between the two great powers, broke down any inhibitions existing among the leaders in the Soviet Union against using force to secure demands Finland continued to oppose.

Under such circumstances the Finns discovered that a small state is extremely vulnerable when the hostile great power believes that it is simple to subdue because no one will stand up for it. Even a temporary accommodation between fundamentally opposed totalitarian governments could be and was extremely dangerous for Finland, regardless of long-run incompatibility between Soviet and German objectives. If a small state's security is based on a diplomacy of non-alignment with either of two locally competing great powers, it is in greatest peril of being treated as a pawn when these powers are negotiating on a broad front; for then the great powers are prepared to make substantial concessions in one area in exchange for concessions in another. The Finns lacked the great advantage possessed by the Turks—the ability to draw upon the Western opponents of these two totalitarian states. Although British and French diplomacy could not
sacrifice small powers in the interest of improved Soviet-Western relations at this time, Anglo-French faithfulness to certain standards of international morality did not help Finland very much. Unlike the Turkish situation, the Western allies were strategically remote from Finland. Thin, unsupportable affirmations of loyalty coming from great-power friends at a distance or from closer small states could not save a small state in Finland's predicament, and indeed aggravated the conflict. With only two of the three sides in the three-sided power struggle of Europe in 1939 effective locally, Finland had much less room for maneuver than Turkey.

Finland's experience in this crisis demonstrates how difficult it is for a small state by itself to withstand through diplomacy alone a great power which is relentlessly driving for concessions of military value. Whether it is in fact impossible cannot be proved by Finland's example, for the Finns did not recognize the reality of the hostile great power's fears. Without full appreciation of the great power's perspectives, the small state cannot correctly anticipate its moves. The Finns were undeceived by offers of defense "aid" from the one state most likely to injure them, but they needed to read correctly the signs of military maneuvers at the time of crisis. Such awareness might then have led them to appear open to concessions while they rapidly completed their military mobilization. In such a case the possibilities provided by procrastination during the bargaining process must be fully exploited, because attempting to wait out a crisis may result only in the international situation becoming more unfavorable to the small state. Militarily unprepared Finland gave the Russians the false impression that it would easily succumb to a show of force.

2

THE WINTER WAR AND THE MOSCOW PEACE OF MARCH, 1940

Following the attack on Finland, the Russians, not realizing that this deed would firmly cement all parts of the Finnish body politic, had insisted on dealing only with a puppet regime they had created for the occasion. Headed by the exiled Finnish Communist Kuusinen, this "Democratic People's Government" was situated in a frontier village. To the United States offer of good offices and the Swedish offer to take over Finland's diplomatic in-
terests in Moscow, the Russian response was that the Soviet Union no longer regarded the Finnish government as having any legal status. They gave the same answer to the League of Nations, which subsequently condemned the attack and expelled the Soviet Union from the organization. Even after the League decision and despite many Finnish efforts to renew negotiations, the Soviet government remained incommunicado. Why should they answer when the war would end quickly?8

For two months the Finns fought without showing signs of defeat, despite the overwhelming odds against them. Again contrary to the Russian expectations, a new Finnish coalition government was formed under the former head of the state bank, Risto Ryti. He continued to lead the government for four and a half years, first as prime minister, later as president. For even longer the supreme command of the armed forces was in the hands of Marshal Mannerheim, once a major general in the Imperial Russian Army, and former commander-in-chief of the Finnish Defense Corps in the War of Liberation.

At once the government set about scraping together the war matériel necessary to continue fighting, buying literally “miscellaneous” supplies from many different countries (including Italy) and appealing to the civilized world not to leave them alone in their struggle. Some volunteers, notably from Sweden, did come to their aid. Nevertheless, the League of Nations request that members “furnish Finland with all the material and humanitarian assistance which they can give” went largely unanswered for some time. Nor did the United States help in any significant way, and President Roosevelt’s “moral embargo” had little immediate effect in reducing the Russians’ overwhelming superiority in military equipment. An American credit for non-military items was too little and too late, owing to the President’s unwillingness to make an issue of the neutrality question with congressional isolationists.9


By February, 1940, political leaders in Britain and France began to envision gains to their own cause from sending a relief expedition to the hard-pressed Finns via Norway and Sweden. In this way they could not only help a small democratic friend but also cut off iron ore which was passing from Sweden to Germany through Norway. For the French the expedition was even more inviting in its possibilities, since it might catch the Germans off base and divert them from France's vulnerable borders. However, two obstacles proved decisive in defeating the plan. One was the adamant opposition of Sweden and Norway to the transit of armed forces through their territories. The other was the Finnish government's own reluctance formally to request these countries to permit the transit, and to appeal directly for the force itself.

The Finns desperately required and pleaded for armed aid, but the only country from which they were really willing to accept it was neutral Sweden. The numerous appeals Finnish officials privately made in Sweden always met the same response. The Swedish government (and people) were willing to and did contribute every other form of aid in large measure, but Sweden would not provide a military force or permit the passage of an Allied military force.10

The cause of the northern countries' circumspection was Germany. The Swedes were more cautious than the Finns in estimating what action would bring the Germans north to meet their adversaries. Throughout the whole Winter War, however, the German government played a passive role. Despite entreaties from some of its own diplomatic representatives, as well as from

10 British, French, Swedish, and Finnish expectations regarding military aid to Finland may be found in Dallin, op. cit., pp. 148, 184; Wuorinen, op. cit., pp. 70-71, 75, 78; Tanner, op. cit., pp. 128-218, 233; Bulletin of International News, 1940, pp. 414-16, reporting House of Commons debate of March 19, 1940; Langer and Gleason, op. cit., 397-403. There are somewhat conflicting accounts from the various interested sources regarding the negotiations between the Finns and the Allies, and they vary as to what was promised, for what date, and under what conditions. Cf. Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, pp. 384-88; Churchill, The Gathering Storm, pp. 560-61, 573; T. K. Derry, The Campaign in Norway, pp. 12-14; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs: Norway and the War, pp. 30 ff. C. Leonard Lundin, in his Finland and the Second World War, attempts to weigh the evidence, pp. 61-62, 73-77. For further discussion regarding the Allied plans for aid to Finland see chapters on Norway and Sweden.
other interested countries, the German Foreign Office refused to intercede with the Russians, even when their advance seemed contrary to German interests. The German government complained of Finland's past policy of neutrality, its avoidance of a rapprochement with Germany, and the pro-English orientation of the Finnish leaders and press. The most positive step the Germans took during this period was to "advise" Sweden in January, 1940, not to take action which would result in Allied forces coming into Scandinavia. They took no part in the peace negotiations in March and saw without murmur Russian acquisition of Finnish territory to the strategic disadvantage of Germany. Their eyes were still focused on Britain, and in particular they wanted no British action which would cut off the supply of Swedish iron ore.\textsuperscript{11}

No more than the Germans did the Russians want to see the Allies come into Scandinavia. By February, 1940, Russian military forces had hit their stride, and the opportunity thereby arose of discussing peace terms. This had been impossible earlier because of their poor military showing. Molotov, out of fear of Allied action in aid of Finland, had already told the German ambassador that he expected Germany to use its influence on Sweden to help bring about a peace settlement. The Russians had no greater desire to see the Germans in this area than to see the British and French there. Hence they chose Sweden as their intermediary.

The conditions under which the Soviet Union would agree to peace, as revealed to the Swedish Foreign Office, went much beyond the demands of the previous fall, "as blood has flowed on both sides since" those negotiations. However, the Russians dropped the artifice of the Kuusinen government. The final terms laid down to the Finns went beyond those which the Swedes had expected when they urged the Finns to give up. Meanwhile the Russians had backed up their demands by mounting a powerful offensive on the Karelian Isthmus which the Finns could not withstand for long.\textsuperscript{12}


\textsuperscript{12} The Russian actions are to be found in Dallin, op. cit., pp. 182, 189; Wuorinen, op. cit., pp. 73 ff.; Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII,
The conditions of the Peace of Moscow included the cession of Hangö, the Karelian Isthmus, including the important Finnish city of Viipuri and other towns, territory northeast of Ladoga, much of the communes of Salla and Kuusamo, islands in the Gulf of Finland, and all the Finnish part of the Fisher Peninsula. The Finns were also to construct a railway from Kemijärvi to the new frontier across the narrow part of Finland. Thus an area vital to the economy was taken from Finland and 10 per cent of the population lost their homes. Roughly half a million people left the places they had occupied for many generations, and they had to be helped to resettle within a smaller Finland. Lost, too, were the strategic advantages which had given Finland “a chance of closing the gates to an invader.” Furthermore the Hangö base could threaten the nation’s industrial center and its important communications. Added to these losses were the casualties of the war itself, over twenty-five thousand killed and roughly forty-five thousand wounded, to say nothing of the material resources used up in fighting.\textsuperscript{13}

At this price the Finns were able to retain their independence. They were willing to pay it rather than try to carry on the war with the forces offered by Britain and France. To accept these would have drawn Scandinavia into the war, and Finland would then have been surrounded by war-torn countries. It would no longer have a neutral cushion to the west. The Finns could not face the prospect of Germany’s joining Russia. Furthermore, they were not convinced that the aid planned by Britain and France would be large enough for their needs or come soon enough to help the Finnish army.

This army had not been finally defeated, although the breaking point was near. The unaccepted Allied offer was available as a diplomatic “trump card” in dealing with the Russians but had to be played before the expected German offensive in the west would dissipate the chance. Furthermore, Swedish and American offers of financial aid made the loss of an important industrial region somewhat easier to bear, and the Swedes held out hope of

\textsuperscript{13} Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, p. 388; also Wuorinen, op. cit., pp. 75-79.

\textsuperscript{57}
a defensive alliance with Finland following the peace.\textsuperscript{14} The Finns signed the Peace of Moscow on March 12, 1940.

The Peace of Moscow terminated a situation in which the Finns were fighting a war separate from but not unrelated to the great war. Neither belligerent was then a participant in the great war, nor did either wish to be. Finland had been attacked without ultimatum by a hostile power which through much of this period refused to recognize the Finnish government as the legitimate spokesman of the state. Undeterred by the condemnation of the League of Nations and unhindered by Germany, the Soviet Union still failed to gain a quick victory because of the stiff military resistance from its small victim. Thus the democratic enemies of Germany eventually were prepared to combine Finland’s cause with their own by sending a military relief expedition. However, Finland’s neutral neighbors through whose territory the force was to move showed themselves unwilling to grant the transit. Passage of the great powers’ expedition would have joined the two wars, contrary to the wish of all involved save the belligerent democracies.

The Winter War demonstrated that, when the danger for a small state is greater in the short than the long run, some staying power in battle may make a great difference even against a great power not yet involved in the major conflict. When the enemy decided that quicker and larger gains would be obtained through violence than through further negotiation with an unsupported small state, the Finns chose to counter force with force. Since the quest for neutrality had been frustrated and the more elemental quest for survival had come to the fore, the Finns displayed the importance of even a modest military power in holding a great power at bay for a brief period. The inevitable loss, compounded by war, would have to be paid for with the aggressor’s blood.

Self-protection by a united and determined people proved far more effective than the organized international condemnation of an enemy oblivious to world opinion and the recommendations of

\textsuperscript{14} For the Finnish perspectives on the Peace of Moscow see Tanner, op. cit., chap. 9, esp. pp. 188–218; Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, 359–65, 375–76, 381–88, 393; Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 848–49; Hjalmar J. Procopé, Sowjetjustiz übr Finnland, p. 125. For text of the treaty see Finnish Blue Book, pp. 115 ff.
the League that its members provide help. Verbal support by
other powers, the provision of non-military goods, and even the
shipment of arms could not alter the uneven balance between the
small state and its great-power enemy. Finland could not get mil-
itary support or even substantial material aid from states which
desired above all to stay out of the larger conflict or from those
fearing Germany, partner of Finland’s enemy. Not even diplo-
matic aid was forthcoming from Germany, fundamentally hostile
to Russia, since these two were temporarily allied.

Finland’s powers of resistance raised the possibility that the
Western great powers would eventually be attracted to its side,
for Finland’s cause proved not so desperate as to make such aid
futile. The intervention of Great Britain and France would have
been disadvantageous to both Russia and Germany. However, the
possibility of Allied military intervention was a better diplomatic
weapon for the Finns than active intervention would have been.
Had the proffered Allied forces actively entered the conflict, the
conflict would have expanded to the detriment of Finland, but the
offer of aid strengthened Finland’s hand in negotiating for peace.
The prestige won by a courageous fight was probably also of
value in the negotiations, for even though the final terms imposed
by Russia were hard, they would probably have been harder yet
had Finland collapsed without a fight.

3

SOVIET-GERMAN COMPETITION TO DOMINATE FINLAND
MARCH, 1940, TO JUNE 22, 1941

The self-confidence gained by the Finns as a result of the Winter
War was soon heavily strained by the Soviet Union, whose con-
tinuously mounting demands at the same time intensified the
Finns’ desire to recover their losses when the opportunity arose.
First, the Russians stamped out the prospect of a Finnish-Swedish
alliance and thus destroyed the possibility of carrying out one of
the assumptions which underlay the Finns’ willingness to con-
clude peace. With the Germans in Norway and Denmark, the
Russians began to expand on the terms of the peace treaty, de-
manding, inter alia, possession of private property that had been
taken out of areas ceded to the Soviet Union, compensation for
war damages in these areas, and much rolling stock. In June,
1940, they demanded either demilitarization or joint fortification of the Åland Islands. Furthermore, they asked for the exclusive right to develop the nickel mines of Petsamo, or at least joint Russo-Finnish exploitation, and indicated that not only the ore but the area itself was important to them. Soon they were interfering in Finnish domestic affairs to protect subversive groups organized by the Communists and to force the removal from the Finnish cabinet of one of their favorite targets, the Social Democratic leader Väinö Tanner, foreign minister during the Winter War. In addition, they demanded that four particular individuals be excluded from the candidates for president in the December elections. About this time they also crushed another Swedish-Finnish effort at alliance or union. In January, 1941, they denounced their trade treaty and cut off all deliveries to Finland. Not until May, 1941, after the Germans had overrun the Balkans, did the Russians suddenly relax their pressure and become markedly conciliatory.\(^\text{15}\)

The most far-reaching and fateful demand made by the Russians was for a right of way permitting Russian trains to carry Soviet forces to the Hangö base. This the Finnish government felt forced to grant, albeit in a secret, extra-constitutional manner. In September, 1940, a week after the lengthy Finnish-Russian negotiations over this question were completed, the Germans also received transit permission to enable them to send troops north through Finland to the Norwegian border. Now that France had fallen and the Blitzkrieg was over, the Germans no longer needed so vitally their treaty with the Soviet Union. Russia’s expansion westward in the summer of 1940 could now become a major concern. The Germans began to turn a friendly face toward Finland. Besides transit permission they were also interested in securing nearly the whole future nickel output from Petsamo.

The clash between the two partners came to the surface during the Molotov-Hitler talks in Berlin in November, 1940, and was a

\(^{15}\) The Soviet demands and techniques may be found in Finland, Foreign Ministry, Finland Reveals Her Secret Documents on Soviet Policy, March 1940–June 1941: The Attitude of the USSR to Finland after the Peace of Moscow, passim; Wuorinen, op. cit., pp. 82–87; Dallin, op. cit., pp. 287–89, 293–96; London Times, July 26, 1940; New York Times, July 27, 1940; New York Herald Tribune, July 26, 1940, November 12, 1940; Manchester Guardian, November 12, 1940; Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 238–40, 258; Procopé, op. cit., pp. 141, 143.
forerunner to the directive “Barbarossa.” The Germans told Molotov that they had no political interest in Finland but wanted their economic interests to be respected and desired no new war in the Baltic. They could not reassure the Russians that the promised sphere of influence was not being violated by the passage of German troops through it.

When Hitler in December determined to attack the Soviet Union, he assumed that the Finns would co-operate. In the following months German military leaders engaged their counterparts in Finland in military conversations without, however, revealing their intention of attacking the Soviet Union. Even so, they were unable to collaborate in a common defense. As “Operation Barbarossa” grew closer, they pressed the Finnish military to agree to co-operate in specific ways as they described their plans to counter a Russian aggression. Still lacking Finnish commitment, the Germans began sending very large numbers of soldiers over the permitted route northward in Finland. A few days before the German attack they appointed a liaison officer to serve at Finnish headquarters, and German cruisers and mine-layers appeared in the Finnish harbors of the south coast to secure the Gulf of Finland. The night before the attack the Finns were informed that Germany would start hostilities the next day.¹⁶

Why did the Finns find themselves drawn into the war by a series of German faits accomplis? Following the occupation of Denmark and Norway and the Blitzkrieg in the west, Finland with Sweden stood alone in the north among the ruins; no longer did they have contact with the West except through the Arctic Ocean. Furthermore, both Britain and the United States seemed to be courting the Soviet Union’s favor. For example, the British would not support the Finnish effort to uphold the existing legal

rights of the International Mond Nickel Company of Canada to exploit the nickel mines of Petsamo. (A subsidiary of this company was English-owned.) To prevent Germany from obtaining the anticipated output, the British encouraged Russian opposition to the German claim for a share in any succeeding concession. The Americans withdrew the moral embargo on Russia in January, 1941, the same month that the Russians were cutting off grain and fuel deliveries to Finland. Meanwhile, German forces were just across the Norwegian-Finnish border as the Finns faced a renewed attack from the Soviet Union. Mindful of their earlier and painful experience in standing alone, the Finns were ready to take advantage of the rivalry between the Germans and the Russians. Their interest did not lessen as the Germans gave a new demonstration of power with their sweep through the Balkans in the spring of 1941.

The camel’s nose had appeared under the tent the previous summer. At that time the Finns had begun to counterbalance Russian pressure with closer ties to Germany. Trade treaties with the Soviet Union and Germany had been signed the same day, June 29, 1940. When the German attitude changed in August, the Finns managed to secure much-sought-after armaments. The other side of that bargain soon appeared, when Finnish officials agreed to permit passage of German troops to compensate for the right of way forced from the Finnish government by the Russians. Although the German agreement was concluded by one part of the Finnish government without the knowledge of the others, revelation of the arrangement was greeted more with relief than with anger. Since the German troops using the right of way in Finland passed on directly to Norway, they were hardly in evidence to most of the population. The Swedes had already set a precedent in June, 1940, and the objections raised by the British and Americans appeared to be only pro forma. What little trade Finland still carried on with the West went through Petsamo, thus depending upon German permission as much as British, and the Finns did not dare to worsen relations with the only power that could aid them against the Soviet Union. The Russians made no public comment to the Finns.

The transit traffic provided the foundation for some of the military conversations which the Finns began to conduct with the Germans in December, 1940. In the spring of 1941 the Finnish
government permitted the private recruiting of volunteers for the
German SS, after being promised that they would get instruction
in the use of weapons lacking in Finland, including tanks. While
increasingly close contacts developed between the military plan-
ners of the two countries, the Finns insisted that they meant to
remain neutral unless attacked. A partial mobilization was or-
dered June 9, 1941, and a complete mobilization for defense pur-
poses came eight days later when the Finns discovered that the
Russians were actively preparing for war on the eastern frontier
and in the Gulf of Finland. The Russians did attack Finland a
week later, but not until after the Germans had already invaded
the Soviet Union further south. Hitler’s declaration on that occa-
sion included the following assertion: “Side by side with their
Finnish comrades stand the victorious fighters of Narvik on the
shores of the Arctic. German divisions, commanded by the con-
queroir of Norway, together with the heroes of Finnish independ-
ence, led by their Marshal, guard Finnish soil.”

Between the Peace of Moscow and the German attack on Rus-
sia, Finland was situated all alone between the two totalitarian
great powers, Russia and Germany. Military movements separated
the democratic great powers from Finland, and these states were
wooing Russia, the great power which had defeated Finland.
Meanwhile the Soviet Union, faced with German expansion in
the north, was exploiting its own victory over Finland far beyond
the conditions of peace and was threatening renewed warfare.
Germany was simultaneously preparing for attack upon Russia
and providing opportunities for Finland to shield itself from their
mutual foe.

Thus the Finns were at last in the situation where they could
take advantage of the rivalry between the two great totalitarian
powers by playing each off against the other. Why could the
Finns not exploit this position more fully? Preoccupied with

17 The Finnish expectations and techniques are described in Dallin, op.
25, 628, 631–32; Memoirs of Marshal Mannerheim, pp. 398–401, 404–11; Procope,
91–114; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, pp. 548–49; von Blü-
cher, op. cit., pp. 191–98, 220, 222–26; Bulletin of International News,
1940, pp. 959–60.
18 Wuorinen, op. cit., p. 100.
memories of the Winter War, they bent all efforts toward gaining support from the Germans to counter the Soviet pressures, but they made no comparable effort to use Russian power in any attempt to curb a German threat to their security. Nor were they willing to reveal to the Soviet government their knowledge of German military preparations either to try to intimidate the Russians or to reach a secret modus operandi with them. To the Finns these possibilities did not appear to be open. The threats from Russia completely overshadowed any thought that the Finns were also in danger from Germany. Furthermore, had they made such moves, they might thereby have reinforced the Russians' conviction that the Soviet Union was in danger of attack via Finland and must be protected by the kinds of concessions they had been demanding of the Finns. For the Finns were faced in the east with an adversary who seemed to be intent on confirming its own hypothesis about German attack through Finland, and who was thus continually pushing the small state further into the camp of its German rival.

During this period the Finnish objective had shifted from neutrality to one of regaining what it could from the losses of the Winter War, or at least preventing the enemy from further expansion. Thus Finland could no longer appear an outsider in World War II, for its officials were maintaining military contacts with Germany. As the latter, whose strength the Finns would balance against their own opponent, Russia, was also an aggressive and ruthless great power, Finland was unlikely to avoid being dragged into the war between the great antagonists. The decline from neutrality was perilously easy, and Germany could place the Finns in such a position that a real choice was no longer available for them. So involved had Finland become in getting one great power to counter the pressure of another that it could not avoid tilting the balance too far.

FINLAND'S SECOND WAR WITH RUSSIA: ALLIED-GERMAN TUG OF WAR, 1941-43

Almost immediately after the Germans invaded Russia, the Americans began to try to get Finland out of the war. These efforts continued intermittently for three years, and the Americans
were soon joined by the British. However, for two years the Russians, in whose behalf they were intended, showed relatively little overt interest. Except when the military situation was at its most desperate late in 1941, the Soviet Union ignored the issue until serious negotiations began in early 1944. The Finnish war was, at slight Russian cost, holding down several good German divisions. The Russians presumably did not want them available elsewhere, and they did want to insure the development of circumstances which would permit the Soviet Union to construct a great eastern European glacis.

Even before Finland was actually in the war, the United States froze Finnish assets within its jurisdiction and requisitioned Finnish ships in American ports. Then the Americans began to act as quasi-mediators, without, however, taking any responsibility for this role. As Secretary Hull put it later, "We sought to aid Russia . . . by pulling off the two little countries that were clawing at her sides—Finland in the north and Rumania on the south." In October and November, 1941, the United States exerted unusually heavy pressure on Finland to proceed no further in cooperating with the Germans. As early as September the British, unable to show more substantially their loyalty to the Soviet Union, delivered an ultimatum to Finland. Ignoring the fact that the Russians occupied important points in Finland, the communiqué read: "If . . . the Finnish Government persist in invading purely Russian territory, a situation will arise in which Great Britain will be forced to treat Finland as an open enemy, not only while the war lasts but also when peace comes to be made." Finland must end its war and evacuate all territory beyond the 1939 frontier. Despite Churchill's doubt that a declaration of war would be very effective, he obliged the irascible Stalin by declaring war on Finland on December 6, 1941, after receiving an insufficiently precise reply from Marshal Mannerheim to a personal appeal for a promise to make a "de facto exit from the war." British forces did not, however, engage the Finns.

In 1942 the United States again took the lead and more than once sought a statement from Finland that the Germans were in Finland against the Finns' will. Meanwhile, however, the United

19 Hull, op. cit., II, 977.
20 Royal Institute of International Affairs, Hitler's Europe: Documents, pp. 303 ff.
States had strongly influenced the British in their resistance to the Russians' territorial demands during the negotiations for a British-Soviet alliance—demands which included confirmation of the 1940 boundaries between Russia and Finland. Later in 1942 the United States closed the Finnish consulate, restricted the movements of Finnish legation personnel, and prohibited Finnish information activities in the United States. It also recalled the American minister in December. Early in 1943 the United States again pressed Finland to leave the war and helped to communicate the possibility of peace with the Russians.\(^21\)

By 1943 war weariness and economic exhaustion were becoming acute in Finland. Internal differences developed regarding the war's end, and a governmental shakeup took place. But in the first months of the war the Finns had been advancing. They succeeded in recapturing most of their lost territory and securing a border which would be more militarily defensible. This point was reached to Marshal Mannerheim's satisfaction on the day the British declared war, December 6, 1941. While the Finnish cause was prospering, there seemed no reason to respond eagerly to British and American demands for withdrawing from the war.

After the three days of neutrality which marked the Finnish policy following the German invasion of Russia and before the Russians attacked Finland, the Finnish government's course had seemed quite clearly pro-German. Having secured their military goals, the Finns found that, despite the absence of a formal alliance with Germany and the contention of the "separateness" of their own war, they could not safely escape from their partnership. Almost completely dependent on Germany for imports, Finland was "like a mouse in a trap" (the foreign minister's words). Economic support from the Allies as well as important military advances by the forces of the West were prerequisites to Finland's leaving the war.

Finland brought about the rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain as early as August, 1941, when the government asked that

the British legation be closed. Then came the controversial Mannerheim order-of-the-day of September 3, 1941, in which he told his troops that their task was not finished when they reached the 1939 boundaries. Although the government policy was opposed to irredentism, this declaration aroused the hopes of those interested in “liberating” eastern Karelia.

The most damaging incident in Finland’s pro-German course was the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact, November 25, 1941. Reluctantly the Finns gave in to German pressure, hoping thereby to fend off more important demands, and they did manage to get assurance from the German minister that they would not be summoned into closer treaty relations with the Axis. Furthermore, the Finns believed that signature of the Anti-Comintern Pact would have no practical significance, being a matter of “mere words.” By their deeds they hoped to show the West that their war was not part of World War II. Thus the Finns refused to accede to a number of German military requests, which included aid to the faltering Germans in the north and collaboration in a simultaneous movement against the Murmansk railroad and Leningrad. Mannerheim gradually disentangled those Finnish forces which had been put under German command in the north at the start of the war. At no time was there a joint command, and Mannerheim more than once repelled the suggestion that he assume such a role. The Finnish-Russian front remained relatively stable from the end of 1941 until 1944. But the Finns believed that to make a declaration to the West regarding their military intentions, even though these were in substantial accord with the Allied aim, would be to give an unreasonable advantage to Russia. The Allies, they thought, were acting solely under Russian pressure.

The Finnish government in January, 1942, on the first of several occasions decided not to pursue a peace feeler; this one was made in a roundabout way by the Soviet envoy in a comment to the Swedish foreign minister. The leaders believed that it could involve at most a “simple cessation of fighting,” which was already a fact, and feared that the only practical consequences would be complications in their delicate relations with the Germans. They required a guaranty for their lasting security against the Soviet Union, which from long experience they had learned to distrust completely.

Finnish suspicions of Russian influence on the Western Allies
were intensified by public statements such as that of Sir Stafford Cripps to the effect that after the war the Soviet Union should have dominion over the Gulf of Finland and the Baltic Coast. Early in this period the Finns still believed that Germany would win. When they later realized their error, their exit from the war was not facilitated by Allied propaganda in favor of "unconditional surrender."

Prior to March, 1943, the Germans, aside from requiring the Finns to sign the Anti-Comintern Pact and making certain proposals of a military nature, had not made many demands on Finland. They had appeared respectful of Mannerheim’s authority in military affairs and had made surprisingly little effort to dominate domestic policy or to attempt any Nazification of Finland, although they exerted pressure for censorship of the press. The Germans also manipulated the shipment of foods and fuel to demonstrate their indispensability. Embarrassing honors were lavished on Finnish leaders, particularly on Marshal Mannerheim, and relations between the military leaders were cordial even though those between the Finnish government and the Nazi chiefs were not. As the Finns were not slow to recognize, the Germans could not hurt Finland without hurting themselves also. Furthermore, what was the main concern for the Finns, who had but one enemy, was only a side show for the Germans.

By 1943 the political and economic strain on Finland had mounted to the point where a change of policy was imperative as soon as a proper opportunity arose. When the United States offered its good offices to Finland in March, 1943, the newly appointed foreign minister made an astonishing journey to Berlin to explain why Finland could not reject the offer without exploring the possibilities. However, the blast from Von Ribbentrop was so frightening that the Finnish government declined the American suggestion. The time had arrived when they began


to receive from the Nazis a series of outright demands for a formal alliance and for a promise from Finland to fight to the finish.

Although the Finns did not feel the full weight of the Nazis' demands until the middle of 1943, when Germany began to lose the great war, Finland's military and economic situation had already deteriorated markedly compared to the beginning months of its second war with Russia. During this period Finland was under heavy diplomatic pressure from the great democracies, who were desirous of aiding Finland's enemy in its war with Nazi Germany. However, Russia would make no direct peace overtures to Finland; it left these to its Western allies. Caught up in a war within a war, Finland was soon entrapped by the power whose aid it had accepted in avenging its defeat in the Winter War.

Paralyzed by the dangers flowing from every alternative course, the Finns seemed helpless to choose a different policy from that which they had been pursuing. Yet they had not in fact lost all freedom of action. They could still fix the character of their own government, regardless of how much the Nazis might dislike it. They could also adhere to their own military objectives without respect to their partner's preferences. The Germans could not severely punish them for their independence, because of the mutually dependent position of the two states. Since Germany still needed Finland, retaliation would more likely injure than help Germany's cause. The Finns could also extract materials vital for their welfare from their partner because the German government desired to keep their co-operation, but they found the flow liable to arbitrary checks when they were noticeably non-compliant.

The Finnish leaders felt that they had no choice but to ignore the appeals made by the Western powers to desert their Fascist partner. The Finns were compelled to recognize the dominance of Germany even if the Western powers did not. Finland could not afford to give up a favorable position with respect to Russia to satisfy the democracies when the British and Americans were unable to protect Finland militarily or even to give it economic help. Traditional friendship and ideological bonds offered little assistance, since the Western powers had larger and more pressing
interests, as well as different enemies, different military goals, and different perspectives on the proper balance of power in the region where Finland was located. Once again the Finns found that the small state may be in greater danger of being a pawn when great powers agree than when they fall out.

It did Finland no good to proclaim that its war against one of Hitler's enemies was wholly separate from Hitler's war against the rest of them. Finland's actions, however, were more effective than its words; the state of war that was declared between Britain and Finland was not followed by any act of war between Finland and the West. The week that saw American entry into World War II also saw a halt in the Finnish advance into Soviet territory. And with this halt came a stalemate in the north that both sides were content to prolong until Hitler's strength had begun to ebb.

5

THE SOVIET UNION'S PEACE DEMANDS, 1944

Now that Germany's military power was clearly declining, the time was propitious for greater Western activity to get Finland out of the war. The United States not only pressed Finland but also raised the question on more than one occasion with the Soviet Union, and Churchill also participated in some of the discussions. The terms which the Russians would impose seemed of no great moment to the Western leaders so long as Finland's continued independence was assured, although they did lightly caution Stalin as to the undesirability of excessive indemnities. Even after being informed of the Draconian terms Russia finally proposed early in 1944, the Western Allies made a joint declaration with Russia to Finland as well as to Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria to leave the war while there was still time. The United States backed this up by blacklisting Finnish firms trading with Germany and expelling the Finnish minister and three other legation officials.  

When President Ryti made a no-separate-peace promise to Hitler in June, 1944, the United States at last broke off diplomatic relations with Finland. According to the Russians, the final armistice terms, accepted in September, 1944, were decided upon with the "closest co-operation" of Great Britain and were approved by the United States. Prime Minister Churchill, in speaking to Parliament on September 28, 1944, admitted that the terms "bear naturally the imprint of the Soviet will." But he also drew attention to the Russians' "restraint." Secretary Hull indicated that the United States did not know the detailed conditions, since the Russians had not consulted closely with the Americans. He recorded later that "Finland . . . formed only a minor part of our relations with Russia." 25

So far as the Allies were concerned, therefore, the Russians had a free hand in imposing their will on Finland. Nevertheless, the Soviet Union was unsuccessful in compelling the Finns to accept the peace terms it laid down in March, 1944, which included withdrawal to the 1940 boundary by the end of April. Worse still, German forces in Finland were to be interned or ousted within a month. By the end of May the Finnish army was to be half demobilized and the entire army reduced to a peacetime basis by June or July. Reparations in kind amounting to $600,000,000 were to be paid in five years. After Petsamo had been "returned" to Russia, the Russians would consider the possibility of giving up the lease of Hangö.

The settlement eventually accepted by the Finns on September 19, 1944, was somewhat less harsh. By that time the Russians were more interested in striking at the heart of Germany than in occupying the northern country. Thus no mention was made in the September terms of the lease of Hangö, and the reparations demand was cut in half and was to be paid in six years instead of five. However, the new terms included a fifty-year lease of the Porkkala Peninsula (in the immediate vicinity of Helsinki) and a recognition of the right of the Soviet Union to use ports and airfields in southern Finland and also the Finnish merchant navy until final victory over Germany. All pro-German or anti-Russian organizations were required to be dissolved and war crimes trials

were to be held. An “Allied” (Russian) Control Commission would enforce the execution of the conditions. 26

Prior to Finland’s rejection of the Russians’ spring peace terms, Helsinki had been subjected to furious air bombardment on several occasions. But these acts of violence were minor compared to the offensive mounted by the Russians on the Karelian Isthmus in June, following the Finns’ rejection of their spring terms. Earlier it had seemed unendurable to the Finns to go twice through the tragedy of the Karelian exodus and to withdraw from territory still in the possession of undefeated Finnish troops; the Finns had thus waited in hope of faring better when the Allies made their anticipated entrance on the Continent. By January, 1944, however, the Russian offensive south of Leningrad was sweeping along the Estonian coast of the Gulf of Finland, and Finland was cut off from Germany. Meanwhile, the Finns were feeling the weight of intense propaganda from the Western Allies and from Sweden to get out of the war while there was still time to save themselves. Swedish promises to aid with food supplies made the Finns more ready to discuss peace terms with the Russians. However, the fate of Hungary and Rumania, which the Germans occupied when these countries dared to consider peace with Russia, gave the Finns pause in March. When they heard the complete list of Russian conditions, they could not face the consequences of acceptance. How could Finland expel the Germans while simultaneously reducing the army by half? One war would be exchanged for another. Expert opinion advised the government that the reparations demand was far beyond Finland’s capacity to pay, and if fulfilled would leave nothing over to keep the Finns alive at home.

By June the Finns were also feeling the brunt of the Nazis’ anger. Not only had the Finnish government continually refused to promise that it would conclude no separate peace, but it was also dealing with the Soviet Union. In addition to verbal harassments by the Germans the Finns ceased to receive grain from them. Nevertheless, there remained a forlorn hope that they

might still get some German aid to fend off the time when capitulation was the only way out.

The Finns turned a last time to Germany rather than accept the unconditional surrender which the Russians were then demanding. The Germans moved halfway to meet Marshal Mannerheim's request for anti-tank weapons and ammunition and troop support. In return, Ribbentrop came to Helsinki to demand that the Finns at last sign a written agreement to continue their fight with the Germans against Russia. To gain precious time and increase the chance of creating conditions for obtaining acceptable peace, President Ryti agreed to sign the desired undertaking with Germany's foreign minister but did so in his own name. Parliamentary consent was almost inconceivable in any case.

The retreat from the Karelian Isthmus was brought to an end in late July. The ailing President Ryti resigned August 1, and Marshal Mannerheim succeeded him, forming a new government which no longer felt bound by Ryti's personal promise. After securing Swedish assurances of food supplies for the following six months if the war were ended, Finland sued for peace from a much better military position than before the German aid had come to bolster the faltering Finnish forces. In accordance with the preliminary Russian conditions, Finland on September 2 broke off diplomatic relations with Germany and requested the evacuation of German forces within two weeks. The Finnish government accepted the Russian terms and prepared for a new conflict with the Germans.27

Until the Finns had actually given up, the Germans took no drastic steps which would automatically end their hopes of keeping Finland in the war. When the Finnish capitulation removed their inhibitions, the German retaliation was direct and terrible. President Mannerheim wrote a personal letter to Hitler, appealing for an understanding of the Finns' position, pointing out the absence of any further chance for mutual help, and expressing the desire to continue the friendly relations developed during the

period of *Waffenbrüderschaft*, but Hitler completely ignored this letter. In the north, where there were over 200,000 soldiers with large amounts of equipment, the Germans held out for four months. Every mile of Finnish territory covered by the retreating Germans was laid waste with complete thoroughness.28

Russian troops took a part in driving the Germans from the north of Finland, but the Russians did not remain, as they had in countries to the south. Perhaps occupation seemed unnecessary to them. The armistice terms, practically unchanged by the peace treaty concluded at the Paris Peace Conference in 1946, appeared to put Finland completely at the mercy of the Soviet Union. Finland was stripped of its defenses. Germany was gone as a counterweight to Russian pressure, and the Western Allies continued to regard Finland as too remote to warrant much attention.

The Finns did indeed have to submit to Russian interference. The government leaders—with the significant exception of Mannerheim—were subjected to a war-responsibility trial and were imprisoned for a time, although not silenced. Among them was Väinö Tanner, still a powerful party chief in 1958. For a brief period Finland had a Communist minister of the interior, but he was ousted by the Finns without serious consequences. In 1948, the year of the Czech coup, Finland was compelled to sign a mutual assistance pact with Russia. The Russians for a long time ignored the promise of the peace treaty that Finland should become a member of the United Nations, but it was finally admitted in the “package deal” of 1955. The Finns accomplished the seemingly impossible task of paying off the reparations on time, but they suffered economic hardship at home, and their economy inevitably became bound to that of Russia because, in paying off the reparations in kind, they were required by the Russians to engage in various types of manufacturing which went far beyond their own needs.29

Finland was mutilated but still alive and unoccupied. Thanks to the Finns’ doggedness and industry, to Swedish and American financial aid in the early stages, and to a favorable market for


forest products, the Finns did not experience an economic col-
lapse. A defense force limited strictly to internal protection had 
its compensations. Complete isolation of Finland for a period 
meant that there was no foreign policy about which to worry. 
Political subversion got nowhere among the unreceptive Finns, 
and Russian interference tapered off. In a sense post-1944 Finland 
was freer than it was after the Moscow Peace of 1940.

During the later period of the Russo-Finnish conflict, Finland 
was in the most unenviable situation. Germany was losing the 
world war, and Soviet successes were cutting it off from Finland. 
However, Hitler still had troops concentrated in the north of 
Finland and was adamantly opposed to a separate peace. The 
Western allies of Russia, on the other hand, were pressing hard 
for such a settlement without apparent regard to the terms the 
enemy would demand. Added to their voices was that of the 
necessary neighbor, Sweden, to which Finland was closely tied. The 
terms which Russia had originally proposed had threatened even 
greater destruction to Finland than continuing belligerence. Yet 
how could this small state meet its inevitable defeat and still 
survive?

Large-scale military support from a waning military partner 
was impossible to secure. Nevertheless, the Finns were able to 
obtain sufficient aid to allow them to halt their retreat, because 
the Nazis wanted to believe that their help would be compen-
sated. The price which the Finns had to pay was a commitment 
to make no separate peace. When the Finns, having achieved 
their purpose, repudiated the obligation, they had to pay the bill 
in further violence, this time from their former Waffenbrüder. 
Despite the cost the Finns experienced a net gain, for they had 
put off capitulation until the external situation had improved and 
they could expect better terms. Finland demonstrated that by 
timing its surrender, postponing it when the terms were too 
onerous but yielding when the enemy was preoccupied with gains 
in a more critical theater of war, a small state may prevent oc-
cupation even though it may lose any voice in defining the 
terms.30

Like other states in this study, Finland's leaders had desired

30 To show the power of the defeated, an illuminating comparison may 
be made with three other capitulations as described in Paul Kecskemeti, 
Strategic Surrender: The Politics of Victory and Defeat.
separate outcomes of the war in western and eastern Europe. Had the Allies made their re-entry on the Continent sooner and had the Germans maintained a stalemate in the east, Finland’s fate would have been happier. The Finns’ hopes really depended on a three-sided great-power balance of pressure such as Turkey faced, but events at the moment of crisis revealed only two sides, and one of these was moving toward collapse. When the great powers agree, the small state is in danger; when one side conquers the other, the small state faces catastrophe.

CONCLUSIONS

How was it that Finland survived three wars and made a startling economic recovery even though “right in between the forepaws of the bear”? This could not be attributed to active diplomatic aid from the West any more than to military aid from Germany. The bargaining position of the Finns was to some degree strengthened by the proximity of an important neutral, Sweden. The last-ditch character of Finnish military resistance plus the existence of more inviting regions for Russian expansion elsewhere go far to explain Russian “restraint” in dealing with this small neighbor. Later, with the development of the Cold War and a new balance among the great powers, the Russians chose to treat Finland as an example of Soviet good neighborliness. Thus they implicitly recognized the line of greatest resistance, which was the Finnish people. A firm constitutional consensus and Spartan endurance made a difference in the determination of Finland’s fate.

The Finns failed in their efforts to use Germany to resist the Russians, but the Germans also failed in their attempt to use the Finns. The two specific objectives for which the Germans sought aid from the Finns were not achieved: capture of Leningrad and blocking Allied aid to Russia via the Murmansk railroad. These facts went unnoticed by the Allies during the war, so far as public utterances were concerned, and gained no credit for the Finns in the peace settlement. Neither did the fact that Finland did not become Fascist although it had been a military associate of the Nazis.

31 Arnold Toynbee, in Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Realignment of Europe, p. 33.
Part of Finland's suffering during World War II arose because each actor in the situation imperfectly or incorrectly perceived what the other actors wanted or would do. Enemies with completely conflicting sets of values, such as Finland and Russia, could hardly be expected to entertain accurate notions regarding each other. Where opponents in the war had common political values, as did the Allies and Finland, they had differing operational perspectives on how to protect these values which led them into conflict. Deep in a life-and-death struggle, the Finns willingly co-operated with a regime whose abominable deeds elsewhere they did not recognize or only weakly protested against. Similarly the Western powers sometimes ignored ideological preferences in order to keep the Russians working with them, to the detriment of the small democracy of Finland. Yet some Western leaders admitted frankly that the Finnish case was really quite unimportant in the larger conflict. Perhaps it was in part the insignificance of Finland that saved the Finns.

To influence the great powers making demands upon them, the Finns had very little of strategic value to offer within the context of pure neutrality. All they had to offer was the use of their territory, a concession which fatally compromised their status. Unlike the Turks, the Finns could not convince either side that yielding to its pressure would provoke retaliation by the other side, which would make the concession worthless. Nor was Finland at any time in a very good position to gain its way by threatening to join the other side. Thus the Finns had to depend upon their intrinsic strength alone, and fortunate it was for their nation that they had the stamina to fight it out.
IV

Norway: Maritime Neutral

Nor will it do for him to say, “I do not care for anything; I desire neither honor nor profit; all I want is to live quietly and without trouble,”—for such excuses would not be admitted. Men of condition cannot choose their way of living, and even if they did choose it sincerely and without ambition, they would not be believed; and were they to attempt to adhere to it, they would not be allowed to do so by others.¹

More determinedly isolationist politically if less isolated geographically than the Finns, the Norwegians shared their fate because Norway’s capacity to maintain its neutrality was unconvincing. Where each belligerent believes that a small neutral can and will defend itself against sudden attack by the other long enough for effective help to arrive, or at any rate long enough to inflict on the aggressor the loss of that which he most wants from the neutral, the small state is unlikely to lose its neutrality. Norway’s will to be neutral was not in doubt, but it appeared powerless to enforce its neutrality except through economic means. Thus each belligerent side tried with violence to anticipate a move of violence by the other. The Norwegians were so wedded to neutrality that they feared to exploit Britain’s power to stave off the Germans and were unable to use Germany’s power to stave off the British. Furthermore, the Norwegians reaped the disadvantages of appearing pro-British despite all their protestations. They ended up being allied with victorious Britain after all.

¹ Machiavelli, Discourses, Book III, chap. ii.
The story of Norway's diplomatic resistance to the demands of opposing belligerents in World War II is short and ends in violence. Yet in the seven months between the outbreak of the war and the German invasion, Norway successfully defended its interests against very strong adverse pressure by a great power which was assumed to be a friendly sister democracy. When the climax of the belligerents' struggle over Norway came, the limits of an unarmed small state's ability to protect itself by a single-minded policy of neutrality stood out clearly. Norway's freedom was not completely exterminated, but the tale of how Norway under the German yoke survived, fought back, and became one of the original United Nations must be left for another time. That this state, inflexibly neutral until it became a belligerent in World War II, should join the military alliance of NATO was a logical development of Norway's experience in World War II.

Like Finland, Norway covers a large territory in proportion to its small population (not much over three million). It spreads far north of the Arctic Circle, and this location means a difficult climate over a large part of the country. Since most of it is mountainous, the cultivable area being only 3 per cent, Norway's position on the sea governs its life. Besides linking Norway closely with the outside world, especially Britain and the West, the sea provides the most important communication between points within the country. The sea also provides the main sources of the Norwegians' livelihood: shipping and fishing. The Gulf Stream warms the west coast sufficiently to permit a modern economy to function very far north. Closeness to the sea has greatly added to the value of the abundant water power, mineral deposits, and timber. Besides the fiords, which provide easy access to mainland points far from the open ocean, Norway possesses a unique sea passage, the Leads. These form a continuous route along most of the long coast of Norway which is deep-water but still sheltered from the open sea by the ubiquitous island archipelagos. The Leads are thus part of Norway's territorial waters.

The geographical conditions, though restrictive, have not prevented an industrious and resourceful people from achieving a high living standard in the twentieth century. This economic well-being has been fairly evenly distributed among the people: there has been no great concentration of wealth, nor has poverty
been widespread. Lines between social classes have not been marked, and social mobility has been high. Respect for the rule of law has marked Norwegian behavior, and political participation has been open to all. Compared to other nations, Norway has been an outstanding democracy. The self-reliance of the individual Norwegian was demonstrated after the German invasion, when resistance groups formed themselves from the ground up, without organization by a superior authority.

With a small population and a location away from the centers of strife, the Norwegians before the war had neither the wish nor the capacity to participate in the councils of high politics with greater powers. Others could make the broad decisions so long as Norway was left alone. In the economic realm, however, the Norwegian position was different. Although lacking the political capacity to protect themselves, the Norwegians had both an important economic stake in world affairs and economic instrumentalities for guarding this interest. The superabundance of the few goods and services which Norway could produce required world markets, while many of the necessities of life and industry had to be imported. World War I, when food and fuel were cut off, impressed Norwegians deeply with their economic vulnerability. Against this susceptibility to injury, Norway had available both a source of income and a tool of power in its merchant fleet, one of the three or four largest and best equipped in the world.

Norway’s modern experience as an independent state dates only from 1905. The brevity of this experience may help to account for the business orientation which characterized Norwegian negotiations with both Germany and Britain after war broke out.

Since 1935 the government had been in the hands of the Labor party, most of whose members were new to decision-making on a national or international scale. The Labor party was not a majority party, and since members of other parties were suspicious of “socialism,” its rule was somewhat insecure. Yet all groups seemed to recognize that a small nation could not “afford to have its foreign relations made a matter of factious contro-

2 For a brief description of Norway and its people see Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Scandinavian States and Finland, pp. 151–231.
versy."\(^3\) Despite strong pressure to form a coalition government for the war, the Labor party continued to govern alone until the German invasion, and the other five parties co-operated even though the Labor leaders refused their offers of a moratorium on party politics.\(^4\)

There was unanimous agreement that the only possible foreign policy for Norway was neutrality. Neutrality had indeed become almost a sacred concept. For well over a century Norwegians had not known war, and, although the price had been very high in World War I, Norway's success in remaining non-belligerent though pro-Allied gave the Norwegians confidence that their country could again stay out of war.

Most Norwegian leaders, particularly in the Labor party, interpreted neutrality, peace, and disarmament as practically synonymous. Rearmament, they believed, might offend some nation and thus would appear to weaken Norway's pure impartiality. It would be dangerous also, many of them thought, to perpetuate the type of reactionary thinking often found in permanent military organizations. Money spent on arms would not be available for more desired social and economic welfare plans. Since Norway's armed forces were already so small, whatever additional funds could be spent on them would probably do no good. In any case, it was assumed that geographical conditions would make invasion of Norway difficult and defense easy. Furthermore, the British fleet could be relied upon to control the North Sea.

One or another of these arguments kept Norway practically unarmed until war broke out. Then, too late, the government heeded the dangers of Hitler's expansion and approved large expenditures for rearmament.\(^5\) However, there were few deliveries of critical items before the Germans came. In September, 1939, the navy consisted chiefly of some old ships intended for coastal defense. There were no tanks, no anti-tank guns, and very little anti-aircraft protection.\(^6\) At the time of the invasion, Norway had five coastal fortresses; but their guns were only partly manned, and they lacked infantry garrisons to protect

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\(^3\) Carl Hambro, *I Saw It Happen in Norway*, p. 75.

\(^4\) *Le Nord*, 1939, pp. 539-40.


\(^6\) Hambro, *op. cit.*, pp. 78, 164-65.
them from a landing party. Although Norway had had some kind of compulsory military service since the seventeenth century, when the Germans came the total number of men under arms was about 13,000, half of them in the north. Still, what use would heavy defense expenditures serve for a country without enemies? Norway's relations with all interested countries were good, and they were especially close with the other northern countries and Britain. Norwegians did not fear the Soviet Union as did the Russians' other neighbors. Although Nazism was the complete antithesis of the Norwegian Weltanschauung, Norway had important trade and educational links with Germany.

As the war approached, the Norwegian leaders were uneasy about the military power of the great states regardless of their ideologies. In the late 1930's Norwegian diplomacy had centered on keeping Norway free of any involvement. After the Ethiopian crisis Norway joined the other disillusioned small western European powers in declaring itself no longer obligated by Article XVI of the League of Nations Covenant. In the eyes of Norwegian leaders the League had been transformed from a protector of the rights of all nations, small as well as great, to an instrument capable of compromising the small states and dragging them into great-power conflicts.

As hostilities became imminent, Norway's statesmen met with those of the other northern countries to exchange views and reaffirm their intention to stay neutral. As firmly as any member of this group, if not more firmly, Norway upheld the view that each state could best remain neutral by itself. Only general statements of like-minded neutrality and some very preliminary discussion of economic co-operation came from the Scandinavian meetings. A co-ordinated northern war economy proved an illusory hope, since each country feared to weaken its particular sources of strength by sharing them. Neither the Norwegians nor the Swedes, their most natural partners, cared to mention the word "alliance." That any military agreement between the northern states would involve increased armament expenditures for Norway was an additional reason for opposing it. However,

8 Besides their attachment for neutrality per se, the Norwegians had not forgotten that in World War I they favored the Allies, while the Swedes favored Germany.
Norway and Sweden issued almost identical declarations of neutrality when Germany invaded Poland on September 1 and the Allies declared war on Germany two days later. Norway also regularly consulted Sweden regarding common neutrality problems as the war proceeded, and the two countries co-operated in such matters as the pooling of intelligence. Like Finland and Sweden, Norway rejected Hitler’s demand for a non-aggression pact made in the spring of 1939; the Norwegian government believed that this kind of agreement was unnecessary in peace and useless in war. The president of the Storting made a similar, more informal, rejection of a tentative British hint that England “would not be disinterested” in a possible guaranty or defense pact with the northern countries if their independence was threatened. “A neutrality, guaranteed from one country, ceases to be neutrality [if] the case should arise...”

In addition to avoiding treaty ties with any other state, Norway’s leaders, especially Foreign Minister Halvdan Koht, believed a successful neutrality policy required maintaining a balance in Norway’s economic relations between the two belligerent sides. This balance they defined as maintenance of the normal trade patterns. Since the British could exert far more economic pressure on Norway than could the Germans, the greatest danger of an upset in the balance would accordingly come from England. Furthermore, it would be necessary to compensate overtly for the strong natural pro-Allied sentiment in Norway. Thus the government’s policy focused on resisting British economic and diplomatic demands and lost sight of the possibility of military aggression from the other side except as it might arise from British economic action. Since Norway was much more self-sufficient than in World War I, partly through the building-up of large stockpiles and partly through modern economic developments, the country should be able to hold fast against economic pressure from the belligerent.9

The foreign minister was correct that the explicit demands

made upon Norway in the ensuing months would come from the British side. Not diplomatic pressure but the coup de main proved to be the German way of controlling Norway. However, both before the war and for a while after its outbreak, the Germans were quite content to leave Norway out of their military plans. A neutral Norway would serve two purposes: First, it would keep the British out. Second, it would permit the continued flow of the iron ore from the Swedish mines down through the Leads from Narvik when the Baltic was frozen. This ore the Germans believed vital to their armament industry. Furthermore, with the frightening memory of the British blockade of World War I indelibly imprinted in their minds, the Germans could not tolerate the prospect of a British control over Norway.10

For the very reasons that the Germans wanted Norway neutral the British sought to involve it in their economic warfare. During the first months—the “phony war” period—England had great expectations from this method of fighting the enemy. Not only did the British remember the terrible loss in manpower in the World War I slaughter typified by Verdun; they also lacked military power at the beginning of World War II to deal with the Germans directly on the battlefield. The British calculated in detail the economic weaknesses of Germany and, strongly supported by public opinion, banked on economic measures in lieu of a military contest in the west. To cut off Germany’s supplies from the outside they needed the co-operation, or at least the acquiescence, of the states which were close to Germany or which were supplying it from abroad. Norway played a leading role in the initial stages of the Allies’ economic warfare for many reasons, most notably because the Leads seemed the easiest place to stop the crucially important iron ore from reaching Germany. But in conducting their policy toward Norway, the British showed a lack of understanding of Norwegian ways of thinking which contributed toward a disastrous failure of their efforts to involve Norway against its will.11

10 The German outlook may be found in International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals, III, 263, and Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, 581–85; IV, 509; Anthony Martiessen, Hitler and His Admirals, pp. 43 ff.; Walther Hubatsch, Die deutsche Besetzung von Dänemark und Norwegen 1940, p. 24.

With these incompatible perspectives on Norway's role in the war, it was impossible for the Norwegians to remain outside the conflict. First came the negotiations over the British demand to control Norway's overseas trade and the use of Norway's extensive merchant marine. The former demand met with the inevitable counterpressure from Germany. Neither of these issues—shipping or trade—concerned Norway's continued neutrality so directly as the Allied demand for the transit of an expeditionary force to Finland, which was related in objective to the British and French demand for the end of the ore traffic to Germany through Norway's territorial waters. These two crises led directly to the German invasion of Norway and the Norwegians' subsequent entrance into the war on the Allied side.

I

BRITISH TRADE AND SHIPPING DEMANDS

No sooner had the war begun than the British opened discussions to obtain all Norwegian tonnage not needed for Norwegian use and, in particular, about two-thirds of Norway's oil-tanker tonnage. The British were not interested in a framework agreement setting the conditions under which shipping would be available. They wanted a promise of a particular quantity of ships at a particular price. At the same time that one set of British officials was dealing with this question, another began negotiations with Norway on a war trade agreement. The object of this agreement was to make sure that Norway would forbid the "re-export to Germany of goods reaching them through the Allied controls, and . . . limit the sale to Germany of other goods to 'normal' pre-war figures."12 In addition to a great variety of restrictions on Norway's participation directly and indirectly in trade with Germany, the British desired an increase in Norway's trade with England, including most if not all of Norway's metallurgical exports. Among the most ominous demands were those relating to fish products, including whale oil; these were the commodities the Germans were simultaneously most urgently seeking from Norway.

The Germans appeared at the time indifferent to the British

12 Medlicott, *op. cit.*, p. 55. In the Allies' division of labor the British took the lead in trade negotiations for both Britain and France in the case of the northern countries.
demand on Norway for the use of its shipping, but they were greatly interested in the trade demands.\textsuperscript{13} They wished to continue their trade with Norway on a “normal” basis, taking 1938 as the year for measurement, although they indicated that they would want more of certain products than Germany had received from Norway in that year. The Germans permitted negotiations to drag on for four months because they did not want to hasten the crystallization of a Norwegian-British trade agreement, but eventually the Nazis became impatient. They obtained an agreement with Norway in February, 1940, within two days of the date on which the Norwegians reached a final understanding with the British. What Germany received in its accord was based on the concessions made by the British in their own undertaking with the Norwegians. The Germans were not in a good bargaining position. Most of the economic inducements they offered failed to impress the Norwegians, whose regular sources for the products tendered were not likely to dry up so long as they placated the British. Far more impressive was the Nazis’ indiscriminate sinking of fifty-one ships, in which Norway lost 357 seamen, from November, 1939, to the following February. Sinking ships was an unselective instrument of coercion which nevertheless had some influence on the Norwegians in their trade negotiations.\textsuperscript{14}

The British could not (or would not) strike terror in Norwegian hearts by such imprecise and brutal means, but they had other instruments at their command. They could restrict imports into Norway from England. They could require individual guaranties from private Norwegian firms, and in this manner they were able to play on the strong Norwegian fear of the black list. To persuade the Norwegians, they promised to do everything possible to ease wartime controls and inconveniences caused to shipping if their terms were accepted for controlling

\textsuperscript{13} Months later they used the shipping agreement in building up their propaganda case against Norway.

Norway's trade. They argued that the neutrals' co-operation would shorten the war and that the Germans would not retaliate by force, since the British could injure the Germans too seriously to make violence worth Germany's while. But the British position was strong chiefly because they could cut Norway off from its world trade. Thus, when arguing with the Norwegians about the amount of whale oil and fish products to be permitted the Germans, they pointed out that the Norwegian whale oil catch and the indispensable gear for fishing vessels could reach Norway only through British sufferance. Such intimations were not habitual, but they reflected the British belief that they bargained from a stronger position, which was symbolically underlined when they insisted that all talks be held in London.

Despite the British position of superior power, they had retreated from a more extreme stand on many points by February, 1940, and at the end of the month signed an agreement which by no means answered all their desires. They were inhibited by several considerations. Thus the English negotiators were not sure that Norway could avoid being pushed toward aiding the Germans if the British seriously violated Norwegian neutrality or tried coercion. If they insisted on terms that might have caused a rupture in negotiations, the Germans might have a clear field in their own negotiations, or there might be a crisis in Norwegian politics. In the latter case they might not obtain the shipping which they so desperately needed. Ships were not the only goods and services the Norwegians could withhold from England and its ally, France, which were important to their war effort; there were others as well, such as wood products. Despite some reassuring arguments used on the Norwegians, the British knew they could not guarantee Norway's defense if the Germans did attack. However, they felt that if they came to an agreement with Norway, this would strengthen the Norwegian foreign minister in his negotiations with Germany. Two other considerations help to explain the softening British front: a breakdown in the trade discussions would have adversely affected the negotiations on the ore traffic from Narvik and those on the Finnish aid question. These two considerations could have been in Churchill's mind when he answered parliamentary critics of the "soft" economic warfare policy: "The efficiency of our contraband control . . . depends not upon the Navy, but upon political decisions. . . . But
no one must neglect the serious character of the political decisions which must rule and which are dictated by our relations with various neutral countries."\textsuperscript{15} This statement also reflected the fear that heavy-handed measures against the smaller neutrals might unduly irritate the important neutrals, especially public opinion in the United States.\textsuperscript{16}

The British had come around to this view of their power to control Norwegian trade only after prolonged opposition from Norway. The Norwegian leaders had resented not only the original demands themselves but the manner in which they were put forward, which the Norwegians had regarded as insulting or humiliating.\textsuperscript{17} They knew their vulnerability to England's pressure, and they believed that to maintain the flow of supplies indispensable to their livelihood they must satisfy England's requirements. They expected restrictions, but, when the British tried to extend their control to cover Norway's trade with other neutral countries, transit by land, or the export of products of purely Norwegian origin, both their independence and their security appeared threatened. If the British continued to insist on the prohibition or sharp curtailment of products usually going to Germany, what would happen to the concept of "normal trade" on which they had predicated their safety from German force?

To hold their own course in the trade negotiations the Norwegian government first sought to use the not unwelcome British demand for their shipping in order to offset the far more distasteful trade demands. The chief problem in so doing was to avoid appearing unneutral if they agreed to provide the desired shipping. Thus the shipowners as a private group were persuaded to carry on the negotiations for a shipping agreement, which

\textsuperscript{15} House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 357, col. 1934 (February 27, 1940); see also the statement of the minister of economic warfare, \textit{ibid.}, Vol. 358, cols. 1776-79 (March 8, 1940).


\textsuperscript{17} For example, the British warned the Norwegians not to permit German vessels to sail under the Norwegian flag.
were to run concurrently with—and be co-ordinated with—the trade negotiations. The shipowners were also agreed on the desirability of a neutral policy, but they were not empowered to handle "political" questions. Anxious to keep their vessels sailing and at a reasonable price compared to the risks involved, they came to a commercial agreement before the official trade delegation had obtained any concessions from their British counterparts.

While this shipping agreement was very favorable for the shipowners and for the Norwegian economy, it failed to induce the British to accept the Norwegian government's contentions regarding trade control. The chance to use England's need for ships as a lever did not completely disappear, however. Despite the shipowners' reluctance to consider not honoring their agreement to the full, the agreement was not self-ratifying, and the British were never quite sure they would obtain the tonnage they wanted until they actually had it.

Although the Norwegian leaders failed to make the most of their own intrinsic strength, they still had opportunities for balancing one belligerent's demands against the other's. Here again, because of the overwhelming economic power of the British and the Norwegian's own trade and political interests, the full exploitation of conflicting demands did not take place. However, the Norwegians did manage to secure some bargains in which the two sides were involved. The outstanding three-way trade which they brought about was a "cannon for fish" arrangement achieved in the late stages of the negotiations. In return for ten large tankers beyond those promised in the shipping agreement, Britain agreed that Norway could export to Germany 50,000 tons of fresh fish over the 1938 quantity. In return for this fish, Germany agreed to deliver forty antiaircraft guns and ammunition sorely needed in Norway. 18

The war trade agreements as finally reached were not a complete triumph for any party. The British were promised curtailment of the future export to Germany of Norwegian goods in

which more than a small fraction of their content came over the seas. But the chief item involved was a restriction on the amount of whale oil to be brought in to Norway. The British agreed that Norway could export to Germany a certain quantity of fish oil and fat, which was only a small part of the usual import but much more than the “not one drop” the British had demanded in December. The Germans secured certain objectives, including agreement that 1938 would be taken as the date for reckoning “normal trade.” The Norwegians felt that they had upheld the concept of “normal trade,” at least so far as it applied to products of Norwegian origin, and they conceded very little, if anything, on some other disputed points. British promises of no undue restrictions on shipments to Norway, the assurance of certain raw materials, and the abandonment of the black-list threat were among the Norwegian gains.¹⁹ Yet invasion came too soon to calculate the relative effects of specific successes and concessions. The difference in the two belligerents’ influence over Norway could not be concealed, although the specific agreements were kept strictly secret. However it was not the question of trade but the Allies’ Finnish War plans and their counteraction to German breaches of neutrality in the Leads which triggered the invasion.

During these first months of World War II Norway, a maritime nation, was among the most exposed neutrals in the economic warfare opened up by Great Britain, with whom Norway had always been very closely associated in all realms of life. Yet traditional friendship did not impede the British from making demands which the Norwegians believed seriously threatened their neutrality and therefore their security. Great Britain had the economic and naval power to throttle the trade on which Norway lived. The opposing belligerent, Germany, had the same immediate objective as Norway—maintenance of normal trade. Its economic bargaining position was weak, but its ruthlessness in the use of force was being amply demonstrated on the seas. Vulnerable in having so much of its economy dependent upon shipping, Norway nevertheless possessed in its mercantile marine an important resource for diplomatic negotiations.

¹⁹ For the agreements ultimately reached see Õrvik, Norge i brennpunktet, pp. 346-52, 354-79; Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 157-58, 162-63.
The dangers to Norway were thus quite different from those faced by the Turks and the Finns, for whom the maintenance of their trade had not been a first-rank consideration. Yet, like these other small states, Norway had opportunities for balancing the pressures from more than one belligerent, and, as with Turkey's chrome and Finland's nickel, it had an important strategic resource in its shipping. Trade involves at least two partners, which meant that a small state in Norway's position had the power to resist demands in this field by withholding goods and services desired by the other side or by selling these to another buyer, even the enemy of the demanding state. This power was, however, severely circumscribed in the wartime case of Norway, because both belligerents (though in unequal measure) could use coercive methods to influence Norwegian trade, from the harassment of its overseas trade to the sinking of its ships.

Thus in the end the Norwegians could not confine their trade relations to the economic level or escape official responsibility for helping one side by delegating authority to private business groups. The commercial objective apparently shared by Norway and Germany to maintain normal trade could not be kept out of the political realm, for this ran counter to the war strategy of Britain, to say nothing of Norway's own long-range political interest. As Norway's trade became a political issue, however, the small state's bargaining position was strengthened by other political factors. These had to be considered by Britain, which could not force its policy too hard for fear of prejudicing other more important objectives. Meanwhile, the Norwegians were able, by stubbornly standing their ground on normal trade, to preserve an appearance of impartiality in the great conflict; thus they avoided German retaliation for practices which favored the other side.

2

ALLIED DEMAND FOR TRANSIT OF FINNISH AID CONTINGENT

Products which Norway could export to Germany were of minor importance in the Allies' economic warfare plans compared to the Swedish iron ore traffic which involved Norway because it passed through the Leads. To stop this contribution to the
German war effort the British political leaders (Churchill especially) were ready to use many different methods, and the valiant fight which the Finns were waging against the Soviet Union suggested one. Churchill has reported:

"I sympathised ardently with the Finns and supported all proposals for their aid; and I welcomed this new and favourable breeze as a means of achieving the major strategic advantage of cutting off the vital iron-ore supplies of Germany. If Narvik was to become a kind of Allied base to supply the Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to Germany. Once Norwegian and Swedish protestations were overborne for whatever reason, the greater measures would include the less." 20

There were strong misgivings among some of the military, because of the great difficulties of fighting the Germans in the north with the appallingly deficient forces the Allies had at their command. If the ore was indeed so important to the Germans, would they watch the traffic being blocked and not react violently? However, the political leaders, especially those in France, did not regard unfavorably the idea that Germany might become deeply engaged in Scandinavia, far from their own more vulnerable fronts. The plan approved by the Supreme War Council on February 5, 1940, for an expedition to Finland was described as the "first and best chance of wresting the initiative and ... shortening the war." 21

Many British and French leaders had imagined for some time that the threat of Russian aggression in the north would cause the Norwegians and Swedes to bend their neutrality in favor of the West and that they might almost welcome Allied intervention. As early as December, 1939, the Allied governments had asked Norway and Sweden to help carry out the League of Nations resolutions on aid to Finland, especially to permit the passage of indirect help, volunteers, and war materials. These measures were, as everyone realized, insufficient to bring the Finns victory. On March 2, 1940, their military plans complete, the Allies sent notes to Norway as well as Sweden. These announced Allied readiness to send a force as soon as Finland

20 Churchill, op. cit., pp. 543-44.
21 Quoted in Derry, op. cit., p. 13.
formally appealed for it. The expedition would have to cross
Norwegian and Swedish territory, and in due course formal
request would be made for this transit. To still the Scandinavians' fears regarding a strong German reaction, the Allies were prepared to give extensive military assistance, which would require co-ordination with the Norwegian and Swedish military. If Norway's consent were given, the British proposed to send forces to secure Trondheim, Bergen, and Stavanger, to arrive by March 20.22

Such a plan was poorly adapted to securing Norwegian approval. This government was so cautious a neutral that it had abstained on the League of Nations vote to oust the Soviet Union and had even been afraid that a Scandinavian appeal to Russia to spare Finland might irritate the Russians. Norway had indeed, once the Winter War began, acquiesced in permitting passage of "technical" aid from the Allies, but this personnel had to come unofficially and in civilian garb. The Norwegians were sure that the more far-reaching Allied plan had other objectives in addition to aid to Finland. Why otherwise did the Allied plans envisage bases where the Norwegians believed themselves least vulnerable, while leaving open those areas, such as Oslo, which were closer to Germany? The Norwegian leaders expected that facilitating Allied aid would consolidate the Russo-German alliance and bring Norway into war with both these great powers. Permitting armed troops to pass through from the west would not in the end help the Finns, the Norwegians believed, because these would be wasted in fighting the inevitable German invasion of Scandinavia which would follow the abandonment of their neutrality.

During January and February the Norwegian government was occupied in denying to the Russians that Norway had departed from the rules of neutrality, reassuring the Germans that the Allies would not send troops through Norway, and, above all, trying to quench the very embarrassing flow of rumors and newspaper reports in England and especially France about such an

22 For the Allied expectations and actions see Churchill, op. cit., pp. 560-61; Derry, op. cit., pp. 12-16; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Norway and the War, p. 32; Sweden, Utrikesdepartment, Förspelet till det Tyska angrepet på Danmark och Norge den 9 April 1940, pp. 10, 121-22; for Churchill's warning to the neutrals of January 21, 1940, see London Times, January 22, 1940.
expedition. The Norwegians consulted continually with the Swedish government during this threatening period and tended to recognize its leadership. They were much relieved to learn that Sweden would deny the Allied request for transit. They thereupon gave a similarly negative reply to Britain and France.23 Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold has been quoted as saying that, if the Allied forces came, he would remove the railroad cars necessary for them to go through.24 But there has been no concrete evidence to show that Norway would have resisted the Allies by arms in an organized manner. Finland’s decision to conclude peace saved the Norwegians from further opposition to this Allied plan. It did not save Norway from the effects of the undiminished Allied determination to cut off the iron ore traffic.

In this crisis Norway's difficulties had shifted from the economic and political fields in which its trade was involved to the military field, the belligerents' use of its territory. Here the Norwegians were far less able to help themselves, and their dilemma was much more acute. On their northeast border was a friendly neighbor, Finland, fighting a desperate battle against Russia. If victorious, the Soviet Union could then directly threaten Norway. From the opposite direction Norway was being pressed by democratic great powers to allow their forces transit to the embattled Finland. Permission would surely be followed by violent counteraction from Germany, and this would spell the finish to Norway's non-belligerency.

In this crisis there was not much Norway could do except to act in unison with its fellow northern democracies. Common opposition to the Allied plan for sending an expeditionary force postponed the date for its departure until the war for which it was supposed to be used had ended. The Norwegian efforts to still public discussion abroad about an Allied move through the northern neutrals met with no success. The Norwegians could not, by the strictest observance of the laws of neutrality, convince Germany that Norway would not co-operate with the great-

23 The Norwegian expectations and techniques may be found in Innstilling, pp. 56 ff., 72; ibid., Suppl., I, 192-213, 216-30; Koht, Norway Neutral and Invaded, pp. 36 ff.; American Scandinavian Review, 1940, pp. 73-74; Bulletin of International News, 1940, pp. 124, 389.

24 Innstilling, p. 56.
power democracies. The small state lacked the power of initiative in this case, and its neutrality could be compromised by actions begun by the Allies. What the Norwegians might have done to convince the Germans of their intention and their ability to resist any invader by force could hardly be improvised at this late day. Further evidence of Norway's military impotence appeared very soon.

3

ALLIED DEMANDS FOR END OF GERMAN TRAFFIC THROUGH THE LEADS

When the abrupt end of the Winter War punctured the Allied plans for aid to Finland, it also crumpled British determination to maintain "the honourable correctitude which had deprived [them] of any strategic initiative."25 The British and French returned in mid-March, 1940, to Churchill's idea of mining the Norwegian territorial waters in order to stop the traffic in Swedish ore (as well as to prevent further torpedoing of merchant ships, such as had occurred in December). This project had been discussed since the previous fall, and two schools of thought had developed in England on the desirability of taking direct action. Lord Halifax and the service chiefs as well as the minister of economic warfare had earlier tended to hang back on the grounds of inadequate military force, political difficulties with neutral opinion, and the risk of economic retaliation. Churchill had from the beginning taken a bolder view of the advantages of minesowing, although he saw the need for getting the shipping negotiations with Norway out of the way first. Churchill had believed Norway's interests would prevent it from retaliating because this would bring economic ruin. Since the Norwegian sympathies were Western, Norway would not even try to take countermeasures unless compelled by brute German force. Churchill made the questionable assertion that the Germans would so act anyway, "whatever we do, if Germany thinks it in her interest to dominate forcibly the Scandinavian peninsula." He thought that British control of the Norwegian coastline should be a primary strategic objective and was sure that, even if Germany retaliated fully, the West would not be worse off for taking

the action, but might indeed gain by a German attack upon Norway or Sweden. He argued that small nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and freedom. The letter of the law must not in supreme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its protection and enforcement. It would not be right or rational that the aggressor Power should gain one set of advantages by tearing up all laws, and another set by sheltering behind the innate respect for law of its opponents.26

Churchill's point of view gained new converts after the failure of earlier attempts to solve the problem of the ore traffic. The British had been unable to obtain in their war trade agreement with Sweden in December, 1939, the assurance that the traffic would be stopped at its source, and the understanding they arrived at with the Swedes was based in part on the expectation that supplies coming from Narvik would be intercepted. On January 6, 1940, the Allies tested the Norwegian and Swedish attitude toward a forcible action in the Leads based on the already strongly protested sinkings of merchant ships by Germany in these waters. The note stated that by such action Germany had deprived Norwegian waters of their neutral character and that the British government might thus have to extend its naval operations into waters which had been made a theater of naval warfare by the enemy. But such an outburst came from Norway and Sweden that the British had turned instead to serious plans for Finland's aid. This tactic too had failed, and time was rapidly running out for the success of any plan. Very soon the Baltic ports would no longer be icebound, and thus the traffic through Narvik would lose its significance as the single important way Germany could obtain the ore.

Only once, on February 16, 1940, had the British deliberately entered Norway's territorial waters for a naval purpose. This was in the case of the "Altmark." While two Norwegian gunboats stood helplessly by, a sizable British naval force seized the German tanker serving as an auxiliary warship. They did so to free British prisoners taken earlier by the "Graf Spee." The British did not regard the notorious "Altmark" as making an "innocent passage" and had no faith that the Norwegian coastal patrol would deal with the infraction of Norway's neutrality. Churchill described the "Altmark" as "an invaluable trophy" if captured. The

Norwegians' angry denunciations of this act failed to impress the Germans as much as the act itself, and the incident marked an important step in Hitler's change of attitude toward leaving Norway alone.

A little over a month later, on March 28, 1940, the Allied Supreme War Council made its decision to mine the Leads, the action to take place four days after a note was sent to the Norwegian and Swedish governments. On April 5 the Allies notified these neutrals that they could not permit a new attack on Finland by either Russia or Germany. If such took place and the Scandinavian governments did not facilitate the Allies' efforts to help Finland as they thought fit, this would be considered a danger to vital Allied interests. They would also regard it an unfriendly act if Norway (or Sweden) entered a Scandinavian alliance providing for aid from Germany. If the Russians tried to get a footing on the Atlantic seaboard from Norway, this too would be contrary to Allied interests. The Allies would take appropriate measures if either neutral should "refuse, withdraw or curtail facilities" in commercial and shipping matters essential for the Allies to carry on the war. Finally, they could not allow the course of the war to be affected by advantages Norway and Sweden gave to Germany and would act in any way necessary to prevent Germany from obtaining resources to the disadvantage of the Western powers. The note did not specifically mention mine-laying. Simultaneously with the mine-laying operation the Allies planned to oppose possible German retaliation by sending small forces to four Norwegian ports. The one at Narvik was to extend to the Swedish frontier and perhaps even to the Swedish ore fields "as the champions of Sweden against aggression, actual or hypothetical."

French fears of a companion mining action on the Rhine delayed the project a few days. The mine-laying began in the first of three contemplated places on the Norwegian coast the very day the Germans embarked on their invasion of Norway. The Allies were intent upon their own Norwegian plans and had failed to note seriously or interpret correctly the signs of German activity.27

27 The British and French expectations and their actions are described in ibid., pp. 533–36, 544–48, 574–83, 739–40; Churchill, Blood, Sweat, and Tears, pp. 244–45; Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 180–92; Derry, op. cit., pp. 21 ff.;
The Norwegians did not know until the operation began exactly how far the British would go and with what means. However, they had long feared an Allied action which would destroy their neutrality. They viewed Allied naval strength in the North Sea as overwhelming and, like the British, took insufficient account of German air power. To underscore their concern King Haakon himself had directed an appeal to King George in January, 1940, to prevent steps which would inevitably bring Norway into the war. The foreign minister was continually active, trying to persuade the Western powers to refrain from action or threat of action violating Norwegian neutrality because it would provoke a German invasion. At the same time he attempted to persuade the Germans that the Anglo-French side had no serious plans for military intervention and therefore that there was no basis for German countermeasures. The Norwegian government continued to uphold its view that nothing in international law would permit the prohibition of peaceable merchant transport inside territorial waters. If the British were so greatly concerned about Germany’s obtaining iron ore from Sweden, why did they not go to the country which was the source? Quietly the Norwegians did so themselves, while publicly they belittled the importance of the quantity coming down through the Leads. As the crisis approached, the Norwegian government appealed three times to the United States government to use its influence to restrain the British, but the Americans evaded the issue.

These were all verbal responses. The “Altmark” incident demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the Norwegian neutrality patrol, and the event had not been followed by a general mobilization. The government had indeed considered that Norway might mine the Leads itself (a proposal made by the British in January). Delays ensued, however, and it was only on April 2, 1940, that

the Norwegian commanding admiral recommended such an operation. When the Norwegian government received on April 8 the Allies' proclamation that they would stop vessels carrying contraband of war through Norwegian waters by laying mines, the government immediately protested. It demanded that the mines be at once removed, failing which the Norwegian navy would do so itself. The very day the British started out to lay the mines an announcement was made in Oslo that export of iron ore from Narvik would stop. It was stopped for some time to come, not the way the British had anticipated but by hostilities following the German invasion.

When the Allies were foiled in their plan to send an expeditionary force to Finland through Norway and Sweden, the Norwegian situation became not less but more dangerous. The leaders of Britain and France felt desperate over their lack of military strength to oppose the enemy directly, and they sought to destroy him by cutting off a main artery of his armament industry which ran through neutral territory. While belittling the dangers of luring the Germans into Norway's region, they were threatening military action in Norway's territorial waters. They wished to prevent Norway from permitting the continuation of a practice which was in itself legal but very disadvantageous to their war plans. The action they contemplated would almost certainly involve Norway in war, and they ignored the arguments opposing their plans which were put forward by the neutrals concerned. Although two small states were involved, Norway was closer to the Allies and much more vulnerable to direct action.

In this critical situation the Norwegians probed the limits of diplomacy in protecting themselves from forceful coercion. Their attempt to give weight to their arguments by alluding to the force of the German reaction against the undesired measures of the Allies was unsuccessful. They could not find a substitute for

their own military impotence by playing off the belligerents against each other any more than they could by appealing to world opinion on the basis of international law. Nor could they convince the equally dangerous opposing great power, Germany, that the Allies meant no intervention when they were clearly indicating that they intended to infringe on Norway’s neutrality. Persuasion was all the more difficult, since the Norwegians were known to be overwhelmingly sympathetic to the Allied side. The Norwegians shared with the Finns (before the Winter War) the inability to avoid war through diplomacy unsupported by some military force. As did the Finns later, the Norwegians found that they could not escape the implacable pressure of a great power merely because both of them were democracies and shared the same political and social value systems. Unlike the Finns faced with a totalitarian power in 1939, the Norwegians avoided being offensively neutral when to do so would have favored the Allies. Yet even this implicit recognition of Germany’s aggressiveness was no protection.

4

GERMAN INVASION OF NORWAY

If the Allies’ action came as no great surprise, that of the Germans in invading Norway and Denmark was staggering. In fact, the absence of any kind of warning or ultimatum was part of the shock upon which the Germans relied for an operation they realized to be very risky. The demands came after the invasion.

Hitler’s original preference for a neutral Norway had gradually eroded under the combined pressure of Raeder’s and Rosenberg’s urgings for a northern campaign and the Allied moves in the same direction. His reluctance to come to a decision until March was not due to any fear of Norway, for he anticipated that this notoriously peace-loving people would be easy to manage and even expected that political means would be sufficient. If there was one Quisling, there might be many to do the work. The real obstacle to a successful northern campaign, once the Allied intentions became clear, was the military problem. It was contrary to conventional doctrine for a weaker maritime power like Germany to thrust itself into an area dominated by a bellig-
erent with much greater naval strength. The Norwegian coastline was long and likely to be very hard to penetrate. The fighting conditions in the north might be insuperably difficult. Yet if the Allies were firmly intrenched in Scandinavia, the great German thrust westward through the Low Countries and France would be seriously endangered, and Germany might itself be imperiled if the Allies were able to control the entrance to the Baltic and to break through to the relatively defenseless German ports. To prevent these dangerous possibilities from becoming realities, to guarantee the ore base in Sweden, and to give the air force and navy a wider base of attack against Britain, Hitler approved the plans for an expedition on March 1, 1940. Yet as late as March 14 the Germans were not agreed among themselves that "Case Yellow" (the western push) should not take place first. The problem of suitable weather conditions also postponed the final decision, but by March 26 Raeder had persuaded Hitler that the British danger in Scandinavia was still great. On April 2 (five days after the Allied Supreme War Council decision) the Germans set the date for their own invasion to be April 9.29

With secrecy, thorough preparation, speed, audacity, and deception to aid it, the German invasion was a brilliant military success. All major cities, harbors, and airports were occupied. German air power dominated the fiords, overawed the inhabitants so unaccustomed to ruthlessness, and paralyzed Allied counter-moves. Only on the seas were there serious losses, since the British navy was already in the area on its own mission. The Norwegians, so intent on the British operation, were temporarily stunned. They could not believe the Germans had actually ar-

rived, and for a short period there was great confusion. Only in a few places did the coastal defense forces awaken in time to what was happening. In the crucial northern port of Narvik treachery permitted the Germans to gain an easy foothold.

Despite these military gains, however, the Germans failed completely to achieve their aim of a bloodless coup d'état working through Norwegian puppets. The Norwegian government hastily assembled during the night of the invasion. It rejected at once the German ultimatum containing fourteen pages of justification and demands, and replied that Norway would resist. Despite the specter of merciless German warfare, the Norwegian leaders felt it impossible to give in to Nazi domination. With Allied aid there was some hope, and this help was immediately available. If anything were necessary to solidify the Norwegian determination to resist, it was the Germans’ later demand upon the king to accept a government organized by the despised Quisling.

Under intermittent German bombardment the king and government fled northeast in the direction of Sweden while they continued negotiations with the German minister. Their response to his efforts to gain their acquiescence without further armed resistance was unanimously in favor of continued rejection of the German demands. King, Cabinet, and Storting slipped out of the German grasp and took with them the gold which helped (with shipping) to keep the government solvent during a long exile in England.

Meanwhile, the previously unmobilized army was gathering for a desperate resistance. An improvised and unco-ordinated campaign with Allied aid continued for two months, and at one point the British almost made good their toe hold in the north. Then came the Blitzkrieg in the west, and the Allies withdrew, thus forcing the organized campaign in Norway to collapse. The king and government had already escaped to London, where they were able to carry on the war allied with Britain. The Norwegians settled down to almost five years of unremitting undercover resistance. In this they were harried constantly, not by the occupying German army (which conducted itself with relative decency) but by the dread SS under the Gauleiter Terboven.30

The military and economic advantages accruing to Germany as

a result of its Scandinavian campaign and the enhancement of its reputation as an invincible military power were bought at a fairly high price, only part of which was paid with the original occupation. For example, it took between 300,000 and 400,000 soldiers to garrison Norway. These were perhaps not first-rate troops, but they could have been used elsewhere. The German military experts have not all agreed that the invasion was worth the cost when viewed from the angle of the whole war’s direction rather than as a single operation. "Widening the base of operations" worked both ways, making the Germans far more vulnerable. However, the split between Germany and the Soviet Union did not come over this issue, and at the time of the invasion the Russians wished their German partners well.

The Allied blunder in attracting the Germans northward resulted in a very serious blow to their prestige as well as to their military position. However, the Allies’ indecisiveness, wishful thinking, poor timing, and inadequate military preparation, which were so evident in comparison to the Germans, taught the British valuable lessons, to their later advantage. From the British point of view, the Norway campaign was only a small part of a much larger picture. As the official historian of the Norwegian campaign concluded:

In the long run, we could not have defended Norway, though a better knowledge of Norwegian conditions and a more realistic approach to the problems involved might have made our piecemeal intervention there into something more coherent and in the short run more effective. But given the political situation of 1939–40 British intervention in some form was inevitable; and given the paucity of our then resources in men and arms, a more or less calamitous issue from it was likewise inevitable.31

When Norway was freed with the armistice of May, 1945, liberation came as a result of overwhelming Allied victories elsewhere and not on the spot.

It was those on the spot, however, who suffered most. The

Allies could leave when larger problems loomed elsewhere, but most of the Norwegian people had to remain. They could not even choose the areas about which to fight but saw the Allies expending their force far north in Narvik, which was of little importance to the heart of Norway. Yet the very remoteness of the battlefield, the shortness of the campaign, and the poor showing made by the Allies spared Norway the destructiveness of full-scale warfare. The only real devastation came late in the war in the north; there the Germans, fleeing from the Russians, forced the evacuation of the population and left scorched earth behind them. Meanwhile, the shock of the invasion and occupation had radically changed Norwegian views about military preparedness and neutrality, and this shift had important consequences for post-war Norwegian policy.

With the German invasion the Norwegians were faced with the situation small states are most prone to dread, a decision by brute force in which they are hopelessly outweighed. This was the last act of a drama in which the small state seemed merely an object, even though the movement was initiated by the acts of a friendly great-power democracy. Diplomacy had no place here, and the small state's leaders had only one decision to make: whether or not to fight as far as they were able. Once they decided on war, the Norwegians were able to accomplish what they failed to do when the problem still lay in the realm of diplomacy, bringing in one side to offset the other. On being attacked, Norway obtained military aid from the Allies, whose armed forces remained, however, only until they had to fight more crucial battles closer to their homelands.

Like the Finns, the Norwegians showed that a united will to resist can put off defeat until something can be saved from the disaster which early submission would have lost, and, as with Finland, their experience showed the need for advance military preparation. Unlike Finland, their country could not escape occupation, but the government had a place to flee from which it might continue resistance, and this was also the winning side. Despite their earlier pacifist leanings, the Norwegians were able to find a ready welcome in the warring West and to contribute to the final outcome by their shipping and the valor and worth of their small armed forces.

[104]
Hypnotized by their belief in the enormous economic power of Britain, the Norwegians had placed all their emphasis on building up an economic defense against it. They ignored the likelihood that, in a short campaign, the immediate striking power of another belligerent might overcome the economic power of its opponent, especially if the two belligerents should contend over a militarily defenseless neutral.

Like that of many other democracies, the Norwegian government had failed to co-ordinate its foreign policy with its defense policy. Its leaders had declared frequently that Norway would defend its neutrality, but the government had taken no practical measures to enable the country to do so. Time to rearm was a luxury available only to the great insular powers. Without any military preparation to speak of and with poor military intelligence, the Norwegians still battled the invaders for sixty-three days, longer than any other small country overrun by the Nazis. The question has naturally been raised how much longer they might have held out with proper defense preparations, since the German leaders from the beginning regarded their own gamble as a long shot, depending strongly on good luck.

The Norwegians, among the most doctrinaire upholders of the concept of neutrality, demonstrated by their fate the ineffectiveness of a correct legal position when unsupported by some military power. A great state’s power is enhanced by the appearance of rectitude, but small-state leaders can hardly afford to concentrate exclusively on the rightness of their case so long as other sources of power may be available.

The small state might, theoretically, have added to its power by allying with other like-minded neutrals. Norway was never an enthusiastic proponent of organized co-operation among the small states in its region for the defense of their neutrality. Yet even had it been committed to such a policy, the difference in the power of the potential members was an impediment to its formation and would have dampened its influence. This would have held true at least as long as the association had only the moral support of the members. Parallel positions declared by the northern states did not stand up under pressure.

Norway also learned the difficulty of upholding a neutral status
for the state when vitally important elements of the nation, such as the shipping interests, were not acting impartially. The belligerents would not always make such a distinction between the state and its components, any more than the Norwegians separated clearly the policies of the Allied governments from those advocated in their press.

There were also limits on how far Norway could keep the belligerents guessing about how it would act in a crisis. Foreign Minister Koht’s greatest efforts to act neutrally, which went so far that he was mistakenly regarded by some as pro-German, could not conceal from the Nazis the real bent of most Norwegians toward the Allied cause. The corollary was drawn by the official Norwegian investigating commission studying Norway’s war experience—the neutral should be politically and militarily prepared to jump to the side favored if necessary. Neutrality is not an end in itself—whatever the Norwegians may have thought at the time—but a means to a higher end.

Conflicting demands from the belligerents regarding Norway’s trade appeared soluble without the use of violence. The problem of transit, even when it was only for the legitimate passage of an indispensable war material, was of a different magnitude of concern to the belligerents and thus far harder for Norway to influence. Even more difficult for the Norwegians, the German demands were not so explicit as to be capable of being met. It was, in reality, not possible for the Norwegians to satisfy the demands by themselves if the British moved first to prevent them from trying to do so.

Once the British had determined to shift their demands to military objectives, the Norwegians were too weak to stop their involvement. Economic advantages can be traded off, even though any attempt to be neutral is bound to irritate and appear unbalanced to the side which is most disadvantaged. But a small state cannot balance military concessions, providing bases or transit privileges for one side and also for the other.

Norway’s position was less flexible than Turkey’s, because there were for the most part only two sets of great-power pressures involved, Germany and the Allies. The Soviet Union played a minor part, providing the setting for one crisis but not influ-

32 Innstilling, p. 74.
encing the main events. The Americans were self-inhibited on-
lookers.

The final decision regarding Norway's fate was made outside
Norway, despite the Norwegian leaders' efforts to keep Norway
out of the conflict. British concern about Norway was small com-
pared to its over-all strategic interests. Yet the British so handled
the Norwegian case that this reluctant small state became suffi-
ciently important to the enemy to bring the war into Norway.

The Norwegians paid a heavy price for the Allies' miscalculation
of their own strength and that of their opponents, misjudg-
ment of the importance of the issue of the ore traffic, and indif-
ference to whether or not Norway became involved in the war.
In addition, the Norwegians paid for their own lack of prepared-
ness. The Allies also sustained what seemed at the time a grave
loss, though it grew less as the fighting was intensified. No one
gained from this series of miscalculations. Not even the Germans
benefited, for they overestimated the value of keeping the Allies
out of Norway and could not make as much use of their occupa-
tion as they had anticipated.

The Norwegians could not convince either side that the actions
the great power contemplated would end in serious retaliation
from the enemy, and they were unwilling to threaten to join ei-
ther belligerent. The opportunities which existed for the Norwe-
gians to influence the calculations of the two sets of belligerents
were not fully exploited, but they were in any case very few.
Sweden, potentially and actually the strongest military power among the small states in this study, had the least need to augment its own strength by the use of one great power in competition with another, for the means lay within the country to compensate for much of the pressure put upon Sweden. This was the more fortunate for the Swedes, because for a critical period they were completely surrounded by territories in which there were German forces and could not be reached militarily from outside. Even in this period, as at other times, the Swedes were able to demonstrate to the great power dominant at the moment its own interest in permitting continued contacts between Sweden and the enemy. As the friend of two small neighbors drawn into war on opposite sides, Sweden was able to exploit the interest of each side in preserving Sweden's neutrality vis-à-vis one of these two neighbors.

Where Norway and Finland failed, Sweden succeeded. This country had fought no war since 1809. Like all the northern countries, Sweden was wedded to the idea of neutrality, and many Swedes agreed with their Norwegian brethren that "the best foreign policy is no foreign policy." What, then, were the differen-

1 Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. x.

2 Sweden's experience during this period is described by Agnes H. Hicks, "Sweden," in Royal Institute of International Affairs, The War and the Neutrals, pp. 171–99.
tial characteristics of Sweden's situation and response which would help to explain its ability to withstand forces that would have brought Sweden into war, and to suggest the conditions under which a small state may continue to have its neutrality respected on all sides?

Sweden's population of seven million is considerably larger than Norway's and Finland's but is still small compared to Turkey and Spain. The area of Sweden, 173,000 square miles, is also larger but not much larger than Norway or Finland. However, it extends farther south, and the southern portion is a fertile plain. Thus, despite climatic conditions, the rather small cultivable area is capable of supporting the population. However, over half the country is covered by forests and another significant portion by lakes and waterways. These provide two important sources of livelihood: wood products and hydroelectric power. Among the valuable mineral resources, iron ore is by far the most significant. In the mountains of the north lies one of the world's greatest deposits of rich phosphoric ore, and there are low phosphorus mines in other parts of Sweden. Like the other small states studied here, however, Sweden is deficient in fuels, having only a small amount of low-grade coal and no petroleum. Yet Sweden is one of the highly industrialized states of the world. At the same time, the Swedish economy is greatly dependent upon foreign trade.

Although the need for foreign trade makes Sweden in general vulnerable to outside pressures, this is not the case with respect to the supply of military equipment. The Swedes have been able to arm themselves with little reliance on foreign sources. The quality of Swedish steel is proverbial. Sweden could also be almost self-sufficient in food. Its important industry is not concentrated in one or a few localities but is spread in small enterprises, for the most part, over a large area of the country. However, Sweden is vulnerable to attack in the non-mountainous south, where the peninsula borders the Baltic—flat, easily accessible, and unprotected by any natural barriers. This is the area close to Germany. As a Baltic power Sweden is not within easy reach of Britain, separated as it is from the Atlantic by Norway, while on the east the Swedes have long relied on Finland as a buffer between themselves and Russia.

In its industrialization and high productivity lies much of Swe-
den's strength, but the attendant high standard of living is a source of wartime vulnerability. At the same time, this high living standard can also be regarded as a power component, for the most advanced scientific and rational methods are available and practicable for defending the nation. There is no national minority within the country to weaken Sweden or any discontented minority outside, no irredentist claim upon Sweden or any unrequited Swedish claim upon other territory. Famous as the country of "the middle way," Sweden also has no large pockets of economically underprivileged or socially disadvantaged. Respect for the rule of law and belief in the value of political compromise are ingrained in this very homogeneous people. A Swedish observer has described his country as a new land, for within living memory it has been transformed politically and economically, and it resembles a rich, tradition-free, pragmatic American nation more than any other in Europe.4

It was not until the end of World War I that the Swedish constitution took its final shape as a political democracy. In 1918 universal suffrage and parliamentary government were finally adopted. The king has remained a leader of some political influence, but how great it is difficult to determine exactly. Since World War I the Social Democrats have played an important role in Swedish political life and since 1932 have occupied the strongest position in the government.5 Thus Sweden's foreign and defense policies have been affected by the dominance of a socialist party not unlike those of Finland and Norway. The constitutional consensus so outstanding in Sweden has been particularly marked, as one might expect, in the field of foreign relations. The lively debate among the various parties which has taken place in the press has not been reflected in the behavior of the members of the Riksdag.6

General agreement on foreign policy has not meant that Swedish government leaders have been of one mind, even individually, regarding the specific steps which Sweden should take. An am-

4 Frank Burns, Paradis för oss, p. 200.
5 See Dankwart A. Rustow, The Politics of Compromise, for a study of the Swedish political system. For general information see also Royal Institute of International Affairs, The Scandinavian States and Finland, pp. 232-98.
6 See Herbert Tingsten, The Debate on the Foreign Policy of Sweden, 1918-1939, p. 177 and passim.
bivalence about how much their country should participate in international affairs may arise in part from memories of a glorious past when Sweden was a leading military power. One legacy of this bygone era was a general and continuously conscious fear of Russia, Sweden's most persistent antagonist. Yet the advantages of remaining out of Europe's military entanglements—the policy adopted from the early nineteenth century—were clearly demonstrated by Sweden's success as a neutral in World War I.

That same experience, however, colored later attitudes within the nation and, even more, attitudes about Sweden among the opponents of the Axis outside the country. There had been a vociferous pro-German group within Sweden at the time, and German influence has long been strong in certain sectors of Swedish society. Nevertheless, Sweden, one of the world's leading examples of a genuinely democratic country, could not be expected willingly to fall into the totalitarian trap of Nazi Germany.

The realignment of European power following World War I was advantageous to Sweden. Her two major Baltic neighbors, Russia and Germany, were greatly weakened. This was a period in which Sweden again played an active role in international affairs, especially in the League of Nations. The Swedish emphasis, however, was always on procedures for conciliation and juridical techniques rather than on political measures for collective security. With the failure of sanctions and the realization that the League varied its actions according to the strength of the lawbreaker, Sweden joined the other Oslo Powers in counting itself out of further League action under Article XVI.

The Swedes had already seen Britain for all intents and purposes withdraw its naval power from the Baltic. Further acts of the Western powers developed an attitude in Sweden that the "good" great powers had by their weakness forfeited the right to support from the small states. A policy of non-involvement in

7 Cf. Erik Lönnroth, "Sweden: The Diplomacy of Östen Undén."

8 See Nils Ørvik, The Decline of Neutrality, 1914–41, pp. 177 ff.

9 Cf. Churchill, who said, "The Scandinavian Powers, who only a fortnight before had courageously sustained the protest against Hitler's introduction of compulsory service in the German Army, now found that Great Britain had behind the scenes agreed to a German Navy which, though only a third of the British, would within this limit be master of the Baltic" (The Gathering Storm, pp. 139–40).
power blocs was regarded as essential to protect Sweden's neutral status. Thus Sweden quickly rejected the proffered German anti-aggression pact in May, 1939. So strong was the Swedish attitude against "collective security" or other alignments that the government would consider no kind of alliance whatever, even one among the northern states to protect their neutrality jointly. Sweden readily accepted the moral leadership accorded it by the other northern states. It concentrated on the development of a northern line of foreign policy which involved economic and diplomatic co-ordination. Yet Sweden was no more ready to cement this combination into a practical power group by military co-operation than were Norway or Denmark, and far less so than Finland.

In this respect the Swedes exhibited a strong small-state mentality, regarding their own influence as insignificant in comparison with the risks involved if a more active role were assumed. Despite a power potential which might well have supported a different role, Sweden was cast in an unimportant part by its own citizens. The fact that Sweden had escaped the effects of world strife following World War I and was comparatively lightly touched by the depression intensified the belief that the course of non-participation in European politics was correct.

Despite this almost universal conception of Sweden's proper role, the Swedes remained ambivalent regarding its practical application. They could not avoid recognizing that some great powers threatened their way of life more than others. Social Democrats in particular found their fear of Nazism approaching in intensity their fear of involvement in a struggle against it. Thus, after a temporary defeat in 1936, they came to favor the policy of rearmament promoted by the Conservatives, a policy which had formerly been anathema to the Socialists. In 1938, with the Austrian Anschluss, Sweden began a real defense program. The first mobilization was ordered in September, 1939, but Sweden still lacked such vital items as tanks. The country faced the war far stronger than it had been in the middle thirties, although it remained without very formidable defenses.10

Military preparation within the country was one question, and the extension of defenses beyond the borders of Sweden proper was quite another. This may be seen in Sweden's response to the proposal made by Finland in 1938 that the two states join in re-fortifying the Åland Islands. Here, as later, a policy of prudent passivity appeared dictated by the anxiety that an active step would arouse the hostility of one of the totalitarian powers. So long as the signatories of the Åland Convention and others consulted were agreeable, the Swedes regarded the advantages of changing the demilitarized status of the islands greater than the danger to Sweden's and Finland's neutrality if such a modification were made. However, when the Russians used their position in the League of Nations Council to oppose the proposal (although their approval was not legally necessary), the Swedes began to backtrack in June, 1939. They did not wish to appear allied with Finland in a move which might seem favorable to Germany, since Germany had acquiesced and Russia had not. Although the foreign minister continued to advocate the idea, most of his colleagues feared that it would lead to further military collaboration with Finland, as a result of which Sweden would be dragged into the war they saw coming between Finland and Russia. They could not bring themselves to the point of committing troops to an area outside their own boundaries even in the interests of neutrality and even when the area was one only recently claimed as part of their own territory. The foreign minister lost his post December 12, 1939, during the political crisis arising from the Finnish Winter War.11

The Swedish government was not afraid to use diplomatic means in Finland's behalf when their common interest in neutrality was concerned. For example, during the fall crisis Swedish diplomats more than once endeavored to stimulate German opposition to Russia's pressure on Finland. Sweden also turned to Washington. In the October conference of northern state heads,

however, the action taken by the group studiously avoided any military commitment, and private communications between Finnish and Swedish leaders showed that the Swedes were unwilling to promise armed aid to bolster the Finnish diplomatic position.\textsuperscript{12}

Swedish caution was dictated by the realization that Finland, a Baltic state, was close to two ill-disposed, ruthless, and unpredictable great powers in at least temporary alliance with each other. No adequate support was looked for from Great Britain, since it had bowed out of the Baltic. Because the Swedes then as later estimated French power to be low, they were not impressed by adding the French to the British military resources. Like several other peoples whose traditional enemy was Russia, the Swedes were at this period more fearful of Nazi expansionism than of the Soviet Union.

From the very beginning Swedish policy was simply to avoid being dragged into war under any circumstances. (Some activist leaders denied that this could be called a policy.) With one eye on its own sources of power and the other on the fluctuating configuration of the great powers, the Swedish government pursued this one goal by sometimes very devious routes. Gone was any illusion that strict adherence to a legalistically defined neutrality would protect Sweden; the suffering from such a policy in the previous war was not to be repeated if possible. Diplomacy had to carry almost the full burden in carrying out the objective, and events proved its load-bearing capability very high.

The tightrope walkers who carried out this feat never lost the public confidence as expressed at the polls, despite occasional very strong adverse criticism from influential advocates of a more distinctly pro-Allied or at least pro-Finnish or pro-Norwegian diplomacy. When the Winter War broke out, a coalition government took over in Sweden under the continued leadership of the most popular Social Democratic leader of many years' standing, Per Albin Hansson, and the office of foreign minister was filled by an experienced and detached career diplomat, Christian Gün-
ther. Both held office throughout the great war. King Gustav V, who had already played a decisive role at the time of World War I, again took a leading part during World War II; his German connection proved particularly important. Although the Riksdag members engaged in vociferous debate during some of the crises, the government leaders would frequently have already made an unpostponable and irrevocable decision. For the sake of a continued national government and the shared goal of non-belligerency, the discordant elements never came to an open break. 13

The central objective of Swedish foreign policy was so clear and the conduct of its foreign policy so sensitively attuned to the fortunes of war that the story of its wartime diplomacy can be told more easily in terms of these fluctuating great-power relationships than in terms of the successive demands made upon Sweden by the belligerents.

During the first few months of the war, when the great powers were not yet facing each other squarely on the battlefield, Sweden successfully resisted the pressure of both sides to trim its trade pattern to suit their particular needs. A more critical issue was the Allied demand that in some fashion or other the ore traffic to Germany be curtailed, but still the Swedes held their ground and even more firmly opposed the related pressure to permit an Allied force to cross Sweden to Finland during the Winter War. With the German invasion of Norway and Denmark, the Swedes had to face the strongest demands from the other side; yet they clung to an impartial neutrality until formal hostilities ended in Norway. Once the Germans had definitely established their dominance in northern Europe, however, the Swedes recognized the changed situation by making many concessions, most important among them permission for the transit of war matériel and certain types of military personnel. As the United Nations power began to rise in 1943, Sweden very gradually altered its relations with Germany, in line with Allied desires if not for the most part at their bidding. When the war ended, Sweden had anticipated the outcome and adjusted its diplomacy in time to be in the good graces of the victors.

13 Burns, op. cit., a novel covering the Åland Islands crisis, the Winter War, and the Norwegian invasion, and written by an insider, illuminates clearly how Sweden’s politicians handled foreign policy.
Like the other neutrals, Sweden was immediately approached by England and Germany after the outbreak of the war, each side trying to regulate Sweden's foreign trade to its own advantage. Unlike many of the other neutrals, Sweden came to terms rather quickly and without undue friction with the belligerents. War trade agreements with the two sides were almost simultaneously concluded in December, 1939. 

The British aim in negotiating a war trade agreement with Sweden was the same as their objective with Norway, but they bargained from a somewhat weaker position and were more intent not to alienate the Swedes. In their original calculations the British believed they could, if necessary, control Sweden's supply of such important commodities as textile raw materials, liquid fuels, and foodstuffs; and they expected that the Swedes, in order to prevent bankruptcy, would be even more interested in maintaining exports to the Allies than they with Sweden. They soon found that the Swedes were interested in preserving their independence and neutrality regardless of economic costs and in any case had accumulated large stocks of vital goods likely to last them at least eighteen months. The British also learned very quickly that the Swedish fear of German retaliation was ever present and would be a principal guide to their diplomacy from the very beginning of the war. The Allies needed certain imports from Sweden, especially of iron ore, ferro-alloys, and special steels for airplanes and armaments, to say nothing of other valuable goods such as timber, paper, and bacon. Lacking adequate economic weapons for coercion and unable to penetrate the Baltic for naval measures against German trade with Sweden, the British were additionally embarrassed because at the time of the war's outbreak they were temporarily weaker trade partners with Sweden than were the Germans. Among other things, the usual communications between the two countries had been disrupted. In view of these weaknesses the British felt obliged to confine their

14 See W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, I, 150–52, and Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 564–67. Again the British took the lead for both allies in the effort to curb Swedish-German trade.
diplomatic measures to promises. Thus in the theoretically strict general system of contraband control, including reprisals for violations, they offered exceptions and variances to persuade the Swedes to agree to specific limitations on trade with Germany. Britain had to settle for some kind of agreement more or less on Sweden's terms or get none at all. The compromise reached on the most critical issue, sale of Swedish iron ore to Germany, proved very shortly to be almost worthless.\(^{15}\)

Although the Germans announced the same objective as Sweden—maintenance of normal trade—their bargaining position was hardly stronger than England's. One advantage they had, however, was a clearing arrangement with Sweden dating from 1938. This agreement, which restricted bargaining about granting Germany credits, the Swedes felt bound to uphold. Where the British believed that the Swedes were anxious to accommodate them, the Germans found the Swedes cool toward their trade negotiators. They had to recognize that, if they interfered with Swedish trade with Britain, the effects on Sweden's economy would prevent the maintenance of Swedish exports to Germany, which were of great importance. They also had to realize that in the all-important question of iron ore, it must not only be sold but also "dug and shipped," matters upon which Swedish public opinion could have some influence. Like the British, the Germans were concerned also about opinion outside Sweden, but for different reasons: the Germans wanted to "avoid advertising the differences of opinion between Germany and Sweden to the entire world."\(^{16}\)

As for the trade itself, Germany could only promise payment for about half the Swedish ore they wanted in 1940 and this only in commodity exports. Although they were economically the stronger of the trading rivals when negotiations started, they were unable to maintain coal deliveries at the steady flow which the British soon demonstrated. The Germans began their trade discussions in a conciliatory manner suited to their bargaining position. Soon, however, cruder techniques became more prominent. The Germans informed Sweden that they did not intend to use economic pressure to interfere with Swedish trade to the enemy

\(^{15}\) On the British expectations and techniques see Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 55, 91, 114, 130, 141-52, 180, 182-83.

\(^{16}\) Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 338-39.
if this trade remained within normal bounds, nor would they use such reprisals as embargoing German goods, nor would they object to normal trade between Sweden and other neutrals or any increase in it unless this was at German expense. But commercial policy would have no effect on naval operations. In retaliation for British suppression of German-neutral trade, Germany declared in November, 1939, that it would cut off Swedish exports to England by all naval means, as well as goods to neutral countries if they were likely to end up in enemy territory. The Nazis had another point. With the outbreak of the Winter War the Swedes wanted from them large quantities of arms, including anti-aircraft and antitank guns, submachine guns, field howitzers, and armored cars.  

Both the belligerents were strengthened in their negotiating position with the Swedes because Swedish trade with each formed an important percentage of total Swedish imports and exports, and these in turn were a vital factor in the Swedish economy as a whole. Traditionally, however, Germany bought from and sold to Sweden more than any other country. Yet Sweden was in a stronger position than Norway because its important products desired by the belligerents did not require raw materials coming from abroad. Trade in what was by far the most important—iron ore—could be intercepted only after the ore had left Sweden. Thus the Swedes believed they could pursue as part of their neutrality policy the maintenance of normal trade with both belligerents.

In dealing with England, Sweden’s leaders did not intend to adhere rigidly to an impractical neutrality such as brought their country close to starvation in World War I; they were prepared to make certain concessions to the British in view of Britain’s ability to control goods coming from abroad. On the paramount question of iron ore, however, where Germany was normally their best customer and at the same time principal supplier of goods essential to the Swedish economy, the Swedes would not bow to the British. In other matters they were very conciliatory and went out of their way to express sympathy with England and their anxiety to come to a satisfactory agreement without delay. Pro-

17 The German expectations and techniques may be found in the Bulletin of International News, 1939, pp. 958-59, 1024, 1094, 1351; 1940, pp. 10-11, 330. Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 39-40, 170-71, 338-41, 346, 391-93, 426; and Medlicott, op. cit., pp. 143-44.
testing against the British Reprisals Order of November, 1939, they explained their action as necessary to avert German criticism that Sweden was not defending its neutral rights. Since the British were anxious also to secure a shipping agreement by which they would be assured the use of vessels in excess of Sweden’s needs, the Swedes were able to secure important concessions in their trade arrangements by holding out on the shipping question until their point of view on other matters had been accepted.

In the crucial question of iron ore, the Swedes avoided making a formal commitment by giving a confidential offer of a very secret undertaking that they would do their best to restrict exports of iron ore by “technical obstructions.” Thus the formal agreement came close to Swedish desires. With a few exceptions Sweden would prohibit the export of all Swedish imports from overseas in exchange for no Allied hindrance on such imports. The exceptions dealt mostly with commodities which the Allies would want to purchase in either raw or finished form. Among the other provisions was agreement that the export of products not previously imported in whole or part would be held to 1938 figures, on certain conditions. (Thus when both belligerents wanted to exceed the 1938 figure for some products, they could do so if the sales to each bore the same proportion to the total trade of both belligerents regarding that commodity as they did in 1938.)

The 1938 figure suited the Germans. In negotiating with them, the Swedes obtained the promise of rolling-mill products, certain chemicals, and coal and coke, but had to agree to bear some responsibility for transporting them. In the agreement with the Germans the Swedes specifically recorded that the projected quantities of particular items coming from Sweden could be reached only if a substantial amount, two to three million tons, went via Narvik. Within a month after signature of the trade agreement the Swedes secured the arms they wanted in exchange for gold and additional raw materials.18

The British soon found that their tacit understanding with the

Swedes was not resulting in restriction of iron ore exports. Instead of decreasing, iron ore production had greatly increased by January, 1940, the mines working twenty-four hours a day. The Allies then indicated their intention to try direct action to prevent the shipment of ore through Norwegian territorial waters, with results already narrated. The British were surprised to receive so sharply negative a reaction from the Swedes; the measures they proposed would not even directly touch Sweden but only her weaker neighbor. The British had thought the Swedes would be secretly pleased to have the Leads traffic stopped.

The Swedes helped to slow down the contemplated Allied action by insisting that they had to live up to their promise of ore shipments based on the 1938 average. They also pleaded dependence upon German coal and coke and declared they were receiving iron and steel imports from Germany greater than peacetime and not available elsewhere. Officially and otherwise, the Swedes attempted to minimize the importance of Swedish ore to the German war effort. The Swedes also reminded the English that traffic in Swedish goods to Britain passed through these threatened waters and that this trade would be stopped by the Germans if the area became a war theater. The British were thus risking a trade worth ten times as much as that which they meant to stop by direct action.¹⁹

Sweden's success in thwarting British moves soon appeared to favor the Germans in the tug of war over Germany's access to a critical war material, and thus the Swedes lost the upper hand over both belligerents.

In the twin sets of negotiations over Swedish trade at the outset of the war, Sweden was fortunately situated because both belligerents intensely wanted Swedish products and Swedish good will as well. Like the other neutrals in this study, Sweden possessed a commodity of crucial importance to the war economy of one belligerent, Germany. Unlike Norway, simultaneously under pressure from the other side, Sweden was beyond effective reach of British sea power for the most part and was more closely

linked, economically and geographically, with the belligerent most needing its strategic resource.

The mutual dependence for important commodities which existed between Sweden and each of the belligerent sides provided a perfect situation for the Swedes to balance the pressures of the opponents to its own advantage. Neither side could punish Sweden for trading practices it condemned without harming its own economic interests. Thus the Swedes could uphold the concept of normal trade which formed a part of their neutrality policy. Like the Norwegians, the Swedes pursued a political purpose through economic means, but more completely than the Norwegians they subordinated economic considerations to the political, for example, in the case of shipping. Since their country was bigger, more self-sufficient, better armed, and more experienced in diplomacy than Norway, the Swedes could avoid being regarded by any of the great powers as being definitely in the orbit of either side. The weakness in the Swedish case against intervention by one side to stop the traffic in a war material to the other was that they could not suggest a practical alternative which would accomplish the same result. Despite the accuracy of their predictions, the Swedes were no more able than the Norwegians to convince the British of the genuine possibility of German retaliation in a form which the British would like even less than the continuance of the traffic. As in the Norwegian case, British perspectives so diverged from those in Sweden that even the consequences of a hostile German reaction were differently evaluated, and the two governments could not agree on the usefulness of the Allies’ proffered military support. Thus Swedish opposition to direct action even when coupled with Norway’s could only delay and not prevent intervention.

2

AID TO FINLAND DURING THE WINTER WAR

When the Allies began to press Sweden for aid in permitting their expeditionary force to pass to Finland, the Swedes were also receiving urgent appeals from Finnish leaders to help them. As we have seen, the Finns wanted organized Swedish military intervention in addition to the non-military forms of aid already being provided extensively. But whether or not the Finns wanted Sweden to permit Allied troops themselves was ambiguous. (Not
until the day before the Moscow Peace was signed did the Finns make an outright request for transit permission, and then it was put only verbally.) Also, at the same time that the Allies and the Finns were pressing Sweden, the Russians were indicating their strong displeasure that Sweden was helping Finland in any way. Although the Soviet Union complained about the firm rejection of their charges that Sweden was breaking the rules of neutrality, the Russians threatened no specific action and did not follow up their objections in any practical way. From a fifth country the most ominous pressure came, though it was not clearly defined. The Germans began in January to intimate their opposition to any Swedish move likely to bring the Allies into Scandinavia. No more than the Allies did the Germans want to see Finland obliterated by the Russians, but the Nazis wished to maintain the appearance of a close working alliance with the Soviet Union. Sweden was the country most available for indirect pressure to insure quiet in the north, and the move to be interdicted was transit for Allied troops to aid Finland.

These pressures seemed to the Swedes not likely to cancel each other out automatically but rather to involve Sweden in the great war unless the initiators of the specifically most controversial move could be pacified. The undesired prominence into which Sweden had been catapulted because it supplied a strategic material to Germany was the more difficult to control, since the great democracies which were suddenly so interested in Sweden had very different expectations about the dangers of German retaliation than had the Swedes. Furthermore, the Allies could view with far greater equanimity the possibility of a hostile German reaction to their moves in Scandinavia. The chasm between Swedish and Allied perspectives was emphasized by their respective views on the military support being offered by the Allies in case the Nazis did react violently. To the Swedes this offer of support only revealed the primary intentions of the Allies—to control the ore supply and divert the Germans from the western front. In any case, thought the Swedes, Britain and France lacked the military power to carry out on an effective scale any promise of support for both Finland and Sweden; thus the offer only made Sweden's position with respect to Germany more precarious. The Swedes, like the Norwegians, feared and resented the agitation in the French press in favor of Allied intervention because
this made the northern countries so conspicuous to the Germans.

Swedish eyes were constantly on Germany, and this concentration proved an effective obstacle to assisting Finland with military force. Since the Soviet-German compact must be very shallow-rooted and impermanent, the Swedes weighed the question to what point Germany would tolerate Sweden's support for Russia's enemy, Finland. Clearly the Germans would stand for no offer of facilities to the Allies, but would they attack if Sweden's own forces were committed to the struggle? Did Sweden in any case have sufficient strength by itself to carry out the fight? Sooner or later would Sweden and Finland not have to depend upon aid from the West? Although Sweden could not count on Germany to stop the Russians, there was a good chance that the Germans would at least give them no assistance unless pushed into it by an Allied move into Scandinavia. Cementing of this alliance must be avoided if at all possible.

As the Swedish government wrestled with the dilemma presented by Finland, it was giving all aid short of furnishing troops to its neighbor. Such large amounts of war matériel were sent from Sweden that even the British thought it possible that Sweden had dangerously depleted its own resources. The government also permitted the secret passage through its territory of Allied technical missions disguised as civilians and war matériel listed as Finnish purchases, on condition that Sweden should not appear as a participant in an international action. In January, 1940, they granted permission for the passage of volunteers organized in England and France so long as these were not on active service with Allied forces, went in small groups, and received their equipment after arrival. Over 8,000 volunteers from Sweden itself fought for Finland, many of them from the ranks of the Swedish reserves. Very impressive private contributions to the Finnish war effort came from Sweden, and in addition Sweden gave humanitarian aid on a large scale, including the

20 The pressures on Sweden and the Swedish reactions are indicated in Forspelet, pp. 10, 14-16, 21, 26, 31, 36-37, 48-52, 56-59, 62, 98-103, 120-21, 153; Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 297, 558-59, 862-64; London Times, February 22, 1940 (reporting ex-Foreign Secretary Undén's speech to the Riksdag); Bulletin of International News, 1940, pp. 330 ff.; American Scandinavian Review, 1940, p. 72; and Tanner, op. cit., pp. 158-60, 181-83, 189. See chapter on Finland for further references to Finnish pressures on Sweden.
care of the wounded and the sending of civilian workers to carry on tasks left by Finnish soldiers. When this aid proved insufficient to protect the Finns from the Russian onslaught in February, the Swedes still refused to send their own troops. They ignored Finnish-proffered evidence that Germany would not attack so long as no Allied forces were involved, and to nail down their policy the Swedish prime minister and the king announced definitely that Sweden would not intervene.

The only way out of the dilemma of aid to Finland was, in the government's opinion, to help bring an end to the need for assistance. The sooner the hopeless Winter War was over, the better for Sweden and therefore for Finland also. Swedish efforts to stimulate the Germans into mediating proved unavailing. Nevertheless, the Swedes had reason to believe that their desire for an end to the war was shared both with the Germans and, by February, with the Russians, for none of them welcomed Allied intervention in Sweden. When the first peace feeler from Russia came through the Soviet minister to Sweden, the Swedish Foreign Office did everything it could, short of interfering in Finnish affairs, to expedite and co-ordinate the delicate moves and countermoves toward an early solution. To persuade the Finns that it was safe to conclude a peace, the Swedes assented to their proposals for economic assistance following the war and for consideration of some kind of defensive alliance. The Swedes also warned the Russians as the talks progressed that Sweden would intervene if there were not a prompt settlement. Although the Russians appeared to give little heed to such diplomatic moves from a country patently unwilling to take up arms for Finland, the very extensive "unofficial" aid Sweden had provided showed that the Swedes could impede the Russian steam roller.

Meanwhile the Swedish government, both publicly and privately, declared to the representatives of the states concerned its intention to follow a policy of unambiguous neutrality in the great war, and its foreign minister joined those of Denmark and Norway in a conference on February 25, 1940, in reiterating their common resolve. To emphasize Sweden's opposition to becoming involved in the war, the king of Sweden personally appealed to Daladier on March 2, requesting that the planned action of the Allies should not take place so far as it concerned Sweden, and
in view of the early likelihood of a peaceful decision.\textsuperscript{21} Before the expedition could get under way, the Finns signed the Peace of Moscow.

With the end of Finland's Winter War, Sweden had survived a situation in which its small neighbor, always regarded as a shield against Russia, was desperately in need of aid to avoid being conquered by that power. Sweden had been under very strong pressure from the democratic Allies to facilitate aid to Finland, particularly by the grant of transit permission for their own troops. Their enemy in the great war—Germany—was strongly opposed to such a move. Of all the powers trying to influence Sweden, Germany was the most threatening. Yet if it could be satisfied of Sweden's passivity, Sweden retained a chance of staying out of the great conflict. A choice had to be made, for Sweden could no longer avoid danger by making itself small and staying quiet in a corner.\textsuperscript{22}

As the kingpin in the small northern countries' common opposition to Allied intervention in their region, Sweden was able to postpone a military move until the ostensible reason for it could be removed through peacemaking. For once the balance of interests among the great powers was so even that an important small state could hold it steady. In co-operation with the other northern states, Sweden was able to prevent the Allies from making a disastrous mistake by precipitating a fighting alliance between Germany and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Sweden's experience showed that the small state in such a situation must still act in such a way as not to alienate the great power most dangerous to its security, even when every other factor, including the strongest fraternal ties, exerts pressure in the other direction.


\textsuperscript{22} This expression was used by Foreign Minister Sandler in a speech of July 30, 1939 (\textit{Bulletin of International News}, 1939, p. 836).

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The Swedes recognized that aid to their small neighbor must fall short of open military participation to avoid great risk to the independence of both countries. For their own security the safest course they could pursue was to help bring peace regardless of the conditions.

As the Turks had also demonstrated, the small neutral can resist successfully the pressures of friendly great powers which want it to abandon its neutrality. Even more than the Turkish efforts to bolster their neutrality through a bloc of small neutral nations, the Swedish experience showed the limits of protection provided by a combination of small powers. The northern states were closely bound by culture and interest but still lacked the unity and armed strength which would impress a predatory great power. The shadow of unity was worse than none, for it misled the members and the least dangerous great powers while not fooling their real foes. This was shown again in the next test of Swedish diplomacy, the German attack on Norway.

3

GERMAN INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF NORWAY

The swift movement of events in the early days of April, 1940, brought demands from both sides in the great war. Just prior to the invasion of Norway, an Anglo-French mission had gone to Stockholm to stiffen Swedish resistance to possible German action and had unsuccessfully sought from the Swedish commander-in-chief a promise of Swedish aid in return for such military assistance as airplanes and war matériel. Following the German attack on Norway, the Allies, still hoping against all signs to the contrary to bring Sweden in on their side, shaped their military operations in Norway with one eye on Sweden. The debacle in northern Norway ended this phase of Swedish-British relations, which in any case involved demands not difficult for the Swedes to refuse.23 There was a certain sense of relief in Stock-

holm when the Allies finally withdrew from Norway, for their departure was expected to remove the cause of pressure from Germany for co-operation.

The German demands made at the outset of the invasion were not hard to handle. Since the Nazis were chiefly concerned at this point that Sweden not stab them in the back, they warned against a departure from strictest neutrality, especially any measures such as the concentration of troops directed against the German occupation of Denmark and Norway. Swedish warships were to be restricted to three miles in the Kattegat and Sound and on the south coast. There must be no hindrance to long-distance communication over Sweden from German sources in Norway, and Sweden was also admonished to carry out ore shipments and prevent British-inspired sabotage. While pointing to the overwhelming forces at German command, the Nazis assured Sweden that it would not be harmed so long as it remained neutral; the German action, they said, was actually in Swedish interests, since it was to secure the Scandinavian states from becoming a theater of war. From Germany came also pointed allusions to the desirability of a friendlier press and radio in Sweden and a warning that no propaganda inciting the Norwegians to further resistance should emanate from Sweden.24

The increasing demands that transit to Norway be permitted for various kinds of German personnel and matériel were more difficult to answer. At first the Nazis sought passage of “humanitarian” goods such as medicine and food for the civilian population, and they were not slow to abuse the privilege by trying to use this permission to disguise shipments of a military nature. By the middle of May, 1940, the Swedes were being subjected to very threatening pressure to permit the transit of war matériel and the return of naval personnel. The Germans accompanied these demands with unsubtle hints about Sweden’s military and economic vulnerability and Hitler’s anxiety to keep up his victorious record. Besides threatening unspecified but undesirable

54, 258–59, 282, 342 ff.; and Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX, 65–66, 79–81.

consequences, the Nazis, who had embargoed further delivery of arms shipments to Sweden early in May, tried dangling before them the possibility of renewed and enlarged shipments.25

As the battle of Narvik swung Germany's way, the Nazis momentarily eased their pressure for transit of war matériel, but not before the Swedish government had become thoroughly alarmed about German retaliation. Not the least frightened were its representatives in Berlin. Nevertheless, the government remained adamant in opposing demands which would clearly breach their neutral status. Having failed in their strenuous efforts to dissuade the Germans from believing a venture in Scandinavia would be advantageous, they reacted to the invasion by making clear in every way possible their intention to remain apart from the conflict. Thus King Gustav wrote personally to Hitler on April 19, 1940, assuring him that Sweden was determined to defend its neutrality against attack from any direction with all power at its disposal and added that he had so informed both France and England. To signalize their intention of withstanding a possible Allied move in the direction of the ore fields, they ostentatiously kept the bulk of their own armed forces in the north. This served a double purpose, for it also represented Sweden's readiness to protect the mines against other aggressors. (Moving the troops south, away from the mountains and the ore fields, would only provoke the Germans without intimidating them and might even appear as a shield for Allied activity.) The Swedes answered German protests about an apparent war mobilization by declaring that they were merely "strengthening their neutrality guard" in accordance with German desires.

Adherence to a convincing neutrality policy required a firm denial of any aid to Norway. Sweden declared to both Norway and Germany that this campaign was part of the great war, unlike the Finnish Winter War, and that their policies must vary accordingly. Sweden not only refused to permit recruitment of volunteers to fight for Norway but also forbade the passage

of even minor but sorely needed war matériel from one part of Norway to another over the easy route through Sweden. They interned, at least temporarily, Norwegian soldiers who crossed the frontier, and they were equally inhospitable about the prospects of providing more than refuge to any part of the Norwegian government. The Norwegian legation in Stockholm, however, was not prevented from becoming a center for co-ordinating resistance within Norway and between Norway and the outside world.

At the same time, the Swedes were anxious to placate the Germans and to this end granted a number of concessions regarding transit of goods and persons other than troops and war matériel as a demonstration of a "reasonable" attitude. Medical orderlies, German seamen classified as "civilians," wounded Germans going home from Narvik, and Red Cross workers were eventually among the permitted categories passing through Sweden between Germany and Norway. To fend off a formal request for transit of war matériel or troops, the Swedish foreign minister had publicly stated very early in the Norwegian campaign that these would not be allowed. When the German request came in the middle of May, the Swedish government declared that it would be dishonorable to the Norwegians, to whom they had denied a similar request, and that they could not aid in the transport of arms which would be used against their brothers in Norway.26

Partly in order to divert attention from this very touchy issue, a Swedish representative in Berlin during the transit negotiations raised the question of Sweden’s occupying a neutralized northern Norway. This idea had been very unofficially broached to some Swedish leaders by a prominent Norwegian as a way of ending

the suffering of the inhabitants in that area. At first the Germans showed themselves not averse to considering the idea; the battle at Narvik was going against them at the time. For this reason, among others, the British were slow to appreciate the plan's desirability when the Swedes tried to interest them as well as the Norwegian government. The British and Norwegians expressed willingness only when the Allies were about to withdraw anyway, to meet the Blitzkrieg in the west. By this time the Germans had lost interest for obvious reasons.27

As Germany stood by while the Soviet Union fought with Finland, so the Soviet Union was chiefly an interested spectator while Germany attacked Denmark and Norway. Sweden, however, was another matter. Within four days of Molotov's friendly reaction to the German move in Scandinavia, he told the German ambassador in no uncertain terms that Russia had a vital interest in Swedish neutrality and would not want to see Sweden included in the German operations. On April 15 the Soviet government succeeded in getting the following declaration from Germany:

We share completely the attitude of the Soviet Government that preservation of Sweden's neutrality corresponds both to German and to Soviet interests. . . . It is not our intention to extend our military operations in the north to Swedish territory. On the contrary, we are determined to respect unconditionally the neutrality of Sweden as long as Sweden in turn also observes strict neutrality and does not support the Western powers.28

The Russian concern about Sweden's neutrality placed the Swedes in a situation in which they were not quite so naked and isolated as they felt at the time. Germany, the great power which could most easily ruin Sweden, was gaining the upper hand over the Allies and conquering their small neighbors while

27 For the abortive plan that Sweden occupy a neutralized northern Norway see Derry, op. cit., pp. 173-76; Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX, 473, 517-18; Transiteringsfrågor, pp. 253, 262-63, 283 ff., Transiteringsfrågan, p. 171; Halvdan Koht, Norway Neutral and Invaded, pp. 119-20; La Ruche, op. cit., pp. 89 ff.; Hubatsch, op. cit., pp. 252, 472-73.

28 Nazi-Soviet Relations, pp. 137-41. This view was reiterated in the Molotov-Hitler talks of November, 1940, ibid., p. 239. See also Bulletin of International News, 1940, p. 631, and Max Beloff, The Foreign Policy of Soviet Russia, II, 325.

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pressing for Swedish co-operation; yet there was temporary peace on Sweden's eastern boundary. The Russians wanted to maintain the balance between their own sphere and that of their erstwhile ally. Unlike Norway, Sweden had unsolicited reinforcement for its own successful resistance to pressures from Germany.

Also unlike Norway, the Swedes had a respectble military force which could back up their words, and in the ore fields a kind of hostage which proved then and later very useful in preventing German retaliation when Sweden was thought to be less than completely co-operative. German anger could be endured without dangerous consequences, since the aggressor was almost completely occupied with larger questions than Sweden's own actions. Sweden had demonstrated that smaller concessions may help to hold off the necessity for giving in to a major demand, but as the power situation changed in the northern countries, the chances lessened through time that Sweden could ultimately stand off the successful belligerent. Thus, during the critical period of the Battle of Norway, Sweden escaped being involved, but the German success almost completely bottled this small state up, the stopper being fitted on June 25, 1941. Like other small states, Sweden had to meet the threat of the moment and disregard the long-term consequences if necessary. Thus, unmoved by sentiment, it had to deny some urgent requests from Norway to escape involvement in the war. Yet a belligerent Sweden would not have aided the Norwegian cause in the end—or that of any other participant.

4

GERMAN DOMINANCE: TRANSIT AND OTHER DEMANDS

With the conquest of Norway the Germans achieved the objective Admiral Raeder had outlined to Hitler in February, 1940, in discussing Weserübung: "If Germany occupies Norway it can also exert heavy pressure on Sweden, which would then be obliged to meet all our demands." Not only was Sweden boxed in, but its control over iron ore for Germany's war industry had dwindled in importance after the Nazis secured the Lorraine and Luxembourg ore fields. Expecting still that the war would be over quickly, the Germans concentrated on demands of a

29 U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence, Fuehrer Conferences, 1940, I, 14.
military nature and pressed less hard for the economic concessions which they wanted. A mixture of intimidation, complaint, and conciliation characterized their approach to the Swedes, but they did not employ extreme measures of economic coercion. Indeed, most of the economic issues were handled by specialists in this field and were not pushed up to the political level.

The Germans put forward their transit demands, not with outright threats but with such vague yet unmistakable intimations as "Kriegsnotwendigkeit." Within a week of the Allies’ withdrawal from Norway, Germany secured permission for passage through Sweden of war matériel as well as all other goods, and for military personnel, in particular soldiers on leave. Thereafter the Nazis exploited this entering wedge, continually increasing categories of permitted transit and the size and frequency of the trains. By this means they sought to strengthen their base in Norway without running the risk of transportation through British-patrolled waters. However, it was not until they attacked the Soviet Union the following year that the Germans went to the extreme of demanding passage for whole divisions of armed troops from Norway to Finland. During this period the Germans tried to reorient the Swedish economy to their advantage, and they secured increased exports from Sweden of various metals useful for their war industry. In 1941 Swedish exports to continental Europe (most of which was dominated by Germany) represented 88 per cent of Sweden’s total trade, and Sweden’s imports from this area were 80 per cent. The German recognition that Sweden’s economic survival was important to their own economy did not keep them from demanding non-economic concessions, including “neutrality of thought” as well as of action.30

German complaints about unfriendliness in Swedish publications did not go unheeded. The Swedish government imposed or influenced the self-imposition of certain restricted forms of censorship over expressions hostile to either side. This meant in effect criticisms of Germany. (Nevertheless the press was far

more outspoken than critics in the West then realized, and leaders themselves made public pronouncements against the New Order despite strong German protest.) A “reasonable adjustment” to German hegemony seemed necessary to the Swedes. They felt themselves to be in a straight jacket from the end of the Norwegian campaign until the Allied successes began late in 1942. In June, 1940, they had seen Germany master of almost all of western Europe, and Britain standing alone. The attack on the Soviet Union and the entrance of the United States into the war reversed the Swedish leaders’ expectations that Germany would win, but in their view a long-drawn-out war would end only in victory for Russia. Thus a speedy end to hostilities was desirable without much consideration for the conditions imposed.

Meanwhile Sweden, shut in by both German and British blockades, depended upon Germany to supply many essentials for its economy, or at least German consent to obtain them elsewhere. Of equal importance, only through Germany could Sweden secure the artillery necessary to the building-up of a defense force which might later be strong enough for resistance to German demands.

When the Swedish government made its first major concession regarding transit, immediately following the Norwegian collapse, the leaders were uncertain about Britain’s future policy, and they were greatly frightened at the mounting hostility of the Germans resulting from earlier Swedish refusals. With relief they found the Nazis’ return to transit demands less far-reaching than the kinds of demands they had anticipated. They hoped that, by hedging their concession in with various restrictions, they could keep it within bounds. For example, no more soldiers were to go to Norway than came out, and their arms were to be carried on a separate train. To some extent the Swedes were able to maintain the conditions laid down, in spite of strong pressure to make exceptions.

Regardless of the terms, there were some Swedish leaders in the Riksdag who had opposed compliance with the transit demands, and they were joined by many others when the government granted permission for the Engelbrecht division to pass from Norway to Finland in June, 1941. Only the prime minister’s use of the king’s purported threat to abdicate and the opponents’ fear of a constitutional crisis or a change of government more
favorable to the Germans induced them to abide by the government’s decision. The policy-makers themselves had earlier received advice that the Germans planned to occupy Sweden in March, 1941, in order to make a flank attack on Russia. They were acutely aware that there were many German forces filling most of Europe and obviously ready to march. When the Finns added their voices to the German demand for transit of the Engelbrecht division, governmental consent came easier, for they wished to help their neighbor whenever possible, especially against the Russians. Furthermore, Sweden could also by this action relieve Norway of unwanted German troops.

So far as possible, the Swedes kept quiet about the concessions to the Germans or minimized their importance. Even greater efforts to avoid publicity were necessary in regard to the secret export of contraband of war to Britain and to the quiet assistance the Swedes were giving the Norwegians. Nor did Sweden publicize the number of times the government said “no” to the Germans.

In the economic field, the Swedes were not entirely helpless in their negotiations with Germany over trade agreements. In addition to having large stocks of goods which had been accumulated earlier from the West, Sweden also controlled assets of considerable interest to the Germans, notably the iron mines, wood products, and manufacturing skills. Thus the Swedes followed the example cited by an economic adviser concerning two frogs which had fallen in a pail of cream. Instead of giving up and drowning like the fatalistic frog, the Swedish government behaved like the more enterprising companion. This one had thrashed about in hope that some fortunate change might occur and thus turned the cream to butter. For Sweden the process took three years.

As early as May, 1940, the Swedes turned toward Russia to secure some imports formerly coming from the West. The agreement, signed in September, 1940, promised supplies important to Sweden but still had little effect in reducing Germany’s dominance over the Swedish economy. However, after the German attack on the Soviet Union the Swedes were able to tighten up their credit policy (which never in any case involved state credits) until the balance tilted in the opposite direction and the Swedes became the debtors.
The arrangements for the Gothenburg traffic illustrated best the way in which the Swedes balanced German and British trade demands even during the period of German dominance. Prior attempts to open other trade routes to the West having foundered for one reason or another, the Swedes concentrated on the outlet from Gothenburg. Despite the double blockade, they had maintained good relations with the British in numerous ways. For example, they had requested the continuation of the joint standing committee (set up under the early war trade agreement) in order to maintain economic communication between the two countries and to provide, in the words of the Swedish legislators, a "main bulwark against German pressure." Furthermore, about the time that they made transit concessions to the Germans, the Swedes leased to Britain the merchant fleet, amounting to 600,000 tons, which was cut off from Sweden by the German blockade. Thus by December, 1940, when the Swedes agreed to co-operate in a British rationing system for imports, Sweden secured British consent to a limited number of ships passing through the blockade from Gothenburg to the West. More difficulty was encountered in obtaining the consent of the Germans, but after months of argument the Swedes also secured their agreement to some trade between Sweden and overseas, chiefly Latin-American countries not associated with the United States' efforts to aid Britain. Once established, this arrangement could not be canceled by either belligerent without causing a severe political reaction in Sweden, and it survived despite several interruptions.31

Sweden’s concessions to Germany were understood by the British, who had neither the will nor the power to punish the Swedes in any case. Only by indirection did Britain become a danger to Sweden toward the end of this period. Early in 1942 Hitler was certain that the British planned an assault on the German base in Norway and expected that Sweden would join Britain in the enterprise. The Swedes for their part were convinced that a German attack was coming. They fully mobilized their defense forces, by now greatly improved, and sent word to the German government that they were determined to defend their neutrality against all comers.\[32\] Events in southeastern Europe soon became too pressing for any German military action in Scandinavia affecting Sweden, either in reaction to the Allies or as a diversionary attack upon the Soviet Union.

During this period Sweden was cut off from the West militarily, and the tug of war over it had ceased. The third great power, Russia, was also out of the game after being attacked by the dominant power, Germany. Yet Sweden still had economic contacts with the West, and both sides continued to have an interest in Sweden’s economic survival.

In this situation Sweden had to make concessions to the dominant power that would have been inconceivable under other circumstances. At the same time, the Swedes were able to hold them to a minimum. Since the Germans expected an early victory, they gave a low priority to slow-acting economic warfare. Thus the Swedes were still able to balance the economic claims made upon them by the two sides. Thereby they preserved their economy. The British recognized Sweden’s usefulness if it could stay only on the outer rim of the German orbit, while the Germans recognized that continuance of their own essential trade with Sweden depended upon Sweden’s contacts with the outside world. The Swedes demonstrated that certain limited rights of passage

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Times, December 15 and December 19, 1940; and London Times, February 18, 1947.

could be traded for opportunities to build up their military and economic strength for later resistance, as the Turks had used economic means to avoid transit concessions. For the transit of the Engelbrecht Division the Swedes had to pay a price later in a widespread sense of humiliation, but at the time they had no other great power's strength upon which to draw to withstand German pressure. The dominant power secured enough of its demands from surrounded Sweden to believe that military force was unnecessary for control. Thus the Swedes were able to mislead the Nazis long enough to avoid retaliation when the Swedish government subsequently became more independent. Too late for effective expression of his anger, Hitler's view that the Swedes were "ein Volk im Pension" changed first to uncertainty and then to the attitude that they were "craftily hostile" "villains."  

5

ALLIED DEMANDS, 1943-45

With the rise in the fortunes of the United Nations, Sweden shared the attention being given other neutrals by the Allies. The British and Americans sought to prevent Sweden, among others, from vitiating their major efforts to bring the war to a speedy end, especially their attempts to destroy the German war machine from the air. The Russians continued to remain aloof from direct contacts with Sweden on this subject. From the West, beginning early in 1943, came more and more insistently the demands that Sweden limit, then prohibit, trade with Germany in war essentials such as iron ore, bearings, and special steels. The Allies also sought the end of German transit privileges. Leadership in this phase of economic warfare had passed from the English to the less experienced and more impatient Americans. Under the pressure of a very potent public opinion and importuned by defense officials unskilled in such affairs and focusing on their own special problems, the United States government assumed a rigid and more partial position than Britain.

The Allies had no great difficulty in obtaining an agreement from Sweden substantially meeting most of their economic demands. The first of its kind with the neutrals, it took effect July 1,

33 Quotations are from Burns, op. cit., p. 253, and Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, p. 450.
1943, although not signed until September. Maximum figures for exports of specific items as well as for the total exports by value based on 1942 levels were set for both 1943 and 1944. However, no specific figures were established for ball bearings until the quota for 1944 was to go into effect; there was only an informal understanding that a reduction would take place during 1943.

To back up their demands, the Allies had offered scarce supplies under their control, the most effective inducement being petroleum. (Furnishing this fuel served a dual purpose, for it also aided in building up Sweden's capacity to defend itself against Germany.) In addition, the Allies offered relaxations in the blockade which would insure certain basic rations of goods and the passage of an additional ship per month in the Gothenburg traffic. Manipulation of the blockade regulations could also take the form of sanctions, although this was not stated explicitly, and the possibilities of extending the black list and freezing Swedish assets in the United States lay in the background.

As the Allies were girding for the invasion of Europe, they learned that, contrary to their expectations, shipments of iron ore had been exceptionally heavy in the early months of 1944 and exports of bearings far above the 1943 level, while shipments of balls and rollers increased several hundred per cent. Furthermore, the effect of Britain's preclusive buying of bearings had been nullified when SKF in Sweden built new facilities to increase production. Meanwhile, raids concentrated on Germany's airplane industry had cost shocking losses in Allied lives. As a result, Sweden encountered renewed pressure in 1944 to cease exporting these critical items. The Americans, backed by the British, demanded an embargo regardless of Sweden's previous agreements with the Allies or Germany. In return they offered Spitfires and Allied orders compensating for the loss of sales to Germany.\(^{34}\)

The Allies could more easily secure their 1943 demands than the more extreme demands of the spring of 1944 because the

Swedes perceived their situation differently on the two occasions, and their rapid withdrawal from most contacts with Germany later in 1944 coincided with further changes in their expectations. The Swedes had known by the beginning of 1943 that they would have to rearrange their trade patterns to accommodate the prospective Western victors, and they continued to desire a quick end to the war. No longer did they depend on any outside source for airplanes, and their economy was faring reasonably well despite severe labor shortages. Yet they still had to get their coal and coke from Germany, as well as other important materials, and they respected Germany’s power of last-minute retaliation for concessions made to the West, even as they respected the Allies’ power of economic reprisal if no concessions were granted. In 1944 the Swedes knew not only that the British and Americans did not agree on the amount of economic pressure to be exerted but also that there were conflicts within the United States government itself. Furthermore, they knew that the Soviet Union’s statements in support of the Allied demands were only pro forma. However, they also recognized that with the Russians circling the Baltic there could be no further traffic with Germany anyway. This knowledge was far more influential than the American references to favorable or unfavorable treatment of Sweden when the war had ended.

Even before the Allies first began to press for reduced trade with Germany in 1943, the Swedes had started to trim their shipments because the Germans were unable to keep up with their commitments. Sweden had struck a hard bargain late in 1942 which included a provision that after June, 1943, the quantities of such Swedish goods as timber products should depend upon German deliveries of coal and coke up to that period.

Twice in 1943 the Germans had stopped the Gothenburg traffic. To keep the traffic going while agreeing to the Allied economic demands, the Swedes had difficulty when they negotiated a new trade agreement with Germany. They succeeded in coming to an arrangement with the Germans on the basis of figures which had been sanctioned by the Allies. (By this means they also got the Germans to grant safe-conduct for Swedish civil aircraft flying between Sweden and Scotland.) Thus when the Allies some months later, in 1944, tried to get Sweden to curtail export quantities set by the Americans themselves in 1943, the Swedish gov-
ernment fell back on its agreement with Germany. However, neither this claim nor the contentions regarding the importance of German exports to Sweden and the relative insignificance of Swedish exports to Germany impressed the Americans. The impasse was finally broken by private negotiations between an American representative and SKF, the enterprise actually holding the contract for ball bearings. After six weeks of daily meetings a bargain was struck looking toward an eventual end to these exports.

In rapid succession followed other steps taken by Sweden to cut itself off from Germany, steps which were in line with Allied desires but which the Swedes would not in advance agree to take either in a general declaration or specific obligations. Indeed, they rejected the Allied démarche in August, 1944, by stating that, although Sweden was interested in a United Nations victory, the war would not be shortened by a total change in Swedish-German commercial relations, which had already been whittled down to insignificance. Nevertheless, by the end of the year all Swedish exports to Germany had stopped, except for a few relief shipments.35

The Swedes had for an extensive period resisted Allied pressure to modify the country’s whole neutrality policy and had kept negotiations narrowly confined to the question of trade. Nevertheless, it was Sweden’s initiative in taking other, non-economic, actions which made its later opposition to embargoeing exports to Germany seem insignificant in the balance. These actions favorable to Allied interests were very impressive. Without prior agreement with the Allies or Germany, the Swedes ended in the summer of 1943 most of the transit permission granted earlier to Germany. (The Allies were not at once aware, however, that they kept one transit route open, that across the Gulf of Bothnia to German positions in Finland.) To explain the unilateral ending of transit rights, the Swedes stated that their hope for peace in

Norway had not materialized; since they were insolubly bound by “spiritual affinity, strong joint interest, and, not least, sincere affection” with the other northern states, ending the traffic would remove a cause of grave irritation within the country and in Sweden’s external relations. In October of the following year, 1944, the Swedes declared that changes in their relations with Germany were the direct effect of the Nazis’ mistreatment of the Danes and Norwegians and not a break in their neutrality policy.

As a neutral, Sweden played a role in other movements of concern to the Allies that was almost indispensable. Thus Sweden enacted the leading part in facilitating the armistice between Finland and Russia of September, 1944. An end to this war was very much in Sweden’s interest, not only to prevent Russia’s further expansion into the northern countries, but also to shift the ubiquitous Germans away from one border of Sweden and thereby make concessions to the Allies less risky. Because one northern neighbor, Finland, had been linked with the enemy of the other, Norway, Sweden coupled its reminders to Russia of Sweden’s “imperative” interest in a free Finland with public expressions of dissatisfaction with German treatment of the Norwegians. Besides humanitarian and relief assistance to Norway of very large proportions, Sweden was gradually emboldened to give secret but extensive aid to Norway’s creation of a military force to participate in its liberation. Toward the end of 1943, for example, Sweden allowed the surreptitious training in large camps of thousands of Norwegian soldiers who had escaped to Sweden but who had not been permitted to fly to Britain. By 1945 a force of 15,000 trained and Swedish-equipped soldiers was ready, administered completely by Norwegian leaders answering to Allied headquarters in London and independent of Sweden save for ammunition depots.

Better known were Sweden’s wide-ranging humanitarian activities. For example, by the end of the war there were 20,000 Danish refugees in Sweden. The Swedes had been unsuccessful in softening Germany’s treatment of the Jews in Denmark but had welcomed them as they fled across the narrow water passage to neutral territory. Another example was the work of Count Bernadotte, who, under the Swedish Foreign Ministry’s supervision, arranged with Himmler for the safe transfer of 19,000 Scandinavian and other prisoners of war from Germany, thus avoiding
their probable annihilation. In addition to its humanitarian activities Sweden provided invaluable services as consular representative for the interests of belligerents and also as a channel for unofficial and secret communications between individuals from one side and the other, and even for some Nazi officials' contacts outside their government's knowledge.\textsuperscript{36}

During this period Sweden rearranged its diplomatic connections to accord with changes in the power of groups like the Free French. Yet, as if to emphasize an independent policy, Sweden did not withdraw diplomatic recognition from the German government until the day of its capitulation. Nor did the Swedish government, despite heavy pressure from the Allies, Norway, and Denmark, commit itself to aid its two Scandinavian neighbors with armed force if the Nazis tried a last-ditch destruction of these countries, which the Germans still occupied. Sweden's hesitating move in that direction was cut short by the armistice.\textsuperscript{37}

The Swedes experienced at first hand German reprisals for some of their actions. The punishment was in the first instance not economic. As the air bombardment of Germany increased, the Nazis were interested in maintaining whatever critical materials they could still get from Sweden and had no great desire to cut off these supplies. But in the fall of 1944, as Sweden cut off most of its contacts with Germany, the Nazis extended their indiscriminate attacks on small Swedish vessels and warned of immediate attack on ships in the Baltic. The Swedes were forced to close the Gothenburg traffic themselves in January, 1945, and thus found themselves in the tightest blockade of the war.\textsuperscript{38}


\textsuperscript{38} For the German actions see Martienssen, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 234; London Times, January 13, 1945; \textit{American Scandinavian Review}, 1945, pp. 67-68; \textit{Bulletin of International News}, 1944, pp. 426-27.
Despite its being blockaded by both sides and seeing its markets shift radically, Sweden still had been able to buy and sell throughout these difficult years, and even imported more than it exported. Only with Britain did Swedish exports exceed imports, as they had in prewar years, but on a very reduced scale. Sweden ended the war in an almost unique position among those trading with Germany—owing the Nazis money. Despite its earlier relations with Germany and its independent attitude about ending them, Sweden still had a reservoir of good will among the Allies when peace came, as evidenced by their proposal at Potsdam that it share in the allocation of the German merchant fleet to make up for its losses. Sweden was not qualified to attend the United Nations Charter conference, but it shortly became a member, while continuing to abstain from any alliance with the great powers.

During the last period of the war Sweden was still beyond military reach of the great-power democracies, but Allied ascendancy elsewhere made it possible for them to require Sweden’s economic reorientation. At the same time, Germany was still able to inflict serious injury, economic and military, upon a hostile Sweden. The third great power, Russia, was making no direct demands upon Sweden, but its military power was spreading into the vacuum left by the retreating Germans. However, Sweden’s military strength had increased significantly since the earlier period, and it was not experiencing severe economic deprivation.

With the strangle hold of the Germans loosened, the Swedes could again to some extent balance the pressures of one side against the other. However, they could not avoid the ill effects flowing from the fact that the winning side perceived the situation differently from the way it was perceived by the Swedes, even though they shared the same fundamental system of preferences. Thus the Swedes had to make concessions to the views of the Allies regarding how far they could go in cutting off relations with Germany and still survive, views which varied from that of Sweden with the distance from which the problem was observed. Unfortunately, the Swedes had to deal with Americans interested in “principle,” whatever the cost to the isolated small democracy. Fortunately for the Swedes, the Allies were divided among themselves on the degree of pressure to exert.

In serving their own interests the Swedes managed also to serve
some interests of the winning side, especially in matters outside the economic realm. Thus Sweden was able to escape the dilemma of a democratic small state whose trade was helping a Fascist power, the enemy both of democracies and of small states generally. This was possible because Sweden’s neutral status permitted it to provide services the winners could not obtain otherwise. At the same time Sweden could make changes in its policy detrimental to the losing side and still maintain its neutrality because of its special position in a region of small states with different enemies. For a small state Sweden was a strong one. Yet because of fear of the Germans, who, though losing, were so close to Sweden, this small state was still not strong enough to risk the loss of its neutrality by making further changes in its policy—even if these changes would shorten the war.

CONCLUSIONS

Unlike the other four states examined in this study, Sweden was for a long and critical period almost completely cut off from military contact with one side. Yet it achieved the main objective of staying out of the war. This goal was realized despite the fact that Sweden permitted un-neutral uses of its territory to a greater extent than the other successful non-belligerents. How the Swedes managed to accomplish what they themselves thought for a long while was impossible must be attributed to several intricately related factors.

By far the most important element was the nature of this particular small state. Sweden’s solidly democratic reputation kept valuable friends in the West even during the period of concessions to the Germans, while it prevented the Germans from expecting more than grudging acquiescence to their demands. At the same time, the democratic belligerents had sufficient respect for this fellow democracy to make them hesitate to coerce it into belligerency.

Sweden’s success owed something also to the pluralistic nature of its political organization. Unofficially the Swedes could execute certain public policies without the government’s appearing to be responsible. That they had a multitude of personal contacts with Germans as well as with Englishmen increased this advantage. The relatively free press kept the Allies’ confidence in Sweden,
and, although occasionally a danger because of German sensitivity, it also served to make the Germans uncertain of their power over the Swedes. Thus the Nazis were readier to bargain for what they wanted, for example, by giving leave for the Gothenburg traffic. Despite the fluidity and diversity in Swedish political expression, the leaders could count on unified support in any crisis, thanks to the Swedish tradition of compromise and mutual agreement on ultimate values. Two national elections during the war (1940 and 1944) showed the country's unity. To unity the Swedes added military strength of impressive proportions plus a political willingness and economic ability to sacrifice for defense.

Even with such impressive characteristics as an actor on the international stage, Sweden could have failed without certain additional advantages in its situation. Fortunately for the Swedes, the neutrality of a small state is usually desired by a neighboring belligerent, particularly if it is pliable. That the small state's neutrality may not be valued by more distant opponents was of less importance to Sweden's security.39 The Germans, unlike some of their enemies, never seriously expected Sweden to come in on their side; their demand for Swedish neutrality thus coincided with the Swedes' own preference. Equally fortunate for Sweden, because of its valuable iron ore mines the country could offer or withhold something important to Germany in addition to giving no military aid to the enemy. Although the Russians played a passive role in the Swedish situation, and the Swedes could not actively bring them into the balance, the Soviet Union was always in the background. This fact the Germans could not ignore.

Unlike Turkey and Spain, the Swedes meticulously avoided at all times any pretense of alliance with one side or the other, and they did not even try to give life to a bloc of northern neutrals. Yet their pivotal position in the north was some source of strength, though perhaps not fully exploited. The fact that their two closest neighbors and friends were fighting on opposite sides with respect to Germany during a critical period inhibited both blocs of belligerent great powers from making hostile moves against Sweden which they might otherwise have done. Neither small neighbor could help Sweden directly, yet their need for aid gave the Swedes opportunities for maneuvering in relation to the great powers.

39 Cf. La Ruche, op. cit., p. 45.
In the postwar period many Swedish leaders have declared that their success in staying out of the war was due to a policy of strict neutrality, that is, carefully observing the obligations of a neutral. A very different interpretation of "neutrality" provides a likelier explanation. It was not sufficient that the Swedes were determined to stay out regardless of the most pressing ideological and fraternal pressures. Even more important was their ability and willingness to satisfy each side at the height of its power while simultaneously giving the other belligerent reasons for not wanting to end Sweden's non-belligerency. A policy of neutrality did not prevent the Swedes from bending with the wind, heeling over just far enough to maintain their chance to bend again and still remain on their course.

Sweden's behavior was "anti-balance of power," but never so harmful to the disadvantaged power as to drive it to making war on Sweden. Nor was it to the advantaged power's interest to attempt to coerce Sweden into granting further favors. Sweden's active participation would never have been decisive; even in 1944 the Allies had, therefore, to be content with a stretching rather than a breaking of Sweden's neutrality. Unlike some less industrialized neutrals, the Swedes have for such reasons pretended to be insignificant in the power balance. Nevertheless, of all the small states in this study, what the Swedes did by themselves to serve their own interests, regardless of outside pressures, made the most difference in their own fate. It also affected the fate of some others, including Finland and Norway.

Sweden benefited from being on the periphery: the belligerents seldom focused their attention fully upon it. When Swedish leaders did have to face the direct gaze of the great powers, they were supported by genuine military strength within Sweden, a fairly well-balanced economy plus stockpiles of vital imports, and the possession of products highly prized by the belligerents. The circumstances were favorable, and the Swedes were equal to the opportunities presented to moderate the belligerents' expectations in Sweden's favor. The Swedes could and did persuade each side during the war that more forceful pressure for particular demands would have undesired consequences. Either it would be deprived of strategic goods under Swedish control, its advantage would be overbalanced by enemy retaliation, or Sweden would be pushed further into the enemy fold. Thus Sweden stayed out of the war.
VI

Spain: Unneutral Neutral

And those that have been best able to imitate the fox have succeeded best. But it is necessary to be able to disguise this character well, and to be a great feigning and dissembler; and men are so simple and so ready to obey present necessities, that one who deceives will always find those who allow themselves to be deceived.¹

Like Norway, Spain was the object of intense competition between the belligerents, but, unlike Norway, this tug of war remained on the political level because each side greatly feared retaliation by the other.² Spain’s crises came at a later point in the war. The belligerents had become more sensitive to the consequences of miscalculated risks in dealing with small neutrals, and the Western Allies, now mobilized, were more intent on coming directly to grips with their Axis foe. Although Germany was potentially the greater threat to Spain, the Germans proved satisfied so long as “spiritual alignment” kept Spain from siding with the enemy even if Spain would not aid the Axis militarily. The Spaniards’ ideological bond with the enemy inhibited the Allies from seeking more than neutrality from Spain. Thus the Allies concentrated on helping Spain to be able to stand free of Germany. At the same time, the Germans attended to the problem of strengthening Spain to resist the Allies. This was the best of all possible worlds for the neutral.

Politically, socially, and historically, Spain was a far cry from


the northern democracies. The only one of the European neutrals proclaiming itself a friend of the Axis and the only outright dictatorship, Spain was nevertheless one with the other four countries in this study in its desire to stay out of World War II. After three years of terrible and completely exhausting civil war only madmen would have wanted to fight again, and only the foolish would have believed them if they had expressed such a desire.

"The main fact about the land is its inaccessibility. Spain is a castle," wrote Salvador de Madariaga. Cut off from Europe by the Pyrenees, the country is in large part a high plateau dropping sharply to the sea on the east and south and much of the north, while Portugal lies between Spain and the Atlantic over most of the western border. A Mediterranean land, much of it is very hot during part of the year. So large a proportion of Spain's 195,000 square miles is semiarid or barren that the country, although larger than Germany, almost as large as France, and twice as large as Great Britain, has a far smaller productive base. However, there are valuable minerals for exploitation. The population of Spain (28,000,000) is twice as large as Norway, Sweden, and Finland combined and some millions larger also than Turkey.

Industrialization came to Spain earlier than to Turkey. A source of strength, this also meant a greater dependence upon outside markets and most particularly upon imports of such industrial requirements as oil. Unlike Turkey, Spain had a merchant fleet to supply itself.

Industrialization has not meant wealth to most of Spain, one of the poorest countries of Europe. Although a carrier of Christian civilization for many centuries, Spain otherwise has not very greatly differed from Turkey and other "underdeveloped" countries in having a low standard of living and sharp divisions between classes, from the poverty-stricken mass to the cultured elite. One important difference, nevertheless, has been the existence of active labor organizations in Spain, which were without a counterpart in Turkey.

Scarcely another Western country has had its "national character" more often analyzed. Despite the lack of scientific standards for assessment, observers have usually agreed that Spaniards tend to be extremely individualistic, obsessed with dignidad, reckless-

*Spain, p. 13.
ly courageous, and quite indifferent to time. Catholicism in Spain has apparently made no concessions to the twentieth century.

Unlike Turkey's revolution, the Spanish "revolution" of the late 1930's brought no renaissance but only covered over the national disunity. The caudillo was still rather precariously perched on his horse, while monarchists, army, church, and Falange, among leading groups, contended for power over the defeated elements. Yet these divergent groups were held together by an all-pervasive war-weariness, "a veritable psychosis of peace."

The history of Spain, particularly in the 1930's, is too familiar for recapitulation. It is sufficient to state that the Spanish Civil War was widely regarded as the prelude to World War II. The conflict between left- and right-wing radicals, the intervention by foreign states, and the participation of foreign volunteers appeared to bear out this presupposition. Franco's victory seemed to assure Spain's accession to the Axis. Spain's century-old neutrality appeared to be ending.

Yet "the war" never did come to mean the European war to most Spaniards. It alluded rather to their own civil war, whose embers were still burning despite the end of formal resistance less than six months before the Germans went into Poland. Although both the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists had aided the victorious Franco in Spain, they departed at its formal end without obtaining any tangible rewards; somewhat dubious credit was their chief compensation. The only diplomatic gains from their intervention in Franco's behalf were Spain's exit from the League of Nations and its signature to the Anti-Comintern Pact in the spring of 1939. This latter act conformed with the Spanish leaders' deep-seated hatred and fear of the Soviet Union, which made them less than enthusiastic about supporting Russia's new friend after the German-Soviet Union pact in August of that year. As V. S. Pritchett (like others) has observed, "Foreigners burn their fingers in Spanish affairs, which pride and the fragmentation of politics make exasperating and dangerous."

Spain would not be let alone, however. Its position in the ideological struggle and its location alike invited outside interest and interference. If an enemy moving from Spain laid hands on the British base at Gibraltar, the Mediterranean could be closed

4 José M. Doussinague, España tenía razón, pp. 93-94.
5 The Spanish Temper, p. 102.
to the Western democracies, especially since on the African side lay Spanish Morocco.

Spanish indifference to the sensibilities of other states and their interests was no hindrance to the expression of imperialist aspirations, which centered on Gibraltar and North Africa. Spain’s often-voiced claims, no matter how lacking in legal or rational justification, had to be heard by those who would be affected. For the victors in the Spanish Civil War the glory of their imperial past still existed and required revival in some inexpensive fashion. The fact that Spain (alone among the states considered here) had strategically located outlying possessions in the Mediterranean and Atlantic as well as colonies in Africa helped to perpetuate this myth for the Spaniards. At the same time it caused interested great powers to take more account of Spanish claims than they would have, had Spain lacked such possessions.

The Spanish leaders, however, were so aware of the weaknesses of both their rule and their country as World War II broke out that neutrality seemed the only conceivable policy. A European war appeared catastrophic for them and advantageous only to communism. The Spanish government signified its independence from Germany and Italy by a declaration of neutrality when hostilities began. Franco went further and appealed to the United States for localization of the conflict. For several months the Spanish participated in neutral efforts to stop the war. The one issue about which the Spaniards were never neutral was the Communist threat presented by Russia. During Finland’s Winter War, Spain was among those supplying arms (which they had earlier received from Italy). They criticized the Germans for their neutrality in the face of the Bolshevist danger, although they maintained official silence about the German-Soviet pact.

Thus in the fall of 1939 Spain was only ideologically aligned with Germany and Italy; it was closer to the latter, after whose Fascist party the Spanish Falange had been modeled. The debt the Spanish regime owed these countries did not endear them to

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the Spaniards, who did not hurry to make compensation. In fact, the Spaniards intended further levies; in particular they sought Italian aid in building up their navy.\(^8\)

Spanish relations with Britain and France were politically cool, although there were close economic ties. Earlier Spanish resentment against France for permitting the Republicans to find refuge there had somewhat died down. Yet the Spaniards knew there would be a hostile France, host to the Spanish regime’s own enemies, just across the border if Spain should throw in its lot with Germany. Still the Spanish Falangist leaders, at least, regarded England and France as weak compared to the Axis, while Germany, with whom the Spaniards had formerly limited relations, appeared to offer a way out of what they regarded as their humiliating position compared to the British and French.\(^9\) The Spaniards’ other neighbors, the Portuguese, were at least as anxious to preserve their neutrality as the Spanish, but at the same time their country was Britain’s oldest ally.

Remaining neutral was an easy task for the Spanish government until the fall of France, since this status accorded with the desires of both groups of belligerents. However, from June, 1940, onward Spain was under strong pressure from the Germans to join their side, and the prospect in the summer of 1940 looked temporarily inviting. British counterpressure, especially through economic means, continued to be felt, and the Spaniards resisted the temptation until the German interest diminished. Then came the Allied landing in North Africa and the accompanying demand that Spain remain aloof during subsequent operations. Again the Spaniards found this policy to their interest while striving to arm themselves through German sources to protect Spain from either side. As the Allies achieved dominance in the western Mediterranean, they sought to bend Spanish favor away from the Axis and were partially successful. Yet control over one scarce material, wolfram, permitted Spain to continue on its relatively independent course, since the acute need of the German armament industry for this tungsten ore enabled the Spaniards to gain concessions from both sides. When the Normandy invasion ended this opportunity, the Spaniards were willing to cooperate in any effort to end the war quickly, for their fear of

\(^8\) *Ciano’s Diplomatic Papers*, p. 292; *Doussinague, op. cit.*, p. 20.

\(^9\) *Serrano Suñer, op. cit.*, pp. 142–47.
Soviet expansion in Europe overrode all other sentiments except the desire to remain out of war. Spain's helpful inactivity at critical moments in the Allied fight against the Axis could not compensate for the Spaniards' reiterated hostility toward the Western Allies' Soviet ally or for their continuously independent expression of attitudes earlier deemed pro-German. At the end of the war Spain was still neutral but in deep disfavor.

I

ALLIED DEMANDS FOR NEUTRALITY, FIRST PHASE, 1939–MID-1941

The history of Spanish foreign policy during World War II is not easily written in terms of demands made upon Spain by the belligerents, since much of the time it was the Spaniards who appeared to be making the demands. Nevertheless, the belligerents did make claims on Spain, beginning with the usual Allied effort to prevent strategic goods reaching Germany through the neutral states. In the case of Spain, however, this demand was in the early stages subordinated to the overriding desire to keep Spain out of the war, even if at considerable sacrifice to Allied dignity. Anglo-Spanish relations were a continuing concern to the British, since, as Churchill said, "Spain held the key to all British enterprises in the Mediterranean." 10 Until the fall of France the British encountered no great difficulty in their main objective. Spain was not completely exempt from the pressures of Allied economic warfare. During this early period it was well within the Allies' power to control goods reaching Spain, and Germany's bargaining power for goods coming from or through Spain was very weak because of transport difficulties. An agreement secured by the Nazis in December, 1939, mainly registered a promise by each country to seek resumption of normal economic relations "prevented thus far by the deplorable international situation." 11 Yet the British interest in Spain's neutrality caused the war trade agreement concluded between Britain and Spain in the spring of 1940 to include a generous loan to enable Spain to continue trading with the sterling area.

10 Churchill, Their Finest Hour, p. 519.

11 U.S. Department of State, Documents on German Foreign Policy, VIII, 322, 658–69, 704, 927 ff.
The defeat of France radically altered Spain’s position and made England’s problem many times greater. How could the British prevent the Spanish government from giving in to the Falange expansionists and from attempting to profit from the German triumphs by seizing Gibraltar and some of French North Africa? The British knew, even if Franco would not acknowledge the fact, that starvation loomed in Spain. If Britain tried punishing Spain for trading and in relatively minor ways cooperating with the enemy, this would push the Spaniards over into Germany’s camp. Britain would appear the foe, not only because of the blockade but because the English were prolonging the war. On the other hand, economic aid to bolster Spain’s ability to stay independent of the Axis would prevent the otherwise probable internal collapse which would have drawn the enemy into Spain. Such a policy would stress Britain’s usefulness, cultivate friendly elements, and facilitate Britain’s securing much-desired strategic materials available from Spain. Under no circumstances should Britain, fighting for its life, play into Germany’s hands by becoming embroiled with Spain. Thus the British set about a policy of regulated aid, always endeavoring to prevent the accumulation of stocks in Spain and always able to cut off the flow if necessary.\(^{12}\)

In this policy England had the half-hearted co-operation of the United States government. American officials were divided among themselves at this period and were much more inexperienced in economic warfare than the British. They were more subject to pressure from segments of public opinion and far less closely involved in the fate of Spain as it impinged on their own. Thus their readiness to provide relief shipments was easily dulled by Spanish insolence, and they defeated their own feeble moves to win the Spanish by attaching to proposed Red Cross relief ship-

ments the condition that Franco publicly declare that Spain would definitely not join the Axis. 13

Spanish surliness, inefficiency, and incoherence were so exasperating, German influence seemed so ubiquitous, and there were so many signs during the summer and fall of 1940 that Spain intended to jump on the German bandwagon that the British themselves held back; but they never abandoned their course. They continued, even in the face of the Spanish seizure of Tangier. They suspected but did not know until much later that this was the period of heavy German and Italian pressure upon Spain to join the war.

Not only did the Spanish government appear to resist efforts to help it, but it seemed to go out of its way to show its friendliness to the Axis. As soon as Italy joined Germany in the war, Spain declared itself "non-belligerent," no longer simply "neutral." The controlled press was violently anti-Western. Franco and Serrano Suñer (the leading Falangist who became foreign minister in October) privately and publicly asserted that the Axis cause would and should prevail, although it was not until after the German attack on Russia that they gave full voice to this sentiment. Serrano Suñer ostentatiously journeyed to Berlin in the fall of 1940. In November Spain took over the government of the international zone of Tangier, which it had occupied "to protect its neutrality" when Italy entered the war. There were uncurbed demonstrations against Britain made by Spanish pressure groups agitating for Gibraltar, and a Young Falangists' mob attacked the British Embassy. However, the "dictatorship which did not dictate" and the incredible inefficiency of the government (in Anglo-Saxon eyes) made for inaction, and that was really the British objective for Spain at this time. 14


Very few Westerners except those on the spot suspected that at least part of the Spanish perverseness was due to a genuine fear of the Germans, who had fifty idle divisions across the border after the fall of France. The consequences of defying Britain and its friends seemed far less frightening than the reaction to a friendlier Spanish stand regarding the West which a hostile Germany might make. However, until late summer of 1940 Hitler was not intensely interested in Spain, from which he had at first only desired "benevolent neutrality." Despite some disenchanted leaders like Göring, the Nazis were for a while satisfied with relatively small favors. They made clear in the spring and summer of 1940 that they did not intend making a large contribution to Spain's food and aviation needs from any area then under their control. Germany, Ribbentrop told the Spaniards in May, had learned that reconstruction must take place without outside help; it should spring from the country's own strength.¹⁵ Not until the Battle of Britain began to appear a failure did the Germans become seriously concerned about Spain.

Spain's situation in the early months of the war was that of a poor country already exhausted by its own war, whose creditors, Germany and Italy, were unable to maintain close contact with it economically. Spanish neutrality was very important to the other side because of Spain's strategic location. After one of the Western partners collapsed, Spain's position became even more critical to the remaining democratic belligerent, and at the same time the opposing belligerent, Germany, could reach Spain easily and had been joined by another power, Italy.

Before the change in the situation began to affect Spain, the Spanish government could meet the minimum desires of the two sides while maximizing its own: no participation in the war and economic aid from abroad. The latter could be secured from the Allies without incurring German wrath, chiefly by looking weak but admitting the weakness only to the Germans.

¹⁵ Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX, 319. The German expectations and techniques may be found in ibid., VIII, 324, 927, and IX, 240–43, 448 ff., 585 ff., 605; International Military Tribunal, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression, III, p. 582; Bulletin of International News, 1939, p. 1036.

The Undeclared War, p. 84; Bulletin of International News, 1940, pp. 1134, 618–20, 1724; 1941, p. 51.
inefficiencies in Spanish government and business made it difficult for the British to impose very strict rationing, because of technical difficulties in estimating Spain's needs and uses. The Spanish government could, in turn, deflect attention from its own inadequacies by blaming the British blockade for the people's sufferings. Before the military situation changed, Spain could not get economic help from the belligerent with which it was associated in foreign minds, nor could it give any help. With the increase in Germany's power the Spaniards had to make a great show of their friendliness. Biting the hand that was feeding them from the West was not too difficult for a proud and impecunious country, and this ingratitude did not shut off aid because the giver was so desperately in need of Spain's neutrality that it chose to overlook unfriendly behavior.

GERMAN DEMANDS FOR SPANISH PARTICIPATION

The Germans viewed Spain as a military asset in the pocket, to be drawn out at will. When the invasion of Britain began to look more and more formidable, the Nazis took a new look at Spain in seeking ways to injure Britain. Seizing Gibraltar with Spanish assistance might be one answer. Late in the summer of 1940 proponents of Operation Felix were urging on a receptive Hitler the advantages of such an attack. Ignoring the difficulties presented by Spain's belligerency—the country's internal weaknesses, the long and sinuous frontier, and the fact that Gibraltar was only one side of the Mediterranean entrance—they argued that closing the Straits would be a main blow against Britain. They were anxious that Gibraltar be taken prior to the United States entrance into the war, in any case before the following spring. Thus the Germans could prevent a Western toe hold on the Iberian Peninsula and the Atlantic islands of Spain and Portugal. In November, when the directive for the operation was being framed, the Germans planned that they and not the Spanish should seize Gibraltar but that Spain should support them in closing the Straits. Since the Germans might encounter some difficulties in attacking by air, they might have to use Spanish territory. Hitler ordered a reconnaissance unit sent to Spain and the transfer of troops to the Spanish border of France.

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A request was to be made to Spain in December that a road be provided through the country for German troop movements.

Despite this action Hitler was less certain than in September that the Spanish would co-operate. He did not wish to pay Spain's very high price for entering the war. To do so would be at the expense of what he could get from the Vichy French, whose good will was at the moment more valuable. He saw "no reciprocity" in Spanish proposals. More important, territorial concessions to Spain might stimulate an English occupation of the Canaries and French North Africa's adhesion to the De Gaullist movement. The fruitless meeting with Franco at Hendaye in October, 1940, had brought Spain no closer to joining the Axis, and Hitler was appalled by the "great disorder" in Spanish planning and the "unrealistic" attitude they displayed. Nevertheless, Hitler continued to think a "vague formula" might take care of Spanish claims. Following the Molotov talks in Berlin, Hitler's interest in Spain increased, but he lost faith in Spanish intentions when Admiral Canaris in December reported Spain's refusal to set a date for aiding the German troops or granting passage. Yet if Germany proceeded against Gibraltar without Franco's consent, French North Africa might defect to De Gaulle and the British. At this juncture Pétain dismissed the collaborationist Laval. Hitler then returned once more to the increasingly hopeless attempt to get Spanish co-operation. Spanish intervention to bring about Britain's downfall now seemed improbable, for the Spanish were waiting until British collapse was imminent. Still the Germans continued to consider plans for Gibraltar, but all depended upon Spanish agreement. By this time, with Italian difficulties in Greece and North Africa diverting him, Hitler did not want to take the risk of fighting through Spain. Although the Nazis continued trying to persuade the Spanish government early in 1941, they had become more interested in other parts of the Mediterranean, and with the Balkan enterprise and "Barbarossa" to concentrate upon, Hitler gradually gave up the dream of "Felix."

If for no other reason the Germans would have failed to win over the Spanish government because the methods they used were poorly calculated to appeal to Spaniards and were often offensive to the famed Spanish pride. They were supercilious and gave the impression that they regarded Spain as a third-class state. At the
same time they appeared stingy; only much later, after the British were meeting Spain's problem, did they promise the wheat Spain so desperately needed. They had not wanted to spare scarce supplies to Spain until they were sure the Spaniards would do their bidding. Instead of the arms Spain sought they offered a small German force with specialized weapons for the attack on Gibraltar. On the masters in the uses of vague generalities, the amateur Germans tried the same technique, thus fooling no one. Most of their promises were receivable after the war. Yet even these could not be specific because Hitler was also dealing with Italian aspirations and at the same time promising the Vichy French that France's colonial empire would remain intact.  

Although the Germans' tactics were not persuasive, the Spanish leaders realized that they must be circumspect and friendly toward the victors of the Blitzkrieg in western Europe. Spanish diplomacy might be more effective than French military power. A conqueror needed a few friends whom he did not fear and with whom he could confide, for there were limits to all conquests. This was Spain's opportunity to save itself from war. But the poorly prepared Spaniards were not content merely with avoiding war. They knew that their territorial ambitions could not be satisfied by the British or Americans but only by the enemies of the Allies. Yet Spain's outlying possessions might suf-

fer if they went along with the Axis. They even feared that Italy would set covetous eyes on the Balearic Islands. Meanwhile Italy's difficulties after lining up with the Germans indicated that a similar move by Spain would be premature. These considerations regarding colonial possessions had to take second place to another problem the Spaniards constantly raised with the Germans and Italians: Spain's economic weakness and the need for outside help. The chief economic assistance Spain was receiving came from the side against which it was being asked to fight.  

Thus began the familiar sequence of blandishments, rhetorical praise of the Axis cause, extravagantly high counterdemands, excuses and apologies for present weakness, minor concessions, calculated delays and general dilatoriness, and refusals to come to the point about Spanish participation. On June 19, 1940 (the day Sweden granted transit to German soldiers on leave), the Germans received a memorandum from Spain as follows:

Since the Spanish Government considers the further existence of the French Empire in North Africa, which was partly created by the efforts of Spanish workers, to be impossible, it demands the territory of Oran, the unification of Morocco under a Spanish Protectorate, the extension of Spanish territory in the Sahara to the 20th parallel, and the extension of Spain's coastal territories situated in the area on the coast between the mouth of the Niger and Cape Lopez.

Should England continue the war after France has ceased fighting, Spain would be willing to enter the war after a short period of preparing the public. In this case she would need some support from Germany in the form of war materials, heavy artillery, aircraft for the attack on Gibraltar, and perhaps the cooperation of German submarines in the defense of the Canary Islands. Also supplies of some foodstuffs, ammunition, motor fuels and equipment, which will certainly be available from the French war stocks.

Besides occupying Tangier in the same month, Spain concentrated 100,000 troops in Spanish Morocco. This looked very threatening to the British and most especially to the French of Weygand's persuasion, giving them one argument for not trying

17 For the Spanish expectations see Doussinague, op. cit., pp. 41-44, 47, 56-57, 59; Serrano Suñer, op. cit., pp. 139, 161, 168-69, 181-82, 199-200; Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 398, 424-26; Pietri, op. cit., pp. 77-80; Feis, op. cit., pp. 70, 79, 82-84, 88, 92, 116, 121.

18 Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX, 620-21.
to take the French government to Africa. Soon Franco’s demands for coming into the war began to rise beyond those set earlier. Among others he added “rectification” of the border in the Pyrenees and French Catalonia. Furthermore, the Spaniards indicated that their demands for economic aid and war matériel must be met first before they took action. The large quantities asked were in Hitler’s view “impossible.” The Spaniards also refused to provide Germany with a base on the Canaries, which, they said, were not a “colony” but an inalienable part of the motherland about which Spanish opinion was very sensitive.

While Franco’s price rose higher and higher, new arguments were constantly available for postponing the time when Spain would join the war. In October, 1940, the internal Red menace remained too strong. Serrano Suñer told Ribbentrop in November that British airplane production might soon surpass the Germans’. Inadequate transport was one excuse given in December. In January there was too much snow; in February it rained too heavily. Germany’s plan for an air attack on Gibraltar would not work and Spain must take it with its own resources. Franco pointed out to Hitler in February, 1941, that the seizure of Suez seemed an essential condition for Spanish-German collaboration. As for the Tripartite Pact, there was no point to Spain’s signing, since brothers needed no contract for their mutual assistance, and why set their honor in juridical formulas?

Instead of joining the Axis, the Spanish “paid Hitler in small coin.”\[160\] The very outspokenly pro-Axis newspapers impressed Hitler, even though they had few readers. In March, 1941, Franco agreed to send 100,000 workers to Germany, but after much delay a small fraction actually went. For six months the foreign minister refused to let the United States ambassador see Franco. The German attack on the Soviet Union, though it diverted the Germans from focusing on Spain, disposed of one Spanish argument for staying free of the struggle, and for compensation Spain sent the “volunteer” Blue Division to fight on the eastern front. More injurious to the British, Spain’s port facilities were available to the Axis countries for refueling their warships, including submarines. The Spaniards showed marked partiality to the Axis in the treatment of aircraft forced to land on Spanish territory, in permitting the use of their territory for Axis sabotage and in-

formation agents, in making available postal facilities, and in the
circulation of news and propaganda. Even the appointment of
Serrano Suñer to the foreign ministry in October, 1940, when
German pressure was at its greatest, appeared to favor the Ger-
mans because of his well-known pro-Axis views.20

The British took these actions with as good grace as possible,
even reaching a modus vivendi regarding the rights of their sub-
jects in Tangier, and they did not radically alter their economic
policy. The Americans, farther away and with one eye on Latin
America, were less resigned; but their protests were also less
effective than Britain's economic inducements. Nevertheless, the
universally recognized possibility that the British and the Ameri-
cans could take action against the Atlantic islands, both Spanish
and Portuguese, was a potent influence on Spanish behavior and
of necessity impressed the Germans. For almost two years the
British maintained 5,000 men with ships prepared for immediate
emergency use in taking the Canaries should Spain yield to
Germany on the issue of Gibraltar.21

With the rapid shift in military power and the ascendancy of
Germany and Italy, which had supported Franco in the civil
war, Spain was in the most difficult situation it faced during the
war. Its aid seemed necessary to close off the Mediterranean to

20 The Spanish techniques are described in Hoare, op. cit., pp. 54–56, 112–
13, Documents on German Foreign Policy, IX, 396, 509–11, 542, 585–87; X,
97–100, 105–6, 484–86, 514–15, 561–62; Ciano's Diplomatic Papers, pp. 393–
94, 401–2, 417, 424, 427–29, 432–33, 461–62; Feis, op. cit., pp. 77 ff., 88–89, 95,
117, 120–21, 123–24, 126 127, 136, 144–55, 157; U.S. Department of State,
"Documents concerning the Spanish Government," Nos. 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10,
11, 12, 13, 14; Churchill, op. cit., pp. 528–29; Serrano Suñer, op. cit., pp. 166–
208, 233–59; Doussinague, op. cit., pp. 45–46, 50, 78–79; Spain, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Reply to the Publication of the United States Department of
State Documents concerning Spain, p. 29; Piétri, op. cit., pp. 33–35, 80–81,
84, 88; William Langer, Our Vichy Gamble, p. 126; General Maxime
Weygand, "En lisant les mémoires de guerre du general de Gaulle"; Bul-
796, 931, 991.

21 Churchill, op. cit., p. 519. For other references to the British and Ameri-
can reactions see ibid., pp. 529–30, 625; Churchill, The Grand Alliance, pp.
7 ff., 438, 545, 651; Langer and Gleason, The Undeclared War, p. 763; Feis,
also n. 12 above, since these periods overlap.

[ 161 ]
the other side by an attack on a strategic spot at its doorstep. This would be a major blow against the West, now reduced to one active belligerent. However, Britain’s sea power—which might be augmented by the United States—could threaten Spain’s outlying possessions. To Spain’s advantage, the Germans had many conflicting interests. If they were to satisfy other governments from which they wished co-operation, they could not pay the full price required for Spanish participation, and as time went on they had more pressing concerns in areas far from Spain.

By pretending that Spain would join the Axis under certain conditions, the Spaniards were able to prolong negotiations long enough to get past the time when their aid was crucial, and thus they avoided an invasion. Covering over their methods of procrastination with enthusiastic verbiage helped the Spaniards to escape violence at the hands of the disappointed Germans. Spain’s position was so central to the success of the attack on Gibraltar that the relatively minor measures employed by the Spaniards to ingratiate themselves with the Axis had to be overlooked by the other side. To bolster their position with the Germans, the Spanish could also bring in the possibility that the other side might inflict grievous injury on their own territory and spoil the German plan in which Spain was involved. The contradictory behavior of top Spanish officials, which appeared to Western eyes to be gross malco-ordination, permitted Spain to escape responsibility for following either an all-out policy of co-operation with Germany or one friendly to the British and Americans. The Spaniards not only saved themselves from invasion; at the same time they could provision themselves, drawing forth goods from both sides because of Spain’s obvious weakness. Although Spain failed to get Gibraltar, this issue remained useful for its nuisance value—indeed much more desirable as a perennial issue than actual possession would have been.22

3

ALLIED DEMAND FOR SPANISH NEUTRALITY
AT NORTH AFRICAN LANDING

As the Germans became more and more involved in their Russian venture, the likelihood that they would come through Spain

to Gibraltar diminished, but this fear remained in the minds of the Allied leaders planning the Casablanca landing. Since Germanophiles seemed so firmly entrenched in many parts of the Spanish government, the question arose whether the Spaniards could and would resist the Germans if they tried to anticipate the Allies by moving toward Gibraltar first. A further danger was the possibility that the Spaniards themselves would react adversely against Allied action in North Africa and make use of their very large garrison in Spanish Morocco to reinforce Vichy-French resistance. Especially hazardous was the necessity for using the one restricted airfield at Gibraltar as a staging area for the thousands of aircraft required in the operation, since this spot could have been very quickly wiped out. The Allies not only wanted Spain to take no hostile action itself; they also wanted the Spanish to block the Germans if the latter tried to pass through Spain to counteract the landing. As the campaign proceeded, the Allies continued to desire a quiet Spain on their flank.

These demands were made clear to the Spanish government at the moment of the North African landing, but the ground had been prepared earlier for their acceptance. The United States had turned from a practical embargo to a piecemeal trade policy which among other things permitted enough petroleum to reach Spain for its most urgent needs. The British in October, 1942, informed Franco that they contemplated a program of imports into Spain—to cover such items as oil, wheat, cotton, and rubber—which could be carried out only if Spain avoided serious incidents with them and removed existing reasons for friction. As the landing date approached, reassurances began to come in from the United States and Britain that they would continue to respect Spanish interests and territory and would not attempt to intervene in its internal affairs. Further promises of economic support in return for Spain’s continued neutrality came from the Americans. At the moment of landing Franco received a personal note from President Roosevelt telling of the “powerful army” he was sending to French North Africa solely to prevent occupation by the Axis and stating:

I hope you will accept my full assurances that these moves are in no shape, manner or form directed against the Government or people of Spain or Spanish Morocco, Rio de Oro or Spanish islands. I believe
the Spanish Government and the Spanish people wish to maintain neutrality and to remain outside the war. Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations. \(^{23}\)

The British note stated in part:

His Majesty's Government are in full sympathy with what they understand to be the desire of the Spanish Government to save the Iberian Peninsula from the evils of war. Briefly, they wish Spain to have every opportunity to recover from the devastation of the Civil War and to take her due place in the reconstruction of the Europe of the future. \(^{24}\)

These reassurances came as a relief to the Spaniards, who were nevertheless understandably shocked by the landing of Allied troops in an area about which they had been supersensitive. Fear of an Allied invasion of the Iberian Peninsula was only one of their many preoccupations. The Spaniards' intense and overriding dread of Russian communism had made them accept the idea of German hegemony over Europe as a bulwark against their worst enemy. This fear could even overcome their dislike of having Germans on their border and circulating within their country. To them the British seemed wilful in refusing to accept defeat, and they had allied themselves with the Communists; now the Americans were also interfering in Europe instead of confining themselves to their war in the Pacific. Thus the Allies were threatening to prevent the striking of a balance of power which the Spaniards believed the Germans would establish in Europe, given certain concessions from the Western belligerents.

All this, however, showed the strength of Germany's adversaries. At the same time, the Spaniards had also perceived Germany's inability to meet Spain's economic needs during 1942. In addition to these fears the leaders were continuously nervous over the stability of their regime, and this was further stimulated by American press agitation and by German-circulated rumors that


the Allies would try to replace Franco with a Communist government. There remained another fear that, with or without Spanish consent, Hitler might need a diversionary movement through Spain either to cover up Germany's lack of success in Russia or to forestall or counteract Allied action in French North Africa.

Two months before the landing, Franco had prepared for a change of orientation by replacing Serrano Suñer in the foreign ministry with Count Francisco Gomez Jordana. This former general was far friendlier to the West and made clear from the outset his determination to try to keep Spain out of the war, but he did not differ from other Spanish leaders in maintaining that there were two or three separate wars. In only one of these were the Spaniards not neutral, the crusade of Germany against Bolshevist Russia. As the preparations for the African landing became ever more evident, Count Jordana "steadily looked the other way and refrained from embarrassing" questions.25

Especially because of the rapid success of the Allies' operation, the Spanish government was ready to give very satisfactory replies to their reassurances, promising to stay out of the war and to resist attempts from any side to cross Spanish borders. Spain's next move was to counteract its isolation by drawing closer to Portugal. In December, 1942, an "Iberian bloc" was formed with the neutral but historic ally of Great Britain. To overcome the unfavorable impression the Germans would form, the Spanish reiterated and expanded on Iberia's common hatred and opposition to Soviet communism, an antagonism which could be implemented by closer co-operation between Spain and Portugal. Meanwhile Spain asked for a guaranty from Germany to respect its neutrality but was told there was no need for such a promise between good friends. However, the Germans added, they did not intend to ask passage for their troops.

Believing the Germans had a vital interest in preserving Spain from the Allies, the Spanish government had also quietly but urgently sought arms from Germany. They were ready to give a general assurance to the Germans that the arms would be used in case of an Allied effort at infiltration or attack. This was a continuation on a renewed and extended scale of earlier efforts to build up Spain's defenses through German aid and in exchange

for Spanish goods needed in Germany. However, the Spanish government was unwilling to have any political terms attached and wished no German technicians to accompany the arms. Discussion continued for months over the details; early in 1943 Spain made a secret agreement that when Germany "realized its intention to deliver to Spain in the shortest possible time arms, equipment, and war matériel of modern quality and in sufficient quantity, Spain, at German request, declares its determination to resist every entry by Anglo-American forces upon the Iberian Peninsula or upon Spanish territory outside the Peninsula."\(^\text{26}\)

Regardless of the diplomatic advantages, this campaign produced a negligible quantity of war matériel until much later in 1943.

The Spaniards balanced their more cordial relations with the Allies by continued favors and verbal expressions of friendship to Germany. For example, valuable military information passed from Spanish military officials across the Pyrenees to the Germans. Franco sent a warm message to Hitler in January, 1943, expressing hope for Germany's success against the Communists, while the secretary of the Falange, one of Franco's cabinet, visited Berlin amid much publicity.\(^\text{27}\)

Over a year earlier than the North African landing Hitler (if not his naval counselors) had become resigned to Spain's non-belligerency and had come to believe the Nazis must make the most of Spain's "spiritual" alliance with the Axis. However, in making a final effort to secure Spain's military co-operation, the German ambassador sounded out the Spanish government's willingness to declare that an Allied attack in French North Africa would be a casus belli. When Jordana replied negatively, the Germans tried equally unsuccessfully to interest the Spanish foreign minister in a joint preventive step. Following the landing, Hitler believed that the Germans were in no position to make a successful flank attack on the Allies by occupying Spain and seizing Gibraltar; and he greatly feared the kind of rear-guard

\(^{26}\) Department of State, "Documents concerning the Spanish Government," No. 14.

guerrilla warfare which the Spaniards were likely to wage. Now more than ever the difficult terrain and poor communications appeared to present formidable barriers to penetration. What the Germans wanted of Spain when the North African landing took place was therefore the same as what the Allies were asking: that Spain remain neutral and resist any attempt at invasion by the other side.  

This coincided with the Spaniards' own intentions.

When the Spaniards were confronted with an Allied operation in French North Africa, they regarded themselves as in a most dangerous situation, yet in reality the forces that might threaten them were balanced to Spain's advantage. The British were just achieving a decisive victory at El Alamein, and the Germans were suffering a serious setback at Stalingrad. The shift in military power was favoring the side which most desired Spain's neutrality and would pay well to insure it. The other side, the Axis, had to resist the temptation to use the troops it had assembled on the Spanish border or to engage in an operation in the western Mediterranean because it was too completely engrossed elsewhere. Neither side dared to make an overt move to preclude the other from occupying Spain.

Given this favorable balance, it was not difficult for the Spaniards to satisfy the Allies by staying quiescent, especially since this coincided with the optimum Spanish policy the Germans could hope for. The stage had already been set by the expectations the Spaniards had aroused in both Allies and Germans earlier, the one side knowing that Spain had no sympathy with the Allies and thus would give no positive co-operation, and the other that Spain would not permit passage through its territory. Furthermore, Spain was now much more able to defend itself as a result of its earlier policy. The wisdom of the patient English economic policy toward Spain paid off for the Allies in this crisis, but the policy had also paid off for the Spaniards. It was unnecessary for

the Spanish government to draw upon one side to resist the other, for each belligerent was entirely aware of the dangers of retaliation by the other if it went into Spain. However, reassurances from Spain were necessary to convince each side of Spain's intention not to aid the other. Although the Allies did not threaten Spain as the Germans threatened Sweden in a somewhat similar situation, the Spaniards had to change their behavior sufficiently to calm Allied fears of a stab in the back. Similarly, the Spaniards had to continue their favors to the Germans to quiet Nazi suspicions of a complete change of face in Spain, and even the Spaniards' demands of the Germans were directed to this purpose. Since the war against communism complicated the main struggle, the Spaniards could confuse the great powers by differentiating their own stand accordingly. They could also make use of this issue when they drew upon the interest the British and Americans had in Portugal by aligning Spain with this neutral friendly to the other side.

ALLIED DEMANDS FOR CO-OPERATION, 1943-45

For a few months after the North African landing the Allied situation was sufficiently precarious so that neither the British nor the Americans were ready to press the Spanish government to co-operate actively in particular ways. The very real threat that the Germans might still try to counteract the Allies' African campaign by moving into Spain was sufficient to rule out Spanish concessions to them. Eventually the proximity of Allied troops, Spain's need for petroleum, and Germany's deteriorating situation in Russia made it possible for the Allies to seek from Spain more than mere abstention from joining the Axis.

When, in 1943, the Allies intensified their pressure on neutrals supplying the Nazis with strategic materials, Spain was included because, with Portugal, it was the main supplier of wolfram for the steel needed in the German armament industry. The Allies were also asking for the end to a long list of advantages the Spaniards had been providing the Axis, or at least not preventing the Germans from providing for themselves. These included the untrammeled operation of German intelligence and sabotage agents in Spain, particularly in the strategically located German con-
sulate at Tangier; discrimination in the treatment of air crews force-landing in Spanish territory; use of Spanish harbors allegedly for war purposes; and favoring Axis publicity and propaganda while officially throttling most Allied communication. Loyal to their Russian allies, the British and Americans also sought the withdrawal of the Blue Division from the eastern front and the expression of a more friendly Spanish attitude toward the Soviet Union. In addition, more and more facilities were asked, such as unopposed passage through Spain of Free French fighters who had fled across the border southward.

In pursuing these objectives, the British and Americans were not, either in their respective capitals or in Madrid, united as to method, timing, and priority. The co-operation called forth by the Casablanca crisis faded out as the Spanish position became a less crucial factor in Allied operations. Not only were there sharp differences of opinion between the two allies up to and including the very top level of their governments, but there were divisions within the two countries. Particularly serious was the bitter conflict in American public opinion over favors to Fascist Spain.

Some of the conflict arose from a misunderstanding of the facts (such as the source of the oil permitted to go to Spain). More important were the differences in expectations. Those who favored a lenient policy believed that the carrot was more effective than the stick. Their opponents thought that the more prosperous and economically secure Spain became, the less amenable its government would be to pressure against trading with the Axis. Making Spain independent of Germany would also make it independent of the Allies.

This lack of unity within and between the Allied governments set definite limits to their rising powers of persuasion in dealing with the Spaniards. There were other limitations as well. The British had great need for certain Spanish products to carry on their war production, such as iron and potash. After the North African situation had stabilized, there was the Italian campaign, which called for a quiet flank on the Spanish side of the much-extended Allied supply line. Establishing a British base in the Azores needed Spain’s acquiescence in the outcome of Anglo-Portuguese negotiations. Even more critically important for the Allied cause was a friendly and tranquil Spain when the Normandy landing took place.
Despite these restrictions on a tougher policy, the Allies could exert powerful economic pressure on Spain. They did so, while not totally ignoring other methods of impressing the Spaniards. The very strong diplomatic protests which both Allied ambassadors made from time to time concerning Spanish abuses were apparently useless when not accompanied by direct or indirect use of economic sanctions. Since a much earlier period the British and Americans had been making and remaking trade arrangements with Spain, many of these agreements remaining fluid and unpublicized in order not to arouse the Germans unduly. The British maintained the navicert system by which they enforced the blockade, and the two allies continued their policy of helping Spain to obtain regulated amounts of goods in scarce supply. Starting early in 1943, they arranged for shipments of oil, cotton, fertilizers, parts for agricultural implements, coal, rubber, cellulose, and electrodes for steel furnaces. In return they sought more and more Spanish products of use in the war, as well as certain non-economic returns. In some cases the economic weapon was blunted because of indecision and internal conflict among the wielders; nowhere was this more marked than in the case of supplying petroleum products, potentially the most effective source of economic power over Spain.

One scarce commodity with which the Allies refused to bargain despite hints from the Spaniards was armaments; their supply was left to the Germans. The Allies were equally uninterested in using any kind of economic pressure to interfere with the domestic regime.

Some Spanish products sought by the Allies in exchange for scarce goods were more useful to Germany than to the United States or Britain. The Allies therefore attempted to buy up the total supply, particularly of wolfram. While a concurrent but far less successful wolfram campaign was also going on in the more important supplier, Portugal, the Allies and Germany bid up the price in Spain to a fantastic height. By the summer of 1943 the Germans were temporarily—but only temporarily—out of the market for lack of currency, while the Spaniards had acquired so large a dollar credit that they were no longer interested in money but only in goods. Up to the last part of 1943 the Allies had come out far ahead, having during that year secured almost three-fourths of the Spanish exports.
Preclusive buying, a popular technique with the Spaniards and one preferred by Allied military officials fearful of more drastic economic warfare weapons in the case of Spain, proved to be "like a naval battle conducted beyond the horizon." The unreliability of the method was shown up when Germany came back into the market in November, 1943, having secured new credits with the conversion of the Spanish Civil War debt due Germany and substantial shipments of arms, industrial machinery, and food. The Allies determined to find some means for ending the wolfram exports altogether. When the Spanish government committed a diplomatic blunder in sending good wishes to the Philippine puppet Laurel, the United States government became so incensed that, regardless of explanations and the known dislike the Spaniards entertained for Japan, the American officials headed for a showdown to penalize Spain.

There followed a lengthy controversy between the Allies as well as between the United States and Spain regarding the American demand for a total embargo. Other, unrelated, changes in Spanish policy were also demanded, but no material advantages were offered in exchange. At one point a quiet decision to suspend oil deliveries without fanfare failed to work because of a leak in the plan; the resultant publicity converted the idea into a kind of ultimatum. After Prime Minister Churchill had three times intervened with President Roosevelt, the State Department relented, accepting a less than complete embargo on wolfram. This they could have obtained much earlier if they had been willing to agree that Germany receive only token shipments. While the participants in the controversy argued, wolfram continued to pass to Germany, although the quantity was in dispute. Meanwhile also, the Americans were unwilling to try to force an embargo on the Portuguese, from whom they were seeking an air base in the Azores. The final agreement, which, in return for a resumption of petroleum shipments, purchased formal Spanish acquiescence to other demands was arrived at early in May, 1944.  

29 Feis, op. cit., p. 194.

In June the Normandy landing soon put an end to the practical possibility of Spain's delivering wolfram to Germany in any case.

The manner in which the Americans had conducted the embargo campaign plus virulent anti-Spanish expression in the American press had caused the Spaniards to fear that this was the buildup to an Iberian landing for the anticipated Allied invasion of Europe. Spanish intransigence was further strengthened because the American pressure looked less like diplomacy and more like dictatorship. The leaders were also continually worried about the security of their regime. This latter fear stemmed in part from the obsession concerning Russian communism and its spread into Europe as the Germans retreated. The Spanish foreign minister expressed the following views in February, 1943, and these were unchanged later:

If events develop in the future as they have done up to now, it would be Russia which will penetrate deeply into German territory. And we ask the question: if this should occur, which is the greater danger not only for the continent but for England herself, a Germany not totally defeated and with sufficient strength to serve as a rampart against Communism, a Germany hated by all her neighbours, which would deprive her of authority though she remained intact, or a Sovietized Germany which would certainly furnish Russia with the added strength of her war preparations, her engineers, her specialised workmen and technicians, which would enable Russia to extend herself with an empire without precedent from the Atlantic to the Pacific?

... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...

Germany is the only existing force in the centre of Europe capable of realising the great universal work of containing and even destroying Communism, and in the face of this danger, for the sake of European solidarity, all minor divisions should disappear so that we can confront this grave problem which hangs over us. If Germany did not exist, Europeans would have to invent her and it would be ridiculous to think that her place could be taken by a confederation of Lithuanians, Poles, Czechs and Roumanians which would rapidly be converted into so many more states of the Soviet confederation.31

31 Hoare, op. cit., pp. 190-91.
Thus the Spanish believed that they must make even more determined peacemaking efforts than those put forth in the first months of the war. Not only would the Russians thereby be stopped in their tracks, but Spain, her leaders serving as honest brokers between Germany and the West, would achieve a status far more respected than it then enjoyed. Meanwhile it was desirable to make accommodations to the Allied demands with as much face-saving and as little danger from German retaliation as possible.

In the May, 1944, agreement the Spaniards capitulated on such issues as the closing of the German consulate at Tangier, ridding Spain of German agents, withdrawing the last of the Blue Division, and submitting to arbitration or releasing the interned Italian ships in Spanish harbors. But the execution of these understandings was slow and partial. It was never clear to the Americans and British whether delays in carrying them out represented the usual Spanish dilatoriness or were deliberate efforts to continue to serve the Germans. Response on some occasions was silence; on others the Spanish leaders merely raised charges of their own. Withdrawal of the Blue Division was protracted over most of a year after the first signs of Spanish agreement with the British and Americans over this issue, which was not directly related to their own interests and which was very useful for bargaining purposes to Franco because it had been blown up to a size out of proportion to its substance. The Spaniards claimed that Allied publicity greatly embarrassed them in making a change already decided upon quietly. Again because of evasion and procrastination—or mere administrative chaos—the German agents were not expelled for several months after the final agreement in May, 1944.

While these aggravating delays were taking place, however, the Spanish government was providing very valuable facilities to the Allies in other directions. Among the most important was indifference toward, if not outright co-operation with, an intricate intelligence web which stretched between Allied friends observing the Germans in occupied France and the Allies in North Africa. In October, 1943, Franco spoke of Spain’s neutrality, and thereafter the term “non-belligerency,” adopted when Italy entered the war, no longer appeared in official expressions. To Allied complaints that the Spanish press continued to carry German propa-
ganda, the Foreign Office repeatedly indicated that "we are paying Germany with words the price of our peace." If it cost Spain little, Britain had to pay nothing for the advantages thus gained. As Allied military fortunes rapidly rose after D-Day, so did Spanish concessions, now that German troops no longer rested on their northern border. By December, for example, the United States got transit and landing rights not only for three American airlines but also for United States military planes.

These accommodations won no Allied ear to Spain's peacemaking proposals and related efforts to prepare for favorable postwar relations with the victors. The Spaniards found the Allies particularly unenthusiastic about their overtures after the long and unpleasant bargaining experienced by the British and Americans when they offered to provide needed scarce goods in return for Spain's withholding favors from the Germans.

Most irritating was the smugness with which the Spanish negotiators had successfully played off one belligerent against another and one segment of the Allied side against another. The Spaniards promised the Allies that no more wolfram than necessary would go to Germany, while at the same time they told the Germans they would take as little oil as possible from the Allies. More than once they obtained arms from Germany to "protect" themselves from a possible Allied assault, then informed the Allies that they could not cut off such strategic materials as wolfram from Germany because it was their only source of armaments. They secured wheat as well as arms from Germany by telling the Nazis that this would enable them to justify their refusal of Allied pressure to cut off trade with Germany. Grain shipments would also illustrate that Spain had other sources than the Allies. To explain to the Germans, on the other hand, their need to continue trading with the Allies, the Spaniards argued that otherwise separatist influences (Communist) would increase within Spain. Trading an economic concession to one side for a political concession to the other, they agreed with the Allied ambassadors in the summer of 1943 that the Blue Division would gradually be withdrawn, and then opened wide the wolfram market to Germany to purchase all it could pay for. The price was

32 Doussinague, op. cit., p. 270.
not gold but German goods unobtainable from the Allies, including arms. 33

What the Allies failed to note at the time was the frequency with which the Germans failed to obtain their own objectives. Thus the Spaniards, having secured in mid-1943 the arms which they had long sought, declared that it was no longer necessary to hold joint talks between the German and Spanish general staffs for planning an action together in case of an Allied attack on Portugal. The Germans' dissatisfaction with Spanish policy could be expressed only in verbal efforts to intimidate, with special emphasis on the fate of the Franco regime if Allied influence grew. Anxious to get what wolfram they could as soon as they could, they tried bluffs but never really threatened force, which might push Spain into the enemy camp. Their "'don'ts' came from a long way off." 34 In the spring of 1944, when the complete stoppage of wolfram shipments was in the offing, the Germans still sent some food, machinery, and aviation gasoline. 35 By the time that Spain capitulated on a wide scale to Allied demands, the Germans were too engrossed elsewhere to retaliate.

When hostilities ended, Spain had escaped the rigors of war. Yet, unlike the other neutrals, the Spaniards were punished for favoring the Axis even though the Spanish government did not join it. The Allied leaders had forgotten their hints at various crises that Spain would be rewarded for resisting the Germans. 36


34 Feis, op. cit., pp. 256.


36 For some of these allusions see Doussinague, op. cit., pp. 139, 234, 311; Serrano Suñer, op. cit., pp. 210–11; and Duff, op. cit., p. 272.
Not only was this neutral not admitted into the United Nations, but also, in December, 1946, the United Nations Assembly recommended to its members that they break off diplomatic relations with Spain. (The resolution was later rescinded.) Within a decade, however, the United States sought and obtained bases in Spain for the new power constellation against the Soviet Union for which the Spaniards had long argued. The Franco regime not only remained in power but greatly increased in strength. In 1955 Spain, like Finland, became a member of the United Nations in the Western-Soviet agreement bringing in sixteen nations at once.

After the turning point in the war Spain found itself in a situation where the Allied forces were coming closer and closer, their German friends were losing, and the dreaded Soviet Union was penetrating Europe. Yet time was on Franco’s side, the side of inaction. Because of valuable resources Spain’s economic cooperation was being sought by both the Western Allies and Germany, and both were willing to pay well.

Even with the growing strength of the Allies the Spaniards could count on their continued desire for Spain’s neutrality while there was any chance of Spain’s aiding Germany, and this desire modified the pressures the Allies were willing to exert to alter Spanish policy. Especially because of the wolfram issue, Spain could prosper economically while the two sides competed over how this strategic material should be allocated. Although the Spaniards could not borrow the strength of the Axis to secure arms from the Allies, they could obtain them from Germany by reference to the Allied danger. In other matters the Spanish leaders could exploit fully the possibilities of balancing the demands of one side against those of the other and of trading off concessions in some areas in order to avoid concessions in others. They were able to shield Spain from serious retaliation from the winning Allies because of the innumerable divisions in that side over their Spanish policy. What the Spaniards could not do was to raise their prestige, and this was partly because they were too successful in their bargaining and alienated many people by the methods they used. They had to pay for the “spiritual alliance” which had saved them from the other side, and thus they could not obtain respect for another important reason, the nature of the Spanish regime. Furthermore, because Spain was a Fascist dicta-
torship, dependent upon coercion rather than consent, the leaders could never feel that their rule was secure, regardless of the policies followed by the belligerents.

CONCLUSIONS

As successfully as any neutral and more successfully than most of the states in this study, Franco and his colleagues practiced the art of procrastination. Many times a demanded action was postponed until the interest of the belligerent was distracted by actions of the enemy unrelated to Spain. The Spaniards specialized in inaction, and there were many cases, such as the intelligence and propaganda activities of the belligerents, where laissez faire served every side. Although the Spaniards were lenient about the belligerents' use of their territory for some purposes not clearly related to the war or hard to pin down, there was one demand about which they were diligent in evading the necessity for action. Pride and fear of war on their own soil led the Spanish not to yield permission for the transit of German troops.

The Spaniards' success in resisting the most dangerous demands of the war came not from hiding away. Unlike the governments of the other small states in this study, the Spanish were not content with merely demanding to be left alone. They continually took the initiative in making their own demands upon the pressing belligerents. Consequently, the consideration of Spain's claims by the great powers helped to postpone decisive action by them. Since these claims had to be co-ordinated with those of other states whose co-operation was desired, delays were inevitable. The Spaniards also created issues of no genuine import to their main objectives and thereby established bargaining points for dealing with more critical demands from the belligerents. However, only certain kinds of demands could be safely used as counters in resisting the pressure of a belligerent, and Franco confined himself chiefly to those dealing with economic aid and imperial expansion. Significantly, he never sought military assistance by the armed forces of a belligerent under any condition. To do so would have destroyed both Spanish neutrality and Spanish self-esteem.

The pronounced strain of what the great-power negotiators regarded as "irrationality" and quixotic behavior in Spanish leaders served to make bargaining with them difficult and to confuse and
mislead the negotiators. That pride could drive Spaniards to endure unbelievable privations was hard to understand, especially for the Western governments. These seemingly irrational qualities served well a policy of procrastination. They also obscured the fact that underneath the cloak of grandiose pretensions the Spaniards were at least as sharp as any of the other small states and more uninhibited than most in asking and requiring an answer to "What's in it for us?"

Even Franco's and Serrano Suner's habit of insulting American public opinion, often just as the Americans were about to adopt a softer attitude toward Spain, was less irrational than might appear. It served to mislead the Germans, and it created issues without substance which could nevertheless be used for trading purposes. To the extent that the British and Americans showed themselves vulnerable to blows aimed at their national self-esteem, the Spaniards could feed their own national pride—their most precious possession. Only by developing thick skins can great powers protect themselves against this least costly method by which a small state exercises its power.

The Spaniards' verbal disdain of the great democracies was not all show; often it sprang from a deep conflict in ideologies. Spain was the most distant of the neutrals from the Allies in its political value system, and the only one blatantly unfriendly to democratic governments. This led to many miscalculations by the belligerents. The Allies overestimated the strength and pervasiveness of the Falange, the ideological spearhead. So, however, did the Axis. Thus neither side correctly read the Spanish leaders' basic political intentions, and it was especially to Spain's advantage that the Germans were deceived.

Throughout the war Spain's situation contained more favorable factors for non-belligerency than the other states in this study with the possible exception of Turkey. Even though the pattern of great-power relationships was only two-sided, the Soviet Union was included in the picture by Spain's own actions in emphasizing the duality of the war. Spain also profited early in the war because of its friendly relations with Italy, which could act as a go-between for the two very disparate dictatorships. On the other hand, there was sufficient rivalry between the two Latin countries in their colonial aspirations to embarrass Hitler when he dealt with Spain. A similar but deeper rivalry between Spain and France complicated Hitler's task still further, especially because
there were two French governments, and this helped to reduce
Spain’s vulnerability on the northern border. Spain and Portugal
were the only successful European neutrals having another small
neutral as an immediate neighbor throughout the war. Portugal’s
usefulness to the Allies caused the Western leaders to move cau-
tiously in matters which would disturb one of these two small
states and so disturb the other. Similarly, the Germans earlier in
the war had hesitated to take certain actions in Spain for fear of
precipitating a working alliance between Portugal and the West-
er powers.

Like Portugal and unlike the other small states being consid-
ered here, Spain had outlying possessions. The very vulnerability
of these dependencies made it possible for the Spaniards to draw
upon one side in resisting the demands of the other. Western sea
power gave Hitler pause when pressing Spain to become involved
in the war. These same possessions tended to make the Allies
more cautious and respectful in their treatment of Spain when
they came to North Africa.

The art of procrastination, in which the Spaniards were so
adept, threw on the confusion and malco-ordination between
allied belligerents and within each of their respective countries.
The lack of unanimity on all sides regarding what should be de-
manded and how is more marked in the case of Spain than in
that of any other country here considered. It could not even be
attributed to the presence of the Russians, who did not partici-
pate. Divisions on the side making demands looked like weak-
nesses to the Spaniards, who could then employ the method of
counterdemand to compensate for their own weaknesses. By ex-
ploring the belligerents’ disabilities and fears, the Spaniards
thereby postponed undesired action until military events else-
where eased the pressure. This goal of all the small states was
thus achieved by the Spaniards through a somewhat paradoxical
but successful method of resistance, converting impotence into
power.

The Spaniards made the most of the ample opportunities to
impress both sides with the risks of forcing them to undesired
actions. Not only were they ready and able to exploit the possi-
bilities of providing a strategic service; they were also successful
in convincing the demanding powers of the likelihood of enemy
retaliation on a serious scale. They dared to pose on the threshold
of belligerency in order to avoid it.

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VII

The Influence of Small Powers

The one who is not your friend will want you to remain neutral, and the one who is your friend will require you to declare yourself by taking arms.¹

It is not wise to form an alliance with a Prince that has more reputation than power.²

The twenty-five situations examined in the foregoing pages illustrate ways in which five small states sought to resist the demands of great-power belligerents in wartime crises without themselves being drawn into war. They indicate that success depended on convincing the power pressing the small state that its continued neutrality was advantageous to the great power too. The small state’s leaders had to make clear that the belligerents’ major requirements could be satisfied without the use of force or that the use of force would be too expensive in terms of the benefits sought and the larger dividends available if applied elsewhere.

Not all the states studied had equal opportunities for diplomatic maneuver, and the involuntary entrance of Finland and Norway into war came at crises when they had little chance to modify in their favor the expectations of the leaders of the great power or powers involved. Yet even these small states were able to avoid capitulation in some crises. Furthermore, both Finland and Norway emerged from the war as completely independent countries. The others survived not only without the devastation of war but with increased military strength. They had achieved

¹ Machiavelli, The Prince, chap. xxi.
² Discourses, Book II, chap. xi.
their purpose of non-participation, even if it required some payment in pride and self-respect.

The problem of influencing the great-power leaders was complicated by the vast and very significant differences in perspectives between the great powers and the small powers. This gap existed regardless of ideology or any other factor linking the interests of a particular small state with one or another of the great belligerents. The primary difference—and it generally holds true regardless of time, situation, or states involved—was the scope of their attention. Great-power leaders had to broaden their gaze to sweep the whole international arena, and thus their focus upon a particular small power tended to be fleeting and not especially directed to the particular interests of that state. The leaders in the latter, on the contrary, were primarily concerned with their own fate, regardless of the larger constellations of power over which they could have no control. The diplomatic task of the small-power leaders was thus much easier than that of the great powers in one respect. Whether or not they believed that their behavior could alter the outcome of the war, their practical objective was simple and clear: to stay out of the hostilities. And they could attend to this task with great concentration and intensity.

Great-power pressure on a small power to take some action which would make it a belligerent was always justified by an assertion of some distinctive shared interest; like every other great-power move, however, such pressure was only one element in the great power’s necessarily wide and shifting set of maneuvers. For the small-state leaders, the prospect of a long-term victory of commonly held values was outweighed by the immediate likelihood that their regime—if not their nation—might not survive to enjoy the triumph. The government of the small state had to concentrate on the short-run possibilities. Its own estimate of the effects of participation could not easily be impressed upon the great-power leaders, who had a large number of other intermeshed interests to claim their attention. While the great power might be almost the whole concern of the small state, the latter was only a small part of the concern of the great power. There were times when this difference was advantageous to the small state, for example, when the great power was unwilling to concentrate its power on one little country. The more extensive range of great-power interests also provided the opportunity so necessary to the
small state of holding on until the attention of a demanding belligerent shifted.

Another difference in perspectives between the great and the small powers was the acute sensitivity of the small to possible encroachments on their independence. Characteristically, small-state leaders strive to compensate for their military inferiority by emphasizing respect for their dignity. The great powers regularly overlooked this need even in such matters as requiring public declarations of policy from the small.

In World War II, when the small states’ leaders did examine their position in the balance of power, their perspectives on Germany and Russia almost without exception differed from those of the West and not primarily for ideological reasons. For them Germany was a valuable counterweight against the equally threatening Russians, and they were quite unable to obtain acceptance of this idea in the West, even as they failed every time in their several efforts at mediation to shorten the war. The longer the war lasted, the more precarious did they view their position, for they regarded the threatened extinction of Germany and the expansion of Communist Russia as two sides of a single catastrophe. Because of their views on the dual character of the war, they could not share the Western Allies’ preference for final, unconditional, and total victory over Germany.

Once a state, great or small, became involved in the war, the perspectives in that country changed very rapidly. Caution also tended to be thrown aside. But for the leaders of a small state still outside the battle, participation seemed more likely to destroy their regime than to preserve it by assisting in the ultimate victory of the side they favored. Perhaps only a small percentage of all the states participating would face disaster, but for them the tragedy could be 100 per cent. This attitude was another barrier to the great powers’ understanding of the neutrals’ course of action.

Despite basic differences in perspectives, the small-state diplomats had to exert every effort to insure that the great power at least entertained accurate expectations of the likely course of events. Miscalculations within a great power could be very costly both to that power and to the small state involved. The small state had to sound credible when arguing that a proposed action
was likely to lead to an enemy attack or at least to the small state's overdependence upon the opposing side.

There were times when the small state had very little chance to participate in a decision affecting its status. Thus one great power sometimes made a demand relating to a neutral, not on the neutral directly but on another great power. Whether or not the demand was then made upon the small state, and with what pressure, were questions determined outside the sphere in which the small state could operate. Furthermore, demands upon a small state often varied according to changes in the belligerents' relations with one another rather than with their direct interest in the small state.

Other states than the one pressing a small country hardest might also enter into a situation decisively. When a great state had occupied a particular neutral's neighbor and then stopped short of the neutral, the latter, while not helpless, might come within the orbit of the great power without force being used upon the neutral. For it could no longer draw much strength from an opposing great power to balance the pressure of the dominant belligerent.

In such situations, where the locus of the decision-making was outside the sphere of the small state, the range of action available to it was minimal if not completely nonexistent. We have already seen that in other types of situations this was not always or even usually true. But in general the main boundaries of action for the small state were set by the relative military strength of the belligerents.

Within the limits set by inter-great-power relations, leaders in the small states employed tactics which did not vary greatly despite the differences among the countries involved. Their main hope was to ride out the storm represented by a particular crisis, rolling and pitching but not slipping their moorings. Eventually the pressure of any given great power would diminish because its great-power opponents were creating larger or more urgent problems elsewhere. The experience of the five states in this study indicates that the would-be neutral's chance of successfully resisting the pressures from the belligerents increased with the following circumstances:

The more numerous the great powers with conflicting demands who were concerned about the small power and who could give effect
to their concern; i.e., the more complex the balance

The more equal the balance of military strength among the contending great powers in the region of the small state

The greater the range of competing interests elsewhere on which the demanding great power needed to focus

The greater the distance the small state was located from a direct line between belligerents

The more massive the physical barriers to invasion of the small state

The larger the quantity of scarce commodities or services useful for war purposes which the small state controlled and the more critical the scarcity to one or both sides

The more self-contained the small state's economy

The less unified the side making the demand

The greater the moral inhibition in the demanding power to the use of force when there was an alternative

The more influential the groups in the demanding power identifying themselves with the small state

The longer the small state had been a member of the family of nations, an independent country with which the great powers had had to negotiate

The larger the number of neutrals

In these cases the small state could not determine the circumstances, although its government could often exploit them to its own advantage. The following conditions were much more likely to be decided within the small state, and the more they prevailed the better for the small state:

The capacity and will to employ force to resist violently an act of violence, and the great power's realization of these facts

A conciliatory approach, making concessions where the great power's dominance is unquestionable without giving up the principal means of protecting the small state's independence, which in wartime usually meant no foreign troops within the small state's territory and outside its control

Unity in the government, a constitutional consensus, and self-control among the people despite the activities of subversives in their midst

Friendly relations with neighboring small states

The ability to concentrate on the main goal at the expense of other values, e.g., the capacity to ignore irredentist temptations and internal demands for peace-time economic welfare

Possession and use of accurate political and military intelligence regarding the great powers and the ability to calculate correctly their dispositions
Negotiators with experience, imagination, flexibility, nerve, and capacity to conceal intentions disadvantageous to the demanding state.

The capacity to set off the demands of one side against those of the other while extracting concessions from each.

Readiness to exploit each great power’s interest in the small state’s ability to resist the other side by securing from them the economic and military supplies permitting the small state to build up its defense against any side.

The ability to practice the art of procrastination by such means as the following: holding out the possibility of concessions at some price and then making the price exorbitant, distracting the demanding state by such means as reference to cheaper alternatives, increasing the demanding power’s fear of retaliation from the other side, trading off individually trivial concessions to avoid making vital ones, taking advantage of conflicts within the demanding side, giving “informal” and secret understandings to avoid open declarations fixing policy and to counteract favors to the other side, insisting that compensation be tangible and immediately receivable, and otherwise avoiding a decision until its timeliness disappears.

The foregoing factors, both those subject to choice within the small state and the others, were particularly useful in making it possible for the small state to draw on the strength of a great power to supplement its own. Correct timing was of the greatest importance in view of the shifting interests of the belligerents. Drawing upon the power of one side to oppose the other took the form of an outright alliance in only one of the cases studied; yet under particular circumstances such an alignment could have been more of a protection than the danger most of the neutrals regarded it to be. On the other hand, attempts to add to the power of the small state by combining with other small and presumably disinterested states regularly failed, for the sum of their power was weakness and the combinations were too insubstantial. None of the small states studied here dared to go so far in using the strength of one side to oppose another as to threaten joining the enemy, but the possibility of such a move was frequently in the minds of the great-power leaders.

3 The deliberate balancing by the small-state leaders was not always necessary. There were times when the great powers balanced each other without the small “playing off one against the other.”

4 While many of the factors enumerated above would in most cases be of peripheral importance to the great power, supplementing its military strength, they may be essential to the small state, substituting for the military power which it lacks.
This study has dealt with the demands which were actually made upon the small states. There has been hardly any discussion concerning desires which did not reach this state of concreteness because the great-power leaders' expectations changed, sometimes because of lessons learned from negotiations here described. Where the military use of neutral territory was at issue, the great power converting such a desire into a demand did so only at the expense of its long-run interests. Careful consideration would have shown such a demand to be completely incompatible with a small state's views of its interests and likely to be resisted by arms.

When the leaders in the great power recognized accurately the pattern of demands, identifications, and expectations of the small state, they saved their negotiating energy for securing concessions more relevant to their war effort than military co-operation; thus they could also avoid fully mobilizing the small state's powers of resistance. The small state's need for strength to resist would also have decreased in some cases had its leaders acknowledged the substantial identity of their value position with that of the Western great powers and the rationality of these great powers' perspectives, given this shared value position.

The evidence in this study pertains only to a particular period of armed conflict and to a persistent small-power objective of non-participation. Even though it was drawn from the pre-atomic era, it should continue to be applicable to many situations today. The H-bomb is an unsuitable instrument for dealing with small states. A thermonuclear war would be too short for the small state to play any role at all. But in a cold-war period or a period of any kind of limited war the conditions still exist for the kind of great-power–small-power relations described in this study. Furthermore, the horrors of a two-way atomic war are so great that those possessing the bombs have been giving recalcitrant small states much leeway in order to avoid a conflict leading possibly to the destruction of civilization. Paradoxically the small states in the 1950's seem to have found a greater freedom of maneuverability at the very time their military inequality vastly increased.

To take just one example, many of the experiences of the great powers dealing with Spain during World War II have since been duplicated in the case of Yugoslavia. A clearer understanding of the effects upon small-power–great-power relations caused by post–World War II technological changes in communications and warfare requires further research. The author is currently engaged in such a study.
This study is perhaps least applicable to understanding the great-power–small-power relationship within coalitions such as NATO. Once committed, the small power moves into a wholly different set of relationships, although its skill in maintaining its particular interests may remain very great. Before World War II the small states were not offered such an alternative—membership in an integrated mobilized defense organization and one in which they could participate as decision-makers. The experience of World War II was a prerequisite for the acceptance of this idea among the great and the small alike.

The data in this study, though limited in time and situation, do suggest some general conclusions about the power of small states in international affairs. Postwar changes in the orientation of the countries studied here, as well as the small state’s “benevolent neutrality” toward the dominant side during the war, indicate that the decisions of small states are likely to increase the imbalance between two power constellations. Instead of moving to the side of the less powerful and thereby helping to restore the balance, they tended to comply with the demands of the more powerful and thus to accentuate any shifts in the balance of forces caused by changing fortunes of war or prospects of ultimate victory. Viewed in this way, the small state’s characteristic behavior may be described as “anti-balance of power” while that of a great power is characteristically “pro-balance of power.” Where the margin between a self-righting balance and the complete overturn of the balance is very close, this behavior pattern may conceivably be decisive. Ordinarily, however, the small state’s weight is unimportant in determining the distribution of power among the great, because the small state follows a pattern already being set and only accents it. In the large decisions marking out the configuration of power in world politics, the small state has little influence in the sense that it does not participate directly. Yet its own leaders may modify decisions of the great powers indirectly by affecting the expectations of great-power governments in the competition which involves the small. In this manner the small state may be said to be influential.

World War II was settled in favor of the West and the Soviet Union without the active aid or opposition of the small states of Spain, Turkey, and Sweden, while the roles played by Norway and Finland were very small in the total drama. Nevertheless, the
battle would have been waged differently at different times had not the governments of the small states exerted their efforts to maintain an independent policy. In retrospect, the benefits to themselves and to the Western democracies of their independent policies have demonstrated that their diplomats were frequently wiser than those pressing them to take opposing courses. Virtue was no monopoly of the small powers, but wisdom was not an exclusive attribute of the great.
Chronology

HIGHLIGHTS OF WORLD WAR II COMBINED WITH IMPORTANT EVENTS CONCERNING TURKEY, FINLAND, NORWAY, SWEDEN, AND SPAIN

September, 1939: Germans invade Poland and war begins. Self-governing Dominions except Eire join British and French. Declaration of Panama. All states in Western Hemisphere except Canada announce neutrality zone 300 miles out. Finland, Norway, Sweden, and Spain declare neutrality.

October, 1939: Poland partitioned by Germans and Russians. Turkey signs Tripartite Mutual Assistance Pact with Britain and France after failing to agree with Soviet Union on a pact. Finns begin futile two-month negotiations with Russians over Soviet demands for territory.

November, 1939: Soviet Union attacks Finland. Norwegians conclude shipping agreement with British.

December, 1939: League of Nations expels Soviet Union. Sweden concludes war trade agreements with Britain and Germany.

January, 1940: Allies warn Norway and Sweden regarding German use of Leads for transport of iron ore and hint direct action. British agree to pre-empt Turkish chrome for two years.

February, 1940: Allies press Norway and Sweden to permit expeditionary force through to Finland. Anglo-Norwegian war trade agreement concluded; also trade agreement between Norway and Germany. "Altmark" captured by British in Norwegian waters. Balkan Conference high point in Turkish efforts to consolidate Balkan resistance.

March, 1940: Sweden and Norway refuse Allies permission for transit to Finland. Finland signs Moscow Peace ending Winter War. Anglo-Spanish war trade, payments, and loan agreements signed.

April, 1940: Germany invades Norway and Denmark. Abortive Allied mine-laying operation in the Leads. British come to aid of Norway. Sweden observes strict neutrality toward all sides.
May, 1940: Blitzkrieg in west. British occupy Iceland. Winston Churchill becomes Prime Minister of Britain. Russians resume pressure on Finland.

June, 1940: Dunkirk evacuation. Italy enters war. Fall of France. Beginning of ten months of worst losses to Britain in Battle of Atlantic. Soviet Union annexes Baltic states; takes Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from Rumania. Norwegian forces capitulate to Germans; Norwegian government carries on from England. Spain changes status from "neutral" to "non-belligerent" and occupies Tangier. Allies fail to get Turkish participation. Sweden permits limited transit of German military personnel and matériel; signs revised trade agreement with Germany.

July, 1940: Italy pushes toward Suez from East Africa. Beginning of Battle of Britain. Turkey signs commercial agreement with Germany. Anglo-Spanish-Portugese trade agreement signed.

September, 1940: Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan. British-American exchange of destroyers for bases. Finns grant Germans transit right north to Norway when Russians begin to use their transit right to Soviet base in Finland.

October, 1940: Italy attacks Greece. Virtual end of Battle of Britain. German troops enter Rumania by agreement with government. Falange leader Serrano Suñer becomes foreign minister of Spain, visits Rome and Berlin to discuss Spain's entrance into war; Franco meets Hitler at Hendaye and continues refusal to commit Spain.


December, 1940: British begin to push Italians back from Egypt through Libya. Hitler issues directive for Barbarossa. Hitler sends Canaris on fruitless mission to Spain to get co-operation in a German attack on Gibraltar.

January, 1941: Greek counteroffensive succeeding against Italians. Russians denounce trade agreement with Finland and stop all deliveries.

February, 1941: British decide to send aid to Greece and unsuccessfully seek Turkish military aid against Germans. Turkey signs non-aggression pact with Bulgaria. British reach modus vivendi with Spain over Tangier.

April, 1941: Germany attacks and occupies Yugoslavia. Germany invades Greece and defeats Greeks and British. Turkey does not enter Greek war.

May, 1941: British evacuate Crete. Iraq revolt, encouraged by Germany, put down by British.

June, 1941: British and Free French begin to take over Syria from Vichy French. Turkey signs friendship treaty with Germany. Germany attacks Soviet Union. Finland joins war against Soviet Union. Sweden permits a German division to pass from Norway to Finland.

July, 1941: Anglo-Soviet agreement for mutual aid and for joint peace discussions. Spain sends "volunteer" Blue Division to Russian front.


September, 1941: U.S. and British representatives meet in three-power conference in Moscow to give support to Soviet Union.

October, 1941: Germans overrun whole of Crimea. Turks agree to sell chrome to Germany in 1943.

November, 1941: United States extends Lend-Lease to Soviet Union. Turkey signs economic agreement with Germany. Finland signs Anti-Comintern Pact; Spain reaffirms adhesion.

December, 1941: Pearl Harbor. Soviet Union passes to offensive. Hong Kong falls to Japan. United States extends Lend-Lease to Turkey. Britain declares war on Finland.


February, 1942: Fall of Singapore; Japan dominates all Malay Peninsula. German-Spanish trade agreement, including exchange of arms, fuel, steel, etc., for raw materials, including wolfram.

May, 1942: New German offensive against Soviet Union. Anglo-
Soviet Alliance signed. Japanese gain full control of Philippines

June, 1942: Japanese in Attu in western Aleutians. Americans land
in Guadalcanal. U.S. victory in Battle of Midway. Turkey con-
cludes another trade agreement with Germany.

August, 1942: Siege of Stalingrad begins.

September, 1942: Serrano Suñer replaced by more pro-Allied Spanish
foreign minister. Turks agree to sell half their future chrome
production to Germany in exchange for arms.

October, 1942: British open third and final offensive from Egypt and
win victory at El Alamein. Allies send reassurances to Franco of
their mutual interest in Spain’s non-belligerency.

November, 1942: Allied landings at Casablanca, Oran, Algiers.
Stalingrad siege raised and Russians begin counteroffensive. Ger-
mans occupy Vichy France. Spain mobilizes but takes no hostile
action.

December, 1942: Swedes begin to tighten up credit and trade rela-
tions with Germany. Spain reaffirms Friendship Treaty with
Portugal; presses for arms from Germany.

January, 1943: Casablanca Conference and declaration of “uncondi-
tional surrender” objective. Japanese begin to be driven back in
New Guinea and the Solomons. Churchill meets İnönü at Adana,
and Turks agree to British aid in building up defenses.

February, 1943: Round-the-clock bombing of Germany begins on
large scale.

March, 1943: United States offers good offices to Finland to conclude
peace with Soviet Union. Finns get first formal German demand
for no separate peace.

May, 1943: Axis finished in North Africa and Italy’s power broken.

June, 1943: Air “Battle of the Ruhr.”

July, 1943: Swedes agree with Allies to limit most exports to Germany.

August, 1943: Start of decisive Soviet counteroffensive. First confer-
ence at Quebec. British get Portuguese permission to use airfield
in Azores. Americans, with Australians and New Zealanders,
start rollback of Japanese, beginning with eastern New Guinea
and the Solomons. Sweden cancels Germany’s transit privileges
to Norway.
September, 1943: Italy surrenders and Allies secure southern Italy; complete control of Mediterranean except for Aegean. Beginning of long struggle with Germans for remainder of Italy. Mussolini establishes short-lived "republic" in northern Italy.

October, 1943: Conference at Moscow. Russians at Dnieper. British occupy but soon lose islands in Aegean.

November, 1943: Conferences at Cairo and Teheran. British begin saturation bombing of Berlin and other cities. American offensive in Gilberts. Allies fail to get outright Turkish agreement to enter war. Allies renew pressure on Spain to stop wolfram exports to Germany after Allied pre-emption campaign loses force.

January, 1944: Russians mount offensive in north, smash German investment around Leningrad, and proceed westward into Estonia. Americans in central Pacific continue fight to secure atolls. Americans embargo oil to Spain.

February, 1944: Allies push to dominate in Burma. British military mission leaves Turkey, and Britain cuts off supplies.

March, 1944: Russians enter Poland. Germans occupy Hungary and overthrow its government. Finns reject Russian peace conditions.

April, 1944: First of American island leaps in southwest Pacific, Anglo-American appeals to neutrals to end trade with Germany. Turkey suspends chrome shipments to Germany and satellites after Allied threats of blockade.

May, 1944: Allies press Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Finland to withdraw from war. Allies and Spain come to agreement regarding oil, wolfram, and favors to Germany. Russians rebuff Turkish proposals for rapprochement.

June, 1944: Allies enter Rome. Allied landing in Normandy. Beginning of three-month bombardment of England by German V-1's. Russians drive through Ukraine; also mount offensive in Karelian Isthmus against Finns. Finns get aid from Hitler in return for president's promise of no separate peace. United States breaks off diplomatic relations with Finland. Allies get SKF agreement to gradually end ball-bearing exports from Sweden to Germany. Turkey agrees to cut off by degrees remaining critical exports to Germany.

July, 1944: Russians advance toward Warsaw. German army officers' abortive attempt on Hitler's life.

August, 1944: Paris liberated. Polish uprising against Germans fails, unaided by Russians. Rumania surrenders to Russia, declares war on Germany. Allies land on southern coast of France. Man-
nerheim becomes president of Finland; prepares for break with Germany. Turkey severs diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany.

September, 1944: Soviet Union declares war on Bulgaria, Bulgaria declares war on Germany, Russians enter unopposed. Finland signs armistice with Soviet Union. Swedes close all Baltic ports to Germany.

October, 1944: Belgrade entered by Russians and Tito partisans. Russians gain Baltic States, enter East Prussia. Germans withdraw from Greece. Battle of Leyte Gulf and beginning of long struggle for Philippines. First large bombing attack of Honshu by Americans. Finns, with Russians, begin to push Germans out of northern Finland; Germans cross into Norway. Germans begin systematic devastation of northern Finland. Swedes cut almost all remaining economic ties with Germany.

November, 1944: Russians advance west of Danube. Germans force evacuation of Norwegians from homes in northern Norway and destroy them.

December, 1944: Ardennes offensive; Battle of the Bulge. Spain grants landing rights to American commercial and military planes.


May, 1945: German forces surrender unconditionally on all fronts. Rangoon recovered from Japanese. Australians and Dutch secure strategic points in Borneo.

June, 1945: Russians demand Turkey share defense of Straits and give up territory on the eastern frontier.

July, 1945: Potsdam Conference.

August, 1945: Atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki; Japan surrenders.
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